

CURRENT HISTORY

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MAY, 1988

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September, 1988

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This issue details the way in which civil strife, political change and economic instability have dominated the recent history of several African nations. In addition, the latest developments in South Africa and in United States policy toward Africa are reviewed. As noted in our lead article, "... in 1987, it was demonstrated once again that seemingly decisive action in Congress is not always the last word in policy disputes. It appears that someone forgot to tell the Reagan administration that constructive engagement was dead."

United States Policy toward Africa

BY N. BRIAN WINCHESTER

Associate Director, African Studies Program, Indiana University

IN 1987, United States foreign policy toward Africa followed the predictable patterns that had been established over many years. The creation of the Africa Bureau within the Department of State in 1958 had signaled United States recognition of Africa as an area of emerging diplomatic importance. In the 30 years since, United States foreign policy toward Africa has demonstrated remarkable coherence and regularity despite the differences between Republican and Democratic administrations and the tenure of nine different assistant secretaries of state for African affairs. In the formation of United States policy it has become apparent, for example, that perception of Soviet-African policy has frequently overshadowed events in Africa itself and has even overshadowed United States domestic considerations. Indeed, United States policy toward Africa has never been entirely autonomous but has been largely secondary to Soviet-American relations.¹ Expressed another way, Africa has historically been a low priority of United States foreign policymakers, in part a victim of their preoccupation with preempting Soviet advantage.

As an aspect of foreign policy, Africa's modest share of total United States foreign assistance reaffirms the continent's low priority. The distribution pattern of assistance indicates that foreign aid serves political as well as strictly developmental objectives. Aside from emergency famine relief, the largest recipients of United States aid in Africa have been those countries that have best served United States political and strategic interests, whether in regard

to geopolitical strategy in the Indian Ocean, in ensuring continued access to strategic minerals, or in rewarding or punishing a country's particular voting record in international forums.

The United States involvement with the apartheid regime of South Africa has been of long duration. Every administration from that of Dwight D. Eisenhower to that of Ronald Reagan has pursued a policy of pragmatic disapproval, publicly abhorring South Africa's system of white supremacy but continuing to support South Africa in practice. Until recently, growing economic interdependence and military cooperation and the absence of effective anti-apartheid pressure groups in the United States assured South Africa of United States support despite South Africa's escalating white repression and its intransigent attitude toward legitimate black demands for equality and justice.

United States rhetoric and policy have been at odds from time to time in other areas as well. While the United States has favored stable, nonviolent, democratic regimes, it has not been reluctant to encourage instability and violence, especially if Soviet interests are compromised as a result. The United States has not hesitated to support and in some cases enter into long-standing relationships with autocratic, even despotic, regimes, whenever United States national interests have been seen to benefit.

THE YEAR IN REVIEW

Secretary of State George Shultz was the first United States secretary of state to visit sub-Saharan Africa in eight years. Ironically, his eight-day, six-nation tour in

¹For a discussion of the continuities in United States-African policy see Crawford Young, "U.S. Policy Toward Africa: Silver Anniversary Reflections," *The African Studies Review*, vol. 27, no. 3 (September, 1984).

January, 1987, was as significant for where he did not go as for the countries that were included on his itinerary. Conspicuous for its absence, for example, was a stop in southern Africa, the major focus of United States African policy in recent years. Secretary Shultz's Africa trip was originally scheduled for October, 1986, and was to have included southern Africa, but the trip was postponed because of its proximity to the Reagan-Gorbachev summit in Reykjavik, Iceland, that October. A secondary consideration for the postponement was President Reagan's veto of the Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act of 1986, which would have made a Shultz visit unwelcome, particularly to the front-line states. State Department analysts concluded that Congress's subsequent override of the President's veto would also have made a visit to Pretoria difficult. It is not surprising, therefore, that the secretary's rescheduled tour included only nations in West Africa and East Africa that are particularly friendly to the United States: Senegal, Cameroon, Kenya, Nigeria, the Ivory Coast and Liberia.

Shultz told the heads of state in those nations about the virtues of private enterprise and the shortcomings of state-run economies. The nations he visited are attracting significant amounts of United States private investment: \$300 million in Kenya, as much as \$1 billion in the Ivory Coast. He singled out President Félix Houphouët-Boigny of the Ivory Coast and President Abdou Diouf of Senegal for their leadership roles in the move toward more free enterprise and less central economic control. In countries more or less committed to the free-market system, this amounted to little more than preaching to the converted.

His prescription of more private enterprise and austerity measures as the stimuli for Africa's economic malaise could hardly have been expected to reassure even friendly nations; however, Shultz neglected to address the need for more manageable debt service, better terms of trade, and so on. Nor was Shultz's pledge of a few million dollars in additional United States aid any compensation in view of the fact that overall United States assistance to Africa had declined by almost 40 percent in the previous three years alone.

As the fifth largest supplier of crude oil to the United States and the African nation with the largest United States foreign investment, Nigeria's inclusion on Secretary of State Shultz's visit to West Africa was a foregone conclusion. Shultz discussed a range of issues with Nigeria's President, General Ibrahim Babangida, and Nigeria's External Affairs Minister, Bolaji Akinyemi, including the situations in South Africa and Chad. He reserved his strongest praise for Babangida's economic recovery program. While these stringent economic reform measures yielded positive results by the end of 1987, paradoxically, the cuts in government spending, reductions in imports, and devaluation of the naira con-

tributed to the continuing imbalance of trade between the United States and Nigeria in Nigeria's favor.

Described as a trip intended to give a pat on the back to those countries striving to achieve free-market economic reforms despite the political risks, Shultz's "pat on the back" for Liberia's President Samuel K. Doe had its own political risks.² His praise for the Doe regime's alleged progress toward democracy angered and dismayed Liberian critics as well as international human rights organizations. The current regime had come to power in 1985 as a result of widespread election fraud, and opponents of the government continue to be jailed. Ironically, the so-called free press Shultz alluded to is constrained by a military edict that prohibits criticism of the government. To add to Liberia's problems, in February, 1987, the United States General Accounting Office (GAO) announced that \$66.5 million in United States aid given to the Liberian government between 1980 and 1985 could not be accounted for. This led to the threatened suspension of all future aid.


In an attempt to win congressional support for such aid, in February, 1987, Liberia took the extraordinary step of inviting United States "operational experts" to take control of the government's finances beginning in 1988. Under a draft agreement signed by President Doe, 17 American experts were assigned to work with their Liberian counterparts to prepare a realistic national budget and were promised co-signing authority in the Ministries of Finance, Commerce, and Planning as well as in the Central Bank and in the National Oil Company. While some Liberians welcomed these extreme measures because they thought that the country's economy was out of control, others, not unexpectedly, criticized the move as a form of United States neocolonialism.

At various points during his trip, Secretary Shultz's much publicized concern about Soviet encroachment was obviously directed at a wider international audience. However, it was less compelling to West Africans than his warning against the more immediate threat of Libyan adventurism in the region. Indeed, on the eve of his African visit, Libyan jets bombed a village and a military base south of the unofficial dividing line between Libyan-occupied northern Chad and the Chadian government-controlled south.

It is not surprising that even as Shultz was discussing Libya's intervention in Chad with leaders in Cameroon, Nigeria and elsewhere, \$15 million of an eventual \$25 million in emergency United States military aid was being airlifted to N'Djamena, the capital of Chad, to be transhipped to Chadian troops fighting in the north. France, Chad's major arms supplier, spent twice as much as the United States in the first three months of 1987 alone, and combined French-American aid, along with tactical advice and military intelligence, was enough to shift the balance of power in Chad's favor. Nearly one-third of the 14,500 Libyan troops in Chad were killed or captured and \$500-million worth of Soviet-made air-

²*Christian Science Monitor*, January 9, 1987.

TROUBLE SPOTS IN SOUTHERN AFRICA



planes, ground-to-air missile batteries and other matériel were destroyed or captured in several major offensives between January and the end of March, 1987. Some of the captured Soviet weapons were apparently the latest models and it was rumored that they were sent to the United States for study by military experts.

Given increasing international involvement, what may have originally started as a local war over a disputed strip of desert border has become a far more complex struggle with wider ramifications. Whereas France has interests in maintaining good relations with both Libya and Chad, the United States makes little attempt to conceal its interest in destabilizing Libya's de facto leader Muammar Qaddafi in any way that it can. One United States official was candid about the advantages of Chadian surrogacy when he admitted:

When we spent two minutes over Tripoli, it was the super-power beating up on the third world Arab country. With Chad, it's been one third world Arab country driving out Libyan invaders who had tons of Soviet weapons.³

Even Chad's President Hissène Habré and Libya's Qaddafi now see more than disputed territory at stake; each has increasingly used the conflict as a way to generate support in the face of domestic disunity or criticism.

There was renewed fighting in August; Chad initially controlled the ground war but Libya once again demonstrated its superiority in the air. In October, the United States announced the sale of its advanced, heat-seeking, Stinger anti-aircraft missiles to Chad, "in response to the continued air threat from Libya," according to a Defense Department spokesman. The first official sale of Stingers to an African nation caused concern in the United States, because of the danger that the missiles could fall into the hands of Libya, and concern in France, which favored immediate international arbitration to resolve the dispute rather than risk escalating the conflict.

SOUTHERN AFRICA

The Reagan administration continued to send out mixed signals about southern Africa in 1987. This was a reflection of a policy in disarray and of continuing conflict between the President and Congress, between conservatives and liberals in Congress, and between the Department of State and the National Security Council and other agencies engaged in making foreign policy. The administration began to lose control of its South Africa policy in September, 1985, when the President was forced to impose executive sanctions against South Africa as the only way to preempt even stronger congressional action.

A year later, in October, 1986, Congress passed the Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act over the President's veto, a clear repudiation of administration policy; a few

³John Walcott, "Reagan Administration Wants Increase in Campaign Against Gadhafi," *Wall Street Journal*, April 10, 1987.

⁴Owen Bieber, "Clinging to Quiet Diplomacy," *Washington Post*, March 10, 1987.

months later, in February, 1987, the President's own Advisory Committee on South Africa issued a devastating report that judged the Reagan administration's policy of "constructive engagement" to have been a failure. Despite the advice of the President's own committee, and against the will of the Congress and overwhelming public opinion, the administration remained committed to friendly persuasion as the means to end apartheid. An article in the *Washington Post* in March, 1987, commented that "in South Africa Reagan has been so out of touch with reality that he's lost even his own party."⁴

The year 1988 began with the release of a State Department report, prepared at the request of congressional conservatives, which identified Communist influences in the African National Congress (ANC). Nonetheless, several weeks later, on January 28, Secretary of State George Shultz met with ANC leader Oliver Tambo. This was the first official meeting between the United States and the ANC; as a result it was an event of great symbolic significance. Ostensibly "to broaden American access to all parties in South Africa," the State Department sought to exploit divisions within the ANC and to encourage more moderate members to move away from Soviet influence. For its part, the ANC benefited from recognition by the United States as a legitimate actor in South African politics, no small consequence for a group that has been in exile for years.

Any suggestion that United States recognition of the ANC signaled a change in policy, however, was immediately dismissed in February with (1) the United States veto of a United Nations Security Council resolution calling for selective sanctions against South Africa and (2) the administration's reinterpretation of the Anti-Apartheid Act to allow imports of previously banned South African uranium as long as the uranium was intended for re-export. Both actions led South Africa to hope that it might yet look to Washington for support.

With little fanfare, the Reverend Leon Sullivan, a member of the board of directors of General Motors and architect of the business code of conduct for United States companies operating in South Africa, renounced his own "Sullivan Principles" in June and urged United States companies to withdraw from South Africa within nine months. While acknowledging that some progress had been made during the 10 years since the principles were first enunciated, he said that the main pillars of apartheid remained intact and that blacks were still denied their basic human rights. As a consequence, he called for a full trade embargo and a cut in diplomatic ties; both suggestions were subsequently rejected by the Reagan administration, which continues to insist that

(Continued on page 232)

N. Brian Winchester is the author of numerous articles and chapters on African politics. He is currently co-editing *Violence in Contemporary Africa* (Bloomington, Ind.: Indiana University Press, forthcoming).

"Never before has [Zimbabwe's] President Robert Mugabe enjoyed as much power and as much opportunity to shape Zimbabwe's future. It remains to be seen whether . . . he can move his deeply divided country toward greater freedom and equity for all."

Overcoming Zimbabwe's Vulnerabilities

By RICHARD W. HULL

Associate Professor of African History, New York University

ZIMBABWE may have reached a historic crossroads and entered a new, formative phase in its political evolution on December 31, 1987, when Robert Mugabe was inaugurated as the country's first Executive President.¹ The resolute, austere and incorruptible former Prime Minister now stood at the very peak of power, as head, simultaneously, of state, government and party. Into his hands was placed the formal and constitutional power to block legislation passed by Parliament. Only a two-thirds majority in both houses could overrule him.

Not since the days when Zimbabwe was Rhodesia and Ian Smith was Prime Minister has executive power been so concentrated. Yet paradoxically, never before has any regime in that politically convoluted country been so dangerously vulnerable to domestic and foreign destructive forces. In some respects, Mugabe's peak looked more like a precipice.

For the new President and his partisans, the inauguration was viewed as a great political triumph. Finally, the President was constitutionally vested with the authority to initiate sweeping administrative and economic reforms that could transform Zimbabwe into a socialist society firmly grounded in Marxist-Leninist principles. At last, there was hope that the revolution might be completed in their lifetime.

If Robert Mugabe has indeed consolidated the revolution, the great task ahead is to define its character and to forge a national consensus. Through a strategy of "blood and iron," this Bismarck of southern Africa has moved his inchoate country, so divided ethnically, ideologically and racially, one step closer to a de jure one-party unitary structure. To his adversaries, this was a Pyrrhic victory. The quixotic Mugabe had consolidated his personal dominance through intimidation, cooptation and manipulation of the constitutional process. To Marxist hardliners and the unemployed, the revolution had lost its way, betrayed by its own leaders.

Prime Minister Robert Mugabe did not become Executive President by popular mandate but through a vote of both houses of Parliament, sitting together as an electoral college. Indeed, presidential elections by popular

vote were deferred until the 1990's. Some would argue that Mugabe's sweeping victory could not have been achieved without a radical restructuring of Parliament, which since independence had contained an opposition that consistently blocked the regime's quest for constitutional reform. Only days before the inauguration, Mugabe and his ruling Zimbabwe African National Union-Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF) had reached a merger, or unity, agreement with Mugabe's archrival, Joshua Nkomo and the Zimbabwe African People's Union (ZAPU), Nkomo's party.

The merger was a great personal victory for Mugabe. Zimbabwe had become a de facto one-party state, and the path seemed clear for its ultimate constitutional legalization. ZAPU, the political vanguard of the Ndebele, who constitute approximately 20 percent of the nation, had been sent to the dustbin of history, its identity absorbed by ZANU-PF. Hoping to make the deal palatable to the Ndebele masses, key leaders in the former ZAPU were given seats in the Cabinet and in the ZANU-PF central committee and politburo. But significantly, the three bodies were enlarged substantially, to avoid an excessive dilution of the existing power equation. Nkomo, 70 years old and unwell, came away from the agreement as one of two party vice presidents and second secretaries.² In the minds of many Ndebele, all this constituted only half a loaf in that Nkomo had failed to secure the vice presidency of the country. That honor fell to Simon Muzenda, one of Mugabe's closest associates, who has served as the regime's Vice President since independence. Nkomo's disappointment was somewhat assuaged in early January when he received the third most senior position in a reshuffled Cabinet. In addition, an informal inner Cabinet was established and Nkomo was given one of its five seats.³

The absorption of ZAPU by ZANU-PF marked the culmination of several years of torturous bargaining that was punctuated by intermittent strife within and between the two parties and by harassment of ZAPU by government forces. On April 17, 1987, the anniversary of Zimbabwe's seventh year of independence, Mugabe unilaterally broke off unity talks, blaming ZAPU for escalating violence in the western provinces, the home of most of the Ndebele population. Indeed, between January and April, several white farmers, West German

¹*The New York Times*, January 1, 1988, p. A-16.

²*Wall Street Journal*, January 4, 1988, p. 1.

³*African Concord* (London), January 8, 1988, p. 19.

tourists and government officials had been killed in guerrilla attacks. Though no evidence directly linked ZAPU to the events, Mugabe used the violence as a pretext for suspending the talks and cracking down on the party's leadership. Pressure against a merger had also been building within his own party.

NEUTRALIZING THE OPPOSITION

Mugabe must have reasoned that before returning to the negotiating table he would have to neutralize merger opponents by consolidating his own power within ZANU-PF and by driving a mortal wedge into ZAPU. Thus, within a month, he dismissed a number of recalcitrant ZANU-PF members, including Edgar Tekere, a popular provincial party chairman. The first move against ZAPU came in June, when a government decree banned the party from holding rallies or meetings. Then, in July, the State of Emergency was renewed, giving the government extraconstitutional powers of arrest and detention. This was followed in September by a police raid on ZAPU offices in Matabeleland and the arrest of 12 officials who were accused of conspiring with antigovernment dissidents. It was not publicly mentioned that the officials were also leading opponents of a party merger.

Later that month, Home Minister Enos Nkala closed all ZAPU offices and dissolved six popularly elected district councils, dismissing 104 councillors for alleged collaboration with dissidents.⁴ With ZAPU nearly paralyzed and in disarray, in early October Mugabe returned to the negotiating table. As the talks resumed, Zimbabwe's President, Canaan Banana, signed into law the abolition of the 30 parliamentary seats that were reserved for Zimbabwe's whites, who number approximately 100,000 — less than one percent of the total population. This was an entirely constitutional procedure. The Lancaster House agreement, concluded with the British in 1979, had given the government the right to abolish racial representation in the House of Assembly and in the Senate seven years after independence was granted in April, 1980.⁵

Seeing the handwriting on the wall, many white legislators abandoned the all-white Conservative Alliance party or relinquished their positions as Independents and went into retirement or joined ZANU-PF. A few key white business leaders and farmers had already defected and were enjoying important positions in the government.

The white population has been politically and militarily impotent since independence. But economically, whites maintain a formidable presence. Although they constitute a tiny minority of the country's population of

nine million, they control possibly 80 percent of the country's wealth. White commercial farmers still produce more than one-third of Zimbabwe's export revenue; moreover, white-owned factories and mines provide an enormous number of jobs and earn precious foreign exchange. It did not take clairvoyance to recognize that a sudden exodus of whites might result in a collapse of the economy and render the regime even more vulnerable to political destabilization. One had only to gaze across the border to war-torn and impoverished Mozambique, which had lost nearly a quarter of a million Portuguese in less than six months in 1976. Thus, for a while, white capitalists in Zimbabwe must be accommodated.

The parliamentary elections of 1987, to fill the seats formerly reserved for whites, were designed to assure the regime of the majority necessary to push through constitutional amendments. Had the elections been thrown open to the general population on a one-man one-vote basis, the outcome might have resulted in the election of a number of candidates put forward by ZAPU and its Ndebele supporters, who make up about 20 percent of the total voters. It would also probably have been the end of any white representation. As it turned out, all 20 candidates nominated or supported by ZANU-PF won, including 11 whites.⁶ Seven of the whites had at one time served in the Ian Smith regime as members of the old all-white Rhodesia Front party. ZAPU candidates and more militant members of Mugabe's own ZANU-PF party criticized the elections for apparently catering to the Prime Minister's own African supporters and to white vested interests. In its own defense, the government rationalized that general elections would have been too costly at a time of deepening recession and might have triggered communal violence.

With an overwhelming parliamentary majority behind him, in November Mugabe pushed through a constitutional amendment abolishing the post of Prime Minister and establishing a strong executive presidential form of government. Mugabe was the only candidate to stand for the presidency; hence, he was catapulted into the position on December 31, 1987.

CONFRONTING REBELS AND SQUATTERS

As early as May, 1987, opposition from the Ndebele and within ZAPU to any form of merger had resumed its violent, clandestine course, after a lull of more than a year. Former members of the Zimbabwe People's Revolutionary Army (ZIPRA), the pre-independence guerrilla arm of ZAPU, made up the hard core of the resistance. Acting independently of Nkomo and ZAPU leadership, they had already established a loosely organized, nonideological movement called Super-ZAPU. Many of their cadres were based in Ndebele refugee camps just inside the border of northern Botswana, where more than 5,000 political refugees make their temporary homes.⁷

As in most guerrilla movements, the leadership of Super-ZAPU is elusive and rather shadowy. Members hold

⁴*Africa News* (Durham, N.C.), October 5, 1987, p. 4.

⁵*African Business* (London), December, 1987, p. 30.

⁶"Sticking Together," *The Economist* (London), December 5, 1987, p. 50.

⁷Richard W. Hull et al., "Zimbabwe Country Report," *Country Political Risk Reports* (New York: Frost and Sullivan, 1987).

no press conferences and they have not expressed a coherent ideology. Nor is there any certainty as to the size of the rebel movement, which is estimated to range from 200 to more than 1,000. However, rebel ties to Joshua Nkomo and the official ZAPU rank and file seem tenuous at best. Nkomo has distanced himself from the rebels and consistently condemns their violence.

By early 1987, there were strong indications that Super-ZAPU was receiving fresh support from South African military intelligence and Special Forces. The latter are led by veterans of the Selous Scouts, an old Rhodesian elite corps. Many of the diehard elements within Super-ZAPU oppose the dissolution of ZAPU and favor the secession of Matabeleland.

These antigovernment dissidents have taken advantage of the government's slow progress on land reform and have tried to build a popular following among the landless Ndebele peasantry. Embarrassingly, some regions in rural Zimbabwe now resemble the impoverished rural black homelands of apartheid South Africa. The authorities are painfully aware of this situation, and since Zimbabwe's independence, over 40,000 families have been resettled on land bought by the government.⁸ But less than one-fourth of the peasants who had expected to receive land have benefited. Financial constraints, brought on in part by the recession, have slowed resettlement schemes. In the eyes of the landless Ndebele, most of the beneficiaries are Shona supporters of ZANU-PF. Thousands of Ndebele are squatting on lands owned by white farmers, some of whom are absentee landlords living in Bulawayo, Harare, South Africa or abroad.

Land ownership remains highly concentrated, with an estimated nearly 35 percent of the land owned by less than 5,000 whites. Not surprisingly, the rural whites have become the symbol of the government's failure to advance a policy of land reform. They are easy scapegoats and are highly vulnerable to guerrilla attack. Missionaries make especially good targets because they are less likely to protect themselves with weapons. In May, 1987, several white farmers were shot to death while playing darts at a local club. Then, in November, 1987, 16 whites, mostly American Pentecostal missionaries, were massacred at a farm south of Bulawayo in Matabeleland.⁹ This atrocity occurred just three weeks after Mugabe had called on Parliament for stricter handling of squatters.

The squatter problem underlines the urgent need to create productive rural employment for the landless masses. The regime has come to realize that in the short and medium term the growth of the landless can be curbed, or even reversed, only by broadening the base of ownership through land reform. However, that can only be accomplished by massive confiscations of white-

owned land by the state or by government purchase on a willing-seller basis. The problem is greatly exacerbated by the government's lack of funds to purchase land at a rate fast enough to satisfy the people and by its unwillingness to risk alienating the white farmers and triggering their exodus before the peasant sector is productive enough to fill the vacuum. Ominously, an increasing number of the landless have become squatters and are a source of growing frustration and unrest. The situation is particularly explosive and desperate in Matabeleland, where the 1987 drought hit hardest.

The problem is fueled by an explosive population growth that in the long run may pose a threat to economic development and to food self-sufficiency. Zimbabwe must bring its population growth rate into line with its rate of economic growth. At more than 3.5 percent a year, the country suffers one of the highest population growth rates in the world. The burgeoning population threatens to overwhelm the ecosystem, educational and health services, and the employment-creating capacities of the economy. It also seriously threatens political stability.

Since independence, forceful and imaginative measures have been taken to deal with the crisis, and today the regime can boast of having one of the best family-planning programs in Africa and the highest recorded rate of use of contraceptives on the continent.¹⁰ It is widely recognized that in the future, land reform will have to be balanced by population stabilization and the development of food-production technologies that are less energy-intensive.

Government dissidents have also taken advantage of increasing tensions in the urban areas, exacerbated by a severe housing crisis and an annual urban growth rate exceeding six percent. The major urban centers are ringed by dismal shantytowns that bear a strong resemblance to the sprawling black townships of South Africa. The government has begun to deal with them by bulldozing the crude dwellings and using the army to remove the squatters forcibly and to relocate them on state farms. To many of Mugabe's opponents, such tactics are a mirror image of those employed in South Africa by the hated regime of President P.W. Botha.

Whites may have been a target of black urban rage in October, 1987, when a car bomb exploded outside a suburban Harare shopping center and wounded 18 people. The formerly all-white suburbs have become racially integrated but remain economically stratified. That reality has not been lost upon those forces anxious to topple the Mugabe regime.

Mugabe has taken steps to reduce his vulnerability to the rebel insurgency by organizing an antibandit police unit and beefing up the North Korean-trained Sixth Brigade. He has also reached an agreement with neighboring Botswana to improve border surveillance and to expel Zimbabwe dissidents living in Gaborone, Botswana's capital. In some respects this understanding is

⁸*African Business*, May, 1987, p. 43.

⁹*Christian Science Monitor*, November 30, 1987, pp. 12-13.

¹⁰Paul Harrison, *The Greening of Africa* (New York: Viking Penguin, 1987), p. 250.

remarkably similar to an agreement Botswana concluded with South Africa, since South Africa is also vulnerable to cross-border attack, in that case spearheaded by the African National Congress (ANC).

The Zimbabwean authorities have improved their anti-guerrilla counteroffensive in Matabeleland, and shortly after the missionary atrocities they managed to gun down Richard Gwesela, a former ZIPRA commander and an alleged rebel leader. But still at large was Morgan Nsingo, alias "Gayigusu," who reputedly heads the rebel forces.¹¹

BLEEDING IN THE EAST

Mugabe's regime has also come under increasing externally based attack from the guerrilla units of the Mozambique National Resistance, also known as Renamo. For 12 years, this movement has tried to overthrow the Marxist Frelimo regime in Mozambique. It also aims to eliminate Zimbabwe's access to the sea across Mozambican territory. South Africa does not want to reduce landlocked Zimbabwe's dependence on South African ports and thus covertly supports the Mozambican insurgents. The rise of Renamo attacks in Mozambique has paralleled the flood of Mozambican refugees into Zimbabwe. More than 80,000 are camped just inside Zimbabwe's southeastern border, making the frontier increasingly vulnerable to guerrilla attack. Indeed, in late June, 1987, Renamo launched several cross-border attacks, threatening to bring the destructive Mozambican civil war into Zimbabwe.¹² More than a dozen Zimbabwean villages and tea estates were assaulted by Renamo units in the last half of 1987. Ominously, the movement had begun to draw support from Zimbabwe's Ndauspeaking chiefs along the eastern border.

At a time when the economy is struggling to overcome its worst recession since independence, the Mugabe regime has been forced to direct an enormous proportion of its financial and human resources to its military presence in Mozambique. Over 12,000 members of the National Army (ZNA) are fighting Renamo and occupying key transportation routes that connect Zimbabwe with Mozambique's seaports. By far the most important of these is the 183-mile corridor between Mozambique's port of Beira and the Zimbabwean town of Mutare. A vital highway, railway, and oil pipeline runs through the Beira Corridor. Maintaining a security force is costing Zimbabwe more than half a million dollars a day.

Mugabe has put pressure on the front-line states to increase their fiscal and physical contributions to the defense of Mozambique. After much cajoling, in 1987 Malawi and Tanzania agreed to contribute some of their own troops to the effort. The Frelimo government of

President Joachim Chissano is also relying increasingly on the ZNA to protect vital installations in Mozambique's Manica and Tete provinces.

Zimbabwe and its neighbors are desperately seeking to reduce their dependence on South Africa by improving the security and infrastructure of the Nacala, Limpopo and Beira Corridors, which provide vital transportation links to Mozambique's seaports. Thus, a massive effort is under way to rehabilitate the corridors as well as the antiquated seaports. Finland has played a major role in the modernization of Beira. Much of the financing for the corridor has come from the Netherlands and the Nordic countries, especially Sweden and Norway. The work is now well under way; between 1986 and 1987 traffic along the Beira Corridor more than doubled. It is now handling nearly 30 percent of Zimbabwe's external trade.¹³ In October, 1987, the first phase of the Beira port rehabilitation was completed, with the opening of modern oil, coal and freight terminals. A new container terminal has also opened in Nacala, where the reconstruction effort has been far less ambitious. Beira, which is far more important to Zimbabwe's survival, should be fully containerized by 1990 and capable of handling more than three-fourths of Zimbabwe's trade.

The Beira Corridor, and indeed Zimbabwe itself, is extremely vulnerable to air attacks from South Africa. The South Africans recently completed an air base just south of Zimbabwe that will place the corridor as well as Zimbabwe's industrial heartland within short and easy range.¹⁴

The government is acutely aware of its military vulnerabilities. In 1987, the Cabinet was deeply divided over a proposal to purchase MiG-29 jet fighters from the Soviet Union; after high-level negotiations in Harare and Moscow, the plan was placed on the back burner. Zimbabwe has also had to backtrack on its commitment to enact comprehensive sanctions against South Africa. In January, 1987, the deadline passed for implementation of an embargo on South African imports and a ban on air travel between the two countries.

As the Zimbabwean economy slipped into recession, the date was moved ahead to July, when Mugabe announced that sanctions were imminent. But again he had to capitulate. Radicals within ZANU-PF were pressing hard for the move but gave in to the arguments of the finance minister and the private sector, especially the manufacturers who remain reliant on South African markets and contend that sanctions would have a catastrophic impact on the nation's weak economy.

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¹¹Interview with author in New York, N.Y., December 15, 1987.

¹²*Christian Science Monitor*, September 24, 1987, p. 7.

¹³*Africa Economic Digest* (London), January 14, 1988, p. 13.

¹⁴*The Sun* (Baltimore), October 19, 1987, p. 21.

"... the coming year is likely to bring very little change in Mozambique. There will probably be a continuation of the trend toward reform of the economy, and a continued economic decline because of the fighting."

Economic Reform and War in Mozambique

BY MARINA OTTAWAY

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DURING 1987, Mozambique continued to suffer from the war waged by the Mozambican National Resistance (Renamo), the opposition movement initially organized and supported by Rhodesia and South Africa. Fighting spread in the provinces, and the economic and human costs of the devastation increased steadily. At the same time, the Frelimo (Mozambique National Liberation Front) regime continued to implement far-reaching economic reforms, moving further from the socialist economic model it had chosen after independence.

Since 1985, the government has broken the largest state-owned farms into smaller units and has even returned some land to the private sector or to the peasants. Some prices have been decontrolled. The currency has been devalued drastically. The long-neglected private sector is now receiving some aid. Economic reform was badly needed to correct the glaring inefficiencies of earlier policies. But its effect is being nullified by the continuing war, and the economy has continued to decline.

New economic measures have brought in aid from the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the United States. Many West European countries, above all the Scandinavian countries and Italy, have increased their already substantial programs in Mozambique. Great Britain is providing military training, and France and Italy are also considering the possibility of providing assistance to the military. Never closed to the West, Mozambique has been turning increasingly to Western nations in recent years. The Soviet Union, which remains the main provider of military aid, has not objected to the change and is apparently relieved to lessen its responsibility for keeping afloat a nation facing increasingly difficult economic and military problems.

But war has also intensified. Renamo appears to be pursuing a devastating policy of destroying economic targets without concern for the long term impact of such actions for the country. As a result, Mozambique's economy has been on a downward slide for the last seven years: relief agencies now estimate that close to half the population needs at least some assistance.

In the midst of the turmoil, the Frelimo regime re-

mains politically unchanged. The party's cohesive leadership weathered the crisis of President Samora Machel's sudden death in October, 1986, with Foreign Minister Joaquim Albert Chissano, a member of the Politburo, becoming the apparently uncontested choice to succeed Machel. The membership of the Political Bureau and the Central Committee has remained the same and so, at least in theory, has Frelimo's commitment to Marxism-Leninism.

THE COLLAPSE OF THE ECONOMY

A major factor that has led Frelimo to embark on a path of economic reform has been the crisis engendered by war. Following a period of modest recovery after independence, the sharp decline of the Mozambican economy started in 1980. With the end of the Rhodesian war that year, Renamo was transferred from the tutelage of the Rhodesian intelligence services to that of South Africa; South Africa greatly increased its aid to Renamo and thus strengthened Renamo's fighting ability. The signing of the Nkomati Accord between Mozambique and South Africa in 1984 was a reflection of the effectiveness of Renamo as an instrument of destabilization. The accord was designed to end South African support for the Mozambican opposition, in exchange for a curb on the activities of the African National Congress (ANC) in Mozambique.

Nonetheless, the accord did not end South African support for Renamo. Pretoria has acknowledged that it continued to resupply Renamo until 1985, but claims that it has since stopped. In reality, South African support for Renamo is probably continuing, along with support from conservative groups in Portugal, West Europe and even the Middle East. But Renamo is less dependent on outside support than it was in the past, because it is able to resupply itself in part with weapons and ammunition that it captures from the Mozambican military.

The Mozambican economy suffered an early setback with the exodus of the Portuguese settlers at independence. However, until 1980, the economy was experiencing the beginning of a recovery process. Thereafter, it declined rapidly. The enormity of the collapse is best summed up by the fact that the target of the present economic recovery program is to raise the gross domestic product (GDP) to 64.6 percent of the 1980 level by 1990.¹

¹Mozambique Update, no. 10, January 7, 1988, p. 5. *Mozambique Update* is published by the Mozambican embassy in Washington, D.C.

Another measure of the economic problems caused by the war is the famine spreading through the central part of the country, particularly in Manica and Sofala provinces. Increasingly, Mozambique is being compared to Ethiopia. The tragically familiar pictures of emaciated adults and skeleton-like children now come from Mozambique as well as Ethiopia. War has disrupted cultivation in the agricultural sector, and has made it more difficult to provide food for the cities. There are at least 750,000 Mozambican refugees in Malawi, Zimbabwe, Zambia, South Africa, Swaziland and Tanzania.² Inside Mozambique, more than 3 million have been forced to abandon their villages; they live precariously as refugees and are still threatened by Renamo.³

Even the settled population is suffering because Renamo guerrillas destroy crops or steal them when they have ripened. Foreign relief organizations estimate that a total of 3.2 million people are now totally dependent on food aid, while about the same number require some assistance.⁴ These estimates do not include people living in areas controlled by Renamo, about whom no information is available. Altogether, at least 6.5 million people are threatened by famine in a country of 14 million. While drought has compounded the problem in some parts of the country, relief officials consider famine to be largely the consequence of war.

The Mozambican government has asked for and received substantial emergency aid from international sources. The United States government alone provided \$75 million in food aid in 1987.⁵ But relief agencies warn that food supplies are inadequate. Some 35,000 tons of food are needed monthly, but only 7,000 tons are being received.⁶ Furthermore, food distribution has been hampered by the lack of security on the roads. Renamo guerrillas regularly attack food convoys, and the Mozambican army appears unable to offer adequate protection. Even main roads are not safe more than 30 miles north of Maputo, Mozambique's capital. Relief agencies are being forced to organize expensive airlifts or to use roundabout routes to various areas through neighboring countries.

The government is not making any progress in halting Renamo, because of the weakness of the military and because of Renamo's tactics. The Mozambican armed forces, known as the FAM, have been beset by many problems. Originally trained by the Soviet Union for conventional warfare—training justified by Mozambican fears of Rhodesian and, later, South African attacks—the FAM has been fighting a counterinsurgency

war since 1980. Some retraining has taken place, but the military's problems are compounded by the low literacy rate and the lack of technical preparation of the majority of recruits; these inadequacies reflect conditions in Mozambique. Furthermore, discipline is poor and morale is low, as the government has acknowledged repeatedly.

The Soviet Union remains Mozambique's main arms supplier, but Mozambique is now receiving military aid from other sources as well. Zimbabwean and Tanzanian troops are participating in the fighting, and Great Britain is providing some training. Zimbabwe in particular is heavily involved in Mozambique, with about 12,000 troops deployed along the corridor that links the port of Beira to the town of Mutare on the border of Zimbabwe. The railroad, the oil pipeline and the road of the Beira corridor are of great economic and political importance to Zimbabwe. They represent the shortest and cheapest road to the sea and the only economically viable route that does not run through South Africa—the Tanzanian port of Dar es Salaam is too far to be a practical alternative. Zimbabwe's intervention in support of Frelimo also protects Zimbabwean interests. Tanzanian troops, which number only 2,000, play a far less crucial role.

Great Britain has provided some training for the Mozambican army, mostly in Zimbabwe, and small numbers of officers have been sent to Great Britain. It is not clear that this training has substantially improved the fighting ability of the FAM. At any rate, the aid is important to Mozambique politically, lessening its dependence on the Soviet Union. Currently, Mozambique is also negotiating programs with Italy and France. The Soviet Union continues to play the central role in helping the Mozambican military, but its monopoly is being slowly eroded.

The FAM has serious internal problems of discipline, supplies and morale; but the tactics followed by Renamo would make it very difficult for any army to fight a winning war. Renamo is not trying to seize and hold territory, except in very limited areas. Nor does it appear to be fighting for the hearts and minds of Mozambicans. Rather, it concentrates on disruption. It attacks economic targets large and small—from the electrical lines from the Cahora Bassa Dam to peasant crops. It destroys schools and health posts. It enters villages, kills some people, kidnaps others, burns huts and then vanishes, apparently unconcerned that its tactics may antagonize rather than win support from the population. As a result, this is a particularly difficult war to fight, and the FAM is clearly not winning.

ECONOMIC REFORM

In Mozambique, the economic downslide started when South Africa took over the sponsorship of Renamo. But there were also serious flaws in Frelimo's economic policies. The recent reforms aim to correct some of these flaws. Unfortunately, they cannot affect Mozambique's main economic problem, the war. There are

²Estimate provided by Thomas Brennan of the United States Committee for Refugees.

³Estimates of the number of displaced people vary from 1.5 million to 3.5 million. The higher figure is considered more accurate by many relief agencies.

⁴William Claiborne, "War Pushes Mozambique Toward Famine, Collapse," *The Washington Post*, January 24, 1988.

⁵Ibid.

⁶Ibid.

thus reasons for deep skepticism about the possibility of Mozambique's economic recovery in the foreseeable future.

Until the early 1980's, Frelimo's economic policies were lopsided. The government concentrated on state-owned and neglected peasant farms, the private commercial sector, and even the cooperative sector. Periodically, Frelimo went through a bout of self-criticism, admitting that this exclusive concern with state-owned farms was mistaken, but it invariably failed to change its policies. As late as 1981, the National Assembly adopted a ten year plan that called for the development of more state farms and more giant "agro-industrial" complexes, despite the fact that the existing farms were recognized as a drain on the economy.

The plan could not be implemented, and no attempt was made to do so. With no money of its own to invest and a singular lack of enthusiasm for investing in giant projects on the part of foreign donors (apparently including the Soviet Union), Frelimo adopted a series of recovery programs; none of these programs proved effective, largely because of the worsening war situation.

The 1983 party congress saw a debate between the economic hardliners, who insisted that the so-called large project approach was correct, and those who argued that it was time to pay more attention to the peasant sector. This discussion had taken place several times earlier, but the economic downside gave more weight to the argument of the reformists.

The real turning point, however, came after the signing of the 1984 Nkomati Accord and the Mozambican decision to seek more aid from Western economic institutions. The United States Agency for International Development (USAID) provided a development aid package of about \$10 million in 1984—until that time only emergency food aid had been provided. The decision to provide aid, supported by the United States State Department as part of its "constructive engagement" approach to southern Africa, was nevertheless controversial, since it meant that the United States would provide assistance to a Marxist-Leninist regime rather than to "freedom fighters" trying to overthrow it. As a compromise, the decision was made to channel all United States aid to private commercial farmers. Desperately in need of aid, Frelimo agreed.

The signing of the Nkomati Accord also opened the way for negotiations with the IMF and the World Bank, which Mozambique joined in 1984. This was in itself a departure; previously Frelimo had tried to be admitted into the Soviet-led Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA) instead. Joining the World Bank and the IMF in the mid-1980's indicated more than a symbolic turning to the West. It also meant opening Mozambique to pressure for major policy revisions, decreasing state control of the economy and allowing the market to play a

larger role. At least some of the Frelimo leaders already had doubts about Mozambique's initial economic choices and were seeking change. The subsequent impact of the World Bank and the IMF was significant. It is not an accident that all the economic reforms undertaken by Frelimo took place after 1984.

One set of reforms aimed at reducing the size of the public sector and improving its efficiency. As pointed out earlier, Frelimo had developed some large agro-industrial complexes that had proved unmanageable. These complexes were broken down, mostly into smaller, and perhaps more efficient, state-owned farms. Land was also distributed to the peasants and to the commercial farmers. In the industrial sector, some 30 enterprises were returned to private hands.

Of potentially more importance were the steps undertaken to revive the market. Under the original regime of administered prices and government control over agricultural marketing, Frelimo had encountered considerable difficulty in providing food for the cities. Even the supply of essential staples like cereal, sugar and cooking oil was scarce and undependable. Fresh fruit, vegetables and meat were even scarcer. Production difficulties, low producer prices, unsafe roads and lack of transport facilities all played a part in creating these shortages. The reforms introduced after 1985 dealt with pricing and marketing problems, which were the most tractable. A series of measures introduced over the last two years have deregulated the price of most fruits, vegetables and meats, and have greatly increased the producer prices of staples.

The impact of the reforms, not surprisingly, has been limited to those areas close to Maputo and safe from Renamo attacks. The Maputo greenbelt is a success story. The increase in prices and the liberalization of the market have encouraged private farmers to increase production and have led to the formation of a large number of small cooperatives. The Maputo market is reportedly better supplied than it was formerly, although prices are high. Consumer prices have increased by about 29 percent a year since 1984.⁷

In most of the country, however, the reforms have made no difference, and they cannot make any difference as long as the war continues, because produce cannot be brought to market safely. After three years of economic reform, the economy's downward slide has not been reversed, and the number of people dependent on international food aid continues to increase.

The currency has been repeatedly devalued, with the dollar's exchange rate going from 40 meticaïs in early 1987 to 450 meticaïs after the most recent devaluation in January, 1988.⁸ It is highly unlikely that this measure can cure the country's growing balance of payments and debt problem, however. For sources of foreign currency, Mozambique has always been dependent on remittances from miners in South Africa, as well as on the railroad and port fees paid by neighboring countries using Mo-

⁷*Mozambique Update*, no. 10, January 7, 1988, p. 3.

⁸*Ibid.*, p. 15.

zambican facilities. Exports have never been the key factor in the Mozambican balance of payments. But the number of Mozambican miners in South Africa and South Africa's use of the port of Maputo depend on political decisions, not on the value of the metal.

Furthermore, the war has reduced rail traffic drastically. Only the line from South Africa to Maputo and the Beira line to Zimbabwe are now open. Security has improved on the Beira line, thanks to the presence of troops from Zimbabwe, and work continues on the rehabilitation of that line and of the port of Beira. The amount of cargo transported on the Beira line has doubled in the last two years, but it is still far below pre-independence levels. There are plans to reopen the line from the northern port of Nacala to Malawi, but this requires improved security as well as much rebuilding of the heavily damaged rail bed, and it is at best a long-term plan. The possibility of restoring the Limpopo line from Maputo to Zimbabwe is not even being discussed seriously.

The devaluation of the currency is not going to have any impact on transportation problems, and it is thus unlikely to bring a considerable improvement in the balance of payments and debts problem. By the end of 1986, Mozambican debts amounted to \$3.2 billion. A small figure in absolute terms, the debt represented 163 percent of Mozambique's GDP, making Mozambique's debt proportionately one of the largest in the world.⁹

FOREIGN RELATIONS

The combination of war-induced disaster and economic reform has helped Mozambique broaden its foreign relations and attract more foreign assistance in the last few years.

Since independence, Mozambique has received aid from the Soviet bloc and from Western countries. The Soviet Union and the East European bloc have provided civilian and military advisers, training and equipment for the military and some economic aid. The Cubans have provided many *cooperantes* but no troops. Western donors, skeptical about Frelimo's emphasis on state farms, approved Frelimo's attempt to improve services in rural areas—a policy that fitted well with the concern for basic human needs that dominated the development agencies at the time. The Scandinavian countries and Italy, in particular, became major donors.

The reasons for the increased foreign interest in Mozambique in the last few years are complex. First, there is an obvious need in a country that ranks among the world's poorest on every possible indicator. Second, the deteriorating food situation has created the type of emer-

gency to which Western nations have responded well in recent years. Third, Mozambique can be perceived as a victim of the turmoil generated by the fight against apartheid in South Africa. Renamo was supported openly by South Africa from 1980 to 1984, and supported covertly until 1985 and probably to this day. Aid to Mozambique can thus be seen as an expression of opposition to apartheid, without the economic and political costs that might derive, for example, from an embargo on trade with South Africa.

Finally, some countries have special reasons for supporting Mozambique. Great Britain is one example. While the government of Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher is not favorably inclined toward radical regimes, the British are providing military aid to Mozambique as an extension of their policy toward Zimbabwe. Great Britain has a commitment to the success of Zimbabwe, having helped to broker a transition to majority rule that safeguarded the interests of the formerly colonial white residents and prevented an exodus. Zimbabwe needs an open Beira corridor for both economic and political reasons, and the British hope that their military aid will help keep the corridor open.

Mozambique is increasingly dependent on international donors. According to IMF estimates, foreign assistance covered 26 percent of government expenditures in 1985 and 30 percent in 1986. The World Bank provided a \$40-million credit for rehabilitation in June, 1985, and an additional \$20-million credit in May, 1987, for energy rehabilitation. A new agreement reached in August, 1987, involves a \$100-million aid package, including a \$68.9-million soft loan from the International Development Association (IDA), a branch of the World Bank, \$18 million from a special African facility, and a special joint financing program with Switzerland for about \$13 million.¹⁰ The IMF negotiated its first agreement with Mozambique in May, 1987, which involved a loan of \$36 million.

Bilateral aid is also substantial. From the beginning, the Nordic countries have been among the principal aid donors. Sweden provided \$216 million between 1978 and 1983. In the same period, the Netherlands, Italy and Norway gave between \$75 million and \$100 million each.¹¹ The total of official bilateral development assistance has increased steadily, from \$146 million in 1979 to \$300 million in 1985.¹² Development assistance from the United States averaged about \$10 million a year from 1984 on, but food aid is increasing, and reached \$75 million in 1987. Soviet and East European economic aid

(Continued on page 223)

⁹Ibid., p. 4.

¹⁰World Bank figures.

¹¹United States Agency for International Development, *Congressional Presentation Fiscal Year 1987* (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office), p. 304.

¹²World Bank, *World Development Report 1987* (Washington, D.C.: The World Bank, 1987), p. 244. Some sources give slightly higher figures.

Marina Ottaway's publications include *Afrocommunism* (New York: Africana, 1986), coauthored with David Ottaway; and "State Power Consolidation in Mozambique," coauthored with Herbert Howe, in Edmond J. Keller and Donald Rothchild, eds., *Afro-Marxist Regimes* (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1987).

"The appearance of stabilization in South Africa may well mask the realities of political ferment and frustration. . . . The two great nationalisms of South Africa, white and black, are growing stronger as the government tries to project an atmosphere of calm."

South Africa: The Combatants Regroup

BY KENNETH W. GRUNDY

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IF 1986 was a year of protest, resistance, repression and limited reform in South African politics, 1987 was a year of consolidation, delay and retreat. The collision between black and white nationalisms has not been resolved. Struggle in the townships and the conflict over land continues unabated. But the drama of civil strife has shifted to industrial sites; when fighting flares in the townships and the countryside, it often involves black forces contesting for ascendance at the local level. The National party (NP) government seems satisfied to allow—indeed to encourage—such bloodletting. In 1987, the NP was concerned with consolidating its hold on the Afrikaner “volk” and the larger white electorate.

The white polity, for its part, was preoccupied with a parliamentary election. The debate and the jockeying for position among white parties, with their record of promises, accusations and frustrations, set the framework for black resistance and dissent. Because of a serious electoral threat from its right, the ruling NP seemed to lose its nerve. Its vague promises of reform, themselves inadequate in the early 1980's, became even more ambiguous. The government does not know where it is heading, and its bankrupt policies are laid bare when it faces uncompromising white supremacists and the challenge of black demands for power.

An uneasy order has been imposed on South Africa, but most observers feel that it is transitional and inherently artificial. In South Africa, there is order without justice, control without cooperation, and a temporary respite in the struggle for dignity and survival.

THE STRATEGY DEBATE

Despite the apparent and uneasy order that has been forced on the black population, there is a great deal of ferment and contention in government circles over the best strategy for containing dissent and maintaining the current regime. Although it is widely appreciated that the government must negotiate with its black opponents at some point, there is deep disagreement about how to bring about negotiations, and about the issues, the parties and the timing of such talks. In the rapidly changing power relationships among the government and the whites, on the one hand, and among black factions and movements, on the other, it is a complex task for either

side to agree on a strategy that provides continuity and any reliable prospect for success, especially since the diverse parties regard “success” in radically different terms.

There has apparently been a shift in state strategy. The government seems to have abandoned its earlier support for limited tolerance of radical but peaceful dissent in the political arena if not in labor politics. Advocates of repression have gained the upper hand, and the legal space for the open mobilization of resistance has been narrowed. With considerable means of coercion held in reserve, the state has been able of late to marshal more than enough resources to contain the forces of popular resistance.

The order that prevails is not a stalemate. The security apparatus can still destroy organized political dissent. Nonetheless, such a total clampdown would be costly and would not eliminate the psychological basis for political radicalism. Indeed, iron-fisted policies are more likely to contribute to even greater black determination and resilience. The 1980's are not the 1960's, when a muffling of dissent and the arrest of a few leaders immobilized and discouraged the opposition.

The resistance has tasted small victories. The popular movement that mushroomed through the townships and even flared up on occasion in rural areas from 1983 onward can actually boast a few successes—organizationally and practically. Resistance survival is no mean accomplishment. Elements of the resistance have forced the white leadership in the government and industry to recognize, to bargain with and to compromise with them. At the local level, even opponents of the regime realized the exhilaration of power, albeit in narrow realms for very short periods. They gained small victories and the knowledge that they cannot be denied forever. Although momentum has been lost over the past ten months, the resistance's accomplishments serve as a reminder and an incentive. Mass-based black political organizations have deep roots. They may be uncoordinated, but they have a base that cannot be destroyed by force alone. They will return to center stage.

For this reason, the South African government pursues a dual strategy of repression and reform that has been described as a “Brazilian option”—modulated re-

form from above coupled with an uncompromising and violent maintenance of law and order.¹ But within very broad parameters there is tremendous vacillation, indecision and dispute on matters of policy and implementation. Important sectors of the NP are prepared to talk with the United Democratic Front (UDF); a nonracial coalition of over 600 citizen groups on the political left of the resistance. Feelers have been offered to the banned African National Congress (ANC) to consider "talks" with the NP.

Some leaders recognize that the government lacks legitimacy and must consider a new constitutional arrangement that includes parliamentary representation for the black majority in a united, centralized state. Many of these conciliatory ideas were implied in the NP's electoral campaign. But most of the party's leaders do not accept them all.

Security specialists around South Africa's President, P.W. Botha, especially those in the military, prefer to take a hard line toward extra-parliamentary opposition and toward externally based opponents. Press restrictions have been tightened; mass detentions continue (an estimated 30,000 have been detained since the June 12, 1986, emergency and 2,000 are still incarcerated);² extra-legal and illegal forces, especially vigilantes, have been organized and deployed to attack radicals (e.g., in the Crossroads squatter settlement); the most militant and symbolic strongholds of radical opposition have been removed by force; military occupation of the townships continues; and the National Security Management System (NSMS) has been expanded.

Throughout South Africa at national, regional and local levels, layers of committees have been established that are dominated by the armed forces and serve as an alternative state apparatus. This network of committees ostensibly represents diverse community interests. Yet with its quasimilitary structure, it is able to preempt, coordinate and rationalize the state's response to various emerging crises. As counterrevolutionary organs, the components of the NSMS initiate reform, impose presumed solutions and effectively eliminate channels for negotiations and compromise with authentic voices of black opposition. Reform is regarded as necessary, but always from above, on the initiative of the regime, and by no means as a matter of compromise or concession. Negotiations, when they take place, are introduced only from a position of state strength.

As for the reformist component of the dual strategy,

little progress has been made. For the government, the goal of reform is to defuse popular revolutionary fervor. Therefore, the least reform instituted to secure that end, the better. By upgrading local services and facilities and by reforming the structure of local government, the NP seeks to legitimize the South African state. But inadequate funds are appropriated to bring about serious improvements. Virtually all those who are prepared to cooperate with the government in administering policy and in "representing" the black community in discredited government agencies are rejected by the very people they purport to represent.

As a result, there is little progress in advancing President Botha's scheme for a national council, regional service councils or local representative bodies. The government's policy requires the cooptation of black leaders and this has not advanced very far. So long as the majority cannot exercise real power in central government, they will regard the fringe "reforms" as little more than palliatives and distractions from the real political arena.

A plea for law and order without reform is an expensive sham. Reform without the distribution of political rights and power is hollow. This is the argument of the reformist faction, including Minister of Education and Development Aid Gerrit Viljoen, Minister of Constitutional Development and Planning J.C. Heunis and Deputy Minister of Education S.J. de Beer. A case might have been made that reformers in the Cabinet had the upper hand early on. About the middle of 1986, however, the hardliners, like Minister of Defense General Magnus Malan and Minister of Law and Order Adriaan Vlok, asserted themselves because reform had little to show.³ As political scientist Willie Breytenbach says, the "securocrats" now make policy. In the process they have neglected the reform side of the dual strategy. Breytenbach notes that "where once there could be no security without reform, now there can be no reform without security."⁴

The government's first priority is to reestablish control ("law and order"). Then comes South Africa's economic recovery, and only then can resources be diverted to upgrade living conditions for the black masses and to experiment with the constitutional alternatives needed to stabilize and legitimize the regime. This is a far cry from the reformist breakthroughs suggested in the 1987 electoral campaign.

The new reforms have been halting and grudging. ANC stalwart Govan Mbeki, aged 77, was released from jail in early November, 1987. He was not required formally to renounce violence or the "armed struggle." Many analysts saw his release as a test for a phased program of political prisoner releases that would culminate in the freeing of Nelson Mandela, the ANC figurehead leader. Initially, Mbeki was allowed to move about and to speak freely. But his popularity and his continued pro-ANC position led quickly to a clampdown on his activities. Police banned a planned Mbeki rally in Port

¹Mark Swilling, "Playing Rio Roulette," *Weekly Mail* (Johannesburg), vol. 3, no. 11 (March 20–March 26, 1987), p. 11.

²*Weekly Mail*, vol. 3, no. 51 (December 24, 1987–January 14, 1988), p. 4; and vol. 4, no. 1 (January 15–January 21, 1988), p. 4.

³"South Africa: The Government in the Shadows," *Africa Confidential* (London), vol. 28, no. 14 (July 8, 1987), pp. 1–4.

⁴As quoted in Mark Swilling, "The Politics of Negotiation," *Work in Progress* (Johannesburg), nos. 50/51 (October/November, 1987), p. 19.

Elizabeth after magisterial permission to hold it had been granted. Police also persuaded a Cape Town magistrate to reject a request to hold a rally there and, finally, they served orders on Mbeki restricting him to Port Elizabeth and forbidding him to talk to the media. The dry run for a Mandela release had proved to be explosive. The ANC had gained in support and stature. The right-wing whites stand ready to exploit the government's error in judgment. In the words of one analyst, the government has "lost its nerve."⁵

THE ELECTION

Almost from the time that it announced the general election and scheduled it for May 6, 1987, the NP government behaved as if it feared a conservative backlash against its mildly reformist platform.⁶ The results of the election bear out that concern.⁷ Although the NP won 123 seats, the Conservative party proved a serious voting force. It won 22 seats (all in Transvaal) and displaced its right-wing rival, the Herstigte Nasionale party (HNP), as the voice of white supremacy. The CP took over as the official parliamentary opposition, in place of the left-of-center Progressive Federal party. With 26 percent of the vote, the CP won as many Afrikaner votes as the NP, which garnered 52 percent of the total white vote.

Including the HNP votes, fully 81.6 percent of the white electorate supported some form of apartheid. Against this backdrop, the government quickly realized that the CP stands ready to exploit any move toward reform or to oppose the concession of political rights to militant or even moderate blacks. Even more vocal voices on the right, especially the Afrikaner Weerstandsbeweging (AWB), are poised to push the CP into the fray or to take violent action on their own. With a fearful vision of its constituency, the NP decided to slow the pace of change as much as possible.

Botha reaffirmed his government's commitment to the Group Areas Act, which is the legal basis for residential segregation. The Population Registration Act, without which apartheid would be nonexistent, is inviolate. The National Council, long in the planning stage, failed to at-

tract even moderate black support. Some critics say Mbeki's release was intended to persuade the Zulu leader, Mangosuthu Buthelezi, to serve on the National Council. That plan did not succeed. If the council is ever established, black participants will have little black following, and their deliberations for a new constitution will be stillborn. In short, no serious progress has been made in defusing racial tensions or in accommodating black grievances or interests. The reformist impulse seems to be directionless and exhausted, while the conservative forces for rigidity and coercion are on the rise.

THE BLACK POLITY

Despite these hostile tendencies, the black resistance survives and periodically shows signs of energy. The nationwide state of emergency (in force since June, 1986) enables the government to decimate the resistance. Nonetheless, the struggle goes on.⁸

The trade union movement is especially active and politically assertive; its activity is reflected in the levels of strikes and work stoppages.⁹ According to estimates, more than 5.5 million working days were lost through strikes during the first eight months of 1987, compared to around 1.3 million for all of 1986.¹⁰ A successful strike of railway workers lasted 12 weeks.¹¹ The largest strike to hit the public sector, it involved some 16,000–20,000 union members and demonstrated the potential for politicizing labor's grievances. Major strikes by postal workers, retail workers, sugar and tea workers and workers at the government's Sasol (oil) plant stirred the pot.

But by far the largest strike in the country's history involved the National Union of Mineworkers (NUM).¹² In August, 1987, between 240,000 and 340,000 workers went on strike. After three weeks, NUM ended the strike without gaining its principal wage demands. A policy of mass dismissals and security force and striker violence achieved little tangible gain for either side. Yet the trade union movement demonstrated its potential power and disruptive muscle as well as its discipline.

The trade union movement, led chiefly by COSATU (Congress of South African Trade Unions), is growing in size and organizational cohesion. COSATU seeks to consolidate union activity and to make sure that there is only one union in each industry. A dozen large nationwide unions have been formed from 33 smaller organizations. These affiliates now have a combined membership of nearly 800,000. There are smaller rivals of COSATU. The United Workers Union of South Africa supported by Inkatha (one of two black factions fighting in Natal Province) claims 100,000 members, but it has not participated in a single labor-management dispute or recognition agreement. The black consciousness-oriented unions affiliated with the 300,000-member National Council of Trade Unions have been involved in some strikes against mines, and chemical and pharmaceutical industries.

⁵Patrick Laurence, "Year of the Lost Nerve," *Weekly Mail*, vol. 3, no. 51 (December 24, 1987–January 14, 1988), p. 5.

⁶For a preelection analysis, see Heribert Adam, "The Ultra-Right in South Africa," *Optima* (Johannesburg), vol. 35, no. 1 (March, 1987), pp. 36–43.

⁷"Requiem for the Left," *Financial Mail* (Johannesburg), vol. 104, no. 7 (May 15, 1987), pp. 37–41.

⁸See Tom Lodge, "State Power and the Politics of Resistance," *Work in Progress*, nos. 50/51 (October/November, 1987), pp. 3–6.

⁹Ernest Sideris, "The Arena of Strife Moves from Township Streets to Factory Floor," *Weekly Mail*, vol. 3, no. 51 (December 24, 1987–January 14, 1988), p. 7.

¹⁰*Weekly Mail*, vol. 3, no. 50 (October 9–15, 1987), p. 4.

¹¹Hareem Singh, "Public Sector Workers Strike Back," *Work in Progress*, no. 48 (July, 1987), pp. 38–39.

¹²"Disciplined Mine Strike a Test of Strength," *Work in Progress*, no. 49 (September, 1987), pp. 34–37.

COSATU politicizes trade union activity. It has adopted the "Freedom Charter" as a "guiding document that reflects the views and aspirations of the majority of the oppressed and exploited in [their] struggle against national oppression and economic exploitation."¹³ COSATU seeks a more structured alliance with UDF and other political and community organizations. It calls for comprehensive and mandatory sanctions against South Africa and it identifies with the aspirations of the ANC.

As government chokes the community-based organizations, organized labor is taking on the mantle of mass political protest and resistance. Industrial action is replacing township struggle. The UDF and its affiliates, including the newly organized South African Youth Congress (SAYCO), have called for working-class leadership of the liberation struggle. That has proved to be an effective substitute during times of intensive state suppression of protest. In response, the government has introduced the Labour Relations Amendment Bill to counteract the gains that unions have made in the past ten years.

RENEWED REPRESSION

The low-key political activity in the townships is a response to the government's repressive style. Areas once known for their street committees and people's courts have suffered waves of detention, police and Defense Force violence, and government-instigated vigilante action. The government seems determined to break the resistance. Boycotts and rent strikes continue, but the shrill tones of earlier campaigns have been modulated. The three-year school boycott was ended by National Educational Crisis Committee initiatives. The militant youth squads, some calling themselves "comrades" and others that are merely lawless gangs, have been reined in by adult leaders. Nonetheless, youth still plays a central role in the struggle, and democratic organizational modes prevail. The UDF is increasingly being forced underground, despite of and because of its immense popularity. Its substructure of component local organizations is fragmented and in places demoralized.

It is difficult to ensure that underground politics remains democratic; that is a challenge that must be continually addressed. A number of affiliated organizations have been formed or have held major meetings and congresses in secret. The result is a more patient, sober and realistic approach to the struggle. A great deal of organizational work is needed to overcome the government's efforts to divide the black community and to exploit already existing cleavages. As the government shifts from an order based largely on coercion to an order

where ideology, cooptation and limited incorporation play larger roles, the challenge to opposition leaders heightens.

Nowhere is this challenge more apparent than in the "war" in the townships outside Pietermaritzburg in Natal Province. Over 270 people were killed in the last few months of 1987 and at least 50 more were killed in January, 1988. The violence began in earnest in September, after the Inkatha Youth Brigade launched a recruitment drive. However, the bad blood goes back to the murder of pro-UDF students at the University of Zululand in October, 1983. Inkatha is not prepared to allow a rival political organization to challenge it in its own Natal backyard. The battle for control of the streets is an intra-Zulu affair between adherents of the UDF and followers of Inkatha, and their trade union allies, COSATU and UWUSA, respectively.

The Zulu dimension makes the present violence even more intractable. Tribal feuds and factional fights are notoriously vicious and protracted. They fester for years, far beyond the original unrest. An ideological division about how to deal with apartheid compounds the problems. Efforts to negotiate a cease-fire or a settlement have had little success.

There is no single cause for the fighting. Some observers see it as an extension of the long-smoldering faction fights among the Zulus, with new labels. Others stress the overall frustrations and insecurities of township life. Still others put it in the context of the conflict over different strategies against apartheid. Many of the victims, seem to have no known political connection.¹⁴ In the undeclared war, armed gangs bang on doors at night and order parents to release their children for night forays or defense units to ward off attackers. Either the children submit to press-ganging or they risk death and the destruction of family property. Woe to those mistaken for supporting the enemy camp.

Insiders travel in groups. One's identity is marked by symbolic apparel (colors, specific articles of clothing) and language and idiom. Survivalists are experts at such things. Punishments range from "modeling," in which the accused is forced to strip naked and is led through the streets shouting out his "crime," to being hacked to death. The authorities have done almost nothing to curb the violence. It is house-to-house politics at its most divisive and destructive.

Some see this violence as a harbinger of factionalism in the black community as groups position themselves for

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Kenneth W. Grundy's recent book, *The Militarization of South African Politics* (1986), was reissued in an updated paperback edition by Oxford University Press in January, 1988. His earlier book-length studies concentrated on international relations in southern Africa, guerrilla warfare in Africa, and the use of black troops in the South African armed forces.

¹³Yunus Carrim, "COSATU: Towards Disciplined Alliances," *Work in Progress*, no. 49 (September, 1987), pp. 11-18.

¹⁴See the article by Lakela Kaunda in *Weekly Mail*, vol. 4, no. 2 (January 22-January 28, 1988), p. 5.

"Tanzania has set in place the basic building blocks of an economic recovery. As a result, there is considerable basis for optimism about the country's prospects. . . . However, a variety of political and economic hurdles remain to be surmounted."

Tanzania's Economic Recovery

BY MICHAEL F. LOFCHIE

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TANZANIA has begun a gradual and laborious process of economic recovery. After nearly 20 years of economic decline brought about in part by the government's determination to implement a socialist program of development, there are increasing signs of an economic turnaround. It is too early to determine the precise extent of this recovery, but first-hand observers report a remarkable transformation in the vitality of the country's economic system.

The *Wall Street Journal*, for example, has stated that, in 1987, "for the first time in years, Tanzania's standard of living, as measured by per capita income, increased, and the country was self-sufficient in maize, the main food crop."¹ Another recent visitor remarked that "in the shops, everything from Chanel aftershave to the latest in portable stereos is readily available."² Although there are long-term concerns about whether this recovery is merely apparent or is deeply rooted in the revival of the country's productive apparatus, there is little doubt that Tanzania has changed.

The country's economic recovery has been stimulated by a series of profoundly important changes in its economic policy. There is a general belief that these changes began with the inauguration of President Ali Hassan Mwinyi in the late fall of 1985. But there were strong indications of a change in economic mood at least three years earlier. As early as 1982, for example, the government's Ministry of Planning and Economic Affairs published an economic study that stressed the need for greater economic incentives for agricultural producers, for reducing the government's large budget deficits and for greater prudence in the management of the country's money supply.³ In 1983, the government began to implement some of the recommendations in this program and initiated a modest program of trade liberalization, allowing individual Tanzanians with foreign exchange accounts far greater latitude in importing such economically vital goods as pickup trucks and plant

machinery. In a further shift away from the country's socialist economy, the budget address of 1984, delivered almost 18 months before President Mwinyi assumed office, announced additional economic reforms intended to initiate a more market-based economic system.⁴

The overriding question now has less to do with whether these reforms will continue, but whether their pace will be significantly slowed by internal political opposition. The Tanzanian political system has been virtually unique in Africa; it has never been seriously disturbed by ethnic or class frictions. But there are indications of a political division of some proportion between members of the political elite who favor a continuation of economic liberalization and those who prefer to retain some of the country's socialist values and institutions. The salience of this conflict was accentuated in late October, 1987, by the somewhat unexpected decision of former President Julius Nyerere to retain his position as chair of the country's governing Chama Cha Mapinduzi (CCM) party, the Party of the Revolution.

When Nyerere announced his decision to leave the presidency in 1985, it was widely understood that this move was intended to pave the way for economic changes that he had come to accept as necessary and inevitable but nevertheless personally distasteful. As the philosophical as well as political progenitor of the country's socialist program of development, Nyerere had become inextricably identified with his country's fiscal programs and, hence, with its calamitous economic decline since the late 1960's.

Through his books and speeches as well as at his many appearances at international meetings and conferences, Nyerere had championed the belief that Tanzania's economic development must be structured in a manner that would not accentuate social inequalities. Although these efforts had given him a global reputation as the personal embodiment of his country's efforts to achieve economic growth by noncapitalist means, they had promoted the widespread conviction that economic recovery could not take place unless Nyerere were no longer head of state.

At the time of the presidential succession, Nyerere had announced that he would serve out the remaining two years of his term as chair of the CCM, strongly implying that he would not seek an additional term of office in this position. This seemed to set the stage for Mwinyi to be-

¹*Wall Street Journal*, January 27, 1988.

²*South*, December, 1987, p. 97.

³United Republic of Tanzania, *Structural Adjustment Programme for Tanzania* (Dar es Salaam: Ministry of Planning and Economic Affairs, 1982).

⁴*Daily News* (Tanzania), June 16, 1984. Much of the emphasis in this address was on the need to provide greater economic incentives for export-oriented firms.

come head of the party as well as head of state. Such an accession would have been consistent with Nyerere's often expressed view that the two positions should be held by a single person. Indeed, as he stated in his speech accepting the party's nomination to continue, "I have stressed the danger of there arising in our country a division into two groups: the group around the President of the country and the group around the chairman of the party."⁵ If these two centers of leadership were held separately, he stated, a divided country might result.

Nyerere's surprising decision to retain the position of chair of the CCM has been widely interpreted as an indication of his dissatisfaction with the direction of Tanzania's economic change and as a kind of last-ditch effort to retain at least some segments of the socialist framework he has created. This interpretation was further reinforced when the country's minister of finance, Cleopa Msuya, was deprived of his position on the Central Committee of the CCM. Msuya was regarded as the principal architect of the country's movement toward a market economy. His brilliant budget addresses in 1984 and 1985 made a compelling case that economic reforms were long overdue and he elaborated the main areas in which basic policy changes were needed. The party's decision could easily be seen as a rebuke to Msuya. It also appeared to create a fundamental political fissure between the party (the repository of lingering socialist sentiment) and the government (the impetus of the changeover toward a free market system).

This view, however, drastically oversimplifies the complex realities of contemporary Tanzania. The CCM, for example, is by no means monolithically sympathetic to the socialist policies implemented during the Nyerere period. By some accounts, even the decision to retain Nyerere as chair, while publicly presented in an atmosphere of solidarity, met with considerable opposition from many of the 2,000 delegates who attended the October meeting of the party's third national conference. As a large and widely representative organization, the CCM reflects a broad spectrum of national opinion, much of which has been clearly heartened by the economic achievements of the first two years of the Mwinzi administration.

The same can be said of the government itself. While certain key ministries are visibly under the direction of economic pragmatists and reformers, others remain under the jurisdiction of party leaders who remain deeply sympathetic to the idea of a socialist approach to development. The former list includes the Ministry of Finance, under Cleopa Msuya, and the Ministry of Planning and Economic Affairs, under K.A. Malima. The latter list includes the Ministry of Agriculture, pre-

sided over by Kingunge Ngombale-Mwiru, who is described in one recent African publication as the "CCM ideologist."⁶ One of the fascinating features of modern Tanzania is the extent to which the dialogue between pragmatists and socialists continues in a wide variety of national institutions, including the party hierarchy and various government agencies. The result of these complexities is a more evenly balanced juxtaposition of political forces than the idea of a simple party-versus-government imagery conveys and, correspondingly, involves an otherwise bewildering tendency for policy reform to move ahead dramatically in certain areas while lagging markedly in others.

PRAGMATISTS VERSUS SOCIALISTS

The policy dialogue between pragmatists and socialists is at the heart of the Tanzanian political process. The issues it poses are so critical to virtually all the independent nations of sub-Saharan Africa that Tanzania has sometimes been called Africa's "universal country." Because the pragmatist-socialist debate ultimately concerns the merits of capitalism versus socialism as relative approaches to national development, its significance may well transcend continental boundaries.

Socialists in Tanzania base their intellectual position principally on the voluminous writings of Julius Nyerere.⁷ In their view, the term development has little meaning or value if it is applied to processes of social change that deepen the extent of social misery, creating increased social inequalities that impoverish larger and larger segments of a country's population. Socialists insist that development means something more than mere economic growth, and that human values, not increased gross domestic product (GDP), are of overriding concern. The values they stress include equality, dignity, security of life and property, a fair return to labor, and the avoidance of exploitation by one class over others.

Tanzanian socialists are united in their conviction that market-based forms of economic development, while perhaps likely to ensure greater economic growth, are also likely to promote more social injustice. Nyerere himself has always been insistent that capitalism in the countryside would probably generate landlessness by concentrating land ownership in the hands of fewer and fewer owners. Eventually, market-based economic development would produce a minority of excessively wealthy individuals who would control a disproportionate share of a society's resources as well as its political processes, and a majority characterized by extreme poverty and lack of opportunity. To avoid such results, the socialists believe, the state—not private entrepreneurial classes—must be the pivotal instrument of economic development.

This approach to development led, in the late 1960's, to the nationalization of a wide variety of economic sectors including international and domestic trade, banking, insurance, the country's major industries including

⁵*Sunday News* (Tanzania), November 1, 1987.

⁶*African Concord*, November 19, 1987.

⁷The best compendium of early works remains Julius K. Nyerere, *Ujamaa: Essays on Socialism* (London, Oxford, New York: Oxford University Press, 1968).

textiles and transportation and, most notably, the famous but ill-fated effort to collectivize agricultural production, undertaken between 1969 and 1975. During this period, the government sought to induce Tanzania's rural population, numbering well over four-fifths of the total population, to move into government-sponsored villages where land would be collectively owned and agricultural production would be carried out in a collective manner.⁸

The process of nationalization was also extended to include the procurement, processing and marketing of all the country's major agricultural commodities including its export crops, like sisal, coffee and tea. Though small pockets of private activity were allowed to remain, private investment was actively discouraged as state ownership was extended to such economically pivotal areas as tourism and housing.

Tanzanian socialists readily acknowledge that their nation's economy declined dramatically during the period of socialism and that serious mistakes were made in the implementation of the socialist development program.⁹ In response to critics of socialism, however, they make two points of special importance. First, the mistakes that were made should not be taken as an indication that socialist development policies are intrinsically unfeasible from an administrative standpoint.¹⁰ They are an almost inevitable feature of the process of learning to forge a new developmental path. While past mistakes are regrettable and, indeed, might have been avoided in some cases, the Tanzanian left insists that it is possible to learn from these errors. Therefore, the socialist strategy as a whole should not be discarded until mid-course policy corrections have been formulated and tested.

A second point made by defenders of Tanzanian socialism is that critics of the country's economic failures tend to overemphasize the importance of domestic policy failures while understating the importance of external factors beyond the control of the nation's leaders. A major factor that contributed to faltering agricultural production, they believe, was a series of droughts during the 1970's, especially the severe droughts of 1973-1975 and

1979. Defenders of the system also point out that, in order to defend itself against external aggression, Tanzania was compelled to fight a 15-month war against Uganda in 1978 and 1979 and that this war consumed vast amounts of Tanzania's available financial and material resources.

In speeches abroad, President Nyerere repeatedly observed that, during the 1970's, Tanzania also had to cope with the ruinous economic effects of two abrupt increases in the price of oil, with escalating interest rates that vastly compounded the problem of debt repayment and with a precipitous fall in the world market prices of nearly all its principal agricultural exports. Since resigning the presidency, Nyerere has frequently criticized the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) for their failure to take into account the extent to which the international economic environment diminished the resources available for Tanzania's development.

THE PRAGMATIST POSITION

Economic pragmatists in Tanzania have no dispute with the proposition that their country has suffered from difficult external economic circumstances. They believe, however, that the bases of Tanzania's economic difficulties lie in the domestic policies the Tanzanian government pursued in the name of socialism. In its zeal to promote social equality, they believe, the Tanzanian state introduced programs that stifled individual initiative, promoted the excessive growth of the bureaucratic apparatus and suffocated the most productive sectors of the nation's economy.

For the pragmatists, such trends as declining agricultural production (especially of export crops), falling rates of utilization of industrial capacity, and higher and higher rates of inflation can be more easily accounted for by the inappropriate policies implemented between 1967 and 1984 than by the country's external environment. The pragmatists insist that the adverse effects of the international economy cannot even be fully determined until this policy framework is corrected.¹¹

CURRENCY DEVALUATION

The policy reform of utmost importance in the minds of everyone concerned with stimulating economic growth in Tanzania (both the Tanzanian pragmatists and the representatives of external donor organizations like the IMF) was the introduction of immediate and substantial corrections in Tanzania's much overvalued exchange rate. As Table 1 indicates, the Tanzanian shilling became drastically overvalued in the mid-1950's. (Overvaluation refers to a situation in which US\$1 purchases fewer units of a local currency at legal exchange rates than it does when freely traded in informal or "parallel" markets.) When President Mwinyi assumed office, the free market rate for the Tanzanian shilling was more than ten times the rate stipulated by the Tanzanian government.

⁸For an excellent account, see Dean E. McHenry, Jr., *Tanzania's Ujamaa Villages* (Berkeley, Calif.: Institute of International Studies, 1979).

⁹For a discussion of this issue in this journal, see Michael F. Lofchie, "The Roots of Economic Crisis in Tanzania," *Current History*, April, 1985.

¹⁰For an excellent discussion of this issue, see Jonathan Barker, "The Debate on Rural Socialism in Tanzania," in Bismarck U. Mwansasu and Cranford Pratt, eds., *Towards Socialism in Tanzania* (Toronto and Dar es Salaam: University of Toronto Press and Tanzania Publishing House, 1979), pp. 95-124.

¹¹For a comprehensive articulation of this position, see Nguyuru H.I. Lipumba, *Policy Reforms for Economic Development in Tanzania* (Dar es Salaam: University of Dar es Salaam, 1986).

TABLE 1. Official and Parallel Market Exchange Rates for the Tanzanian Shilling

Year	Official Rate	Parallel Rate	Ratio Parallel/Official
1967	7.14	8.68	1.22
1968	7.14	8.25	1.16
1969	7.14	9.10	1.27
1970	7.14	10.45	1.46
1971	7.14	15.00	2.10
1972	7.14	15.40	2.16
1973	6.90	13.45	1.95
1974	7.14	14.00	1.96
1975	8.26	25.00	3.03
1976	8.32	20.40	2.45
1977	7.96	15.15	1.90
1978	7.41	11.75	1.59
1979	8.22	13.50	1.64
1980	8.18	26.50	3.24
1981	8.32	24.35	2.93
1982	9.57	29.15	3.05
1983	12.35	50.00	4.05
1984	17.80	180.00	10.11
1985	17.80	180.00	10.11
1986	40.00	160.00	4.00
1987	72.00	160.00	2.20
1988	80.00	160.00	2.00

Sources: Exchange rates from Philip P. Cowitt, ed., *1984 World Currency Yearbook* (Brooklyn: International Currency Analysis, Inc., 1985), p. 738; Franz Pick, *Pick's Currency Yearbook 1976-77* (New York: Pick Publishing Corporation, 1978), p. 571; Pick, *Pick's Currency Yearbook 1970*, p. 485; Informal rates for 1984-1988 from interviewed by author in Dar es Salaam.

To understand why currency devaluation reform was so important, it is critical to have some sense of the effect of overvaluation on a nation's economy. In brief, currency overvaluation provides an artificial subsidy for the consumption of imported goods by urban wage earners and artificially diminishes the purchasing power of prices paid to rural producers, especially the producers of export crops. Overvaluation, then, stimulates consumption and diminishes the production of exportable commodities. In doing so, overvaluation acts as a sort of income subsidy for consumers and as an indirect tax on rural producers.

The reasons for this are not difficult to discern. Overvaluation cheapens the cost of imported goods by reducing the number of units of local currency required to purchase one dollar's worth of imports. It thereby magnifies the purchasing power of wages paid in the local currency. At the same time, overvaluation reduces the prices paid to rural producers because one dollar's worth of an exportable crop becomes translated into a lower number of units of local currency when paid to the farmer. Overvaluation also contributes to the illegal flight of foreign exchange from the country. The Tanzanians who were involved in purchasing hard currency at parallel market rates were frequently doing so in order to build up cash reserves overseas, which could be used either for investment or to finance the purchase of goods that could not

be obtained in Tanzania.

Among the imported items whose costs are lowered by an artificially expensive exchange rate are food grains. For officials in Tanzania's Ministry of Agriculture, the country's heavy structural dependence on food imports was directly attributable to the fact that the country's unrealistic exchange rate made foreign grains available at lower prices than those that were locally produced. For the five year period from 1976 to 1980, Tanzania's grain imports averaged more than 180,000 metric tons per year, a total of more than 900,000 metric tons. During the five year period from 1981 to 1985, import levels increased sharply, averaging over 290,000 metric tons per year. These figures were so high over such an extended time as to cast serious doubt on the claim that drought was the principal reason for the country's agricultural difficulties.

Because it lowered producer prices, overvaluation could also be held directly responsible for the sharp deterioration in Tanzania's production of agricultural exports. Between the early 1960's and the early 1980's, sisal production, for example, dropped from an average of more than 200,000 metric tons per year to less than 50,000 tons per year. In less than a decade from the early 1970's to the early 1980's, cashew nut production fell from more than 100,000 metric tons per year to less than 40,000 metric tons per year. Coffee production declined from about 60,000 metric tons per year to less than 50,000 metric tons per year over the two decades, a period during which other important African coffee producers, like Kenya and the Ivory Coast, were more than doubling their total annual production. The relatively slow decline in Tanzania's coffee production was accounted for principally by the fact that foreign donors were supplying large sums of money for coffee development projects.

The final three rows of Table 1 demonstrate the degree to which the present government of Tanzania has tried to bring about a more realistic exchange rate for the Tanzanian shilling. Since 1985, the shilling has been devalued to about one-fifth of its former value and some correspondents have indicated that the government's target is to move toward an exchange rate of \$1 to 125 shillings. If this occurs, it should help significantly in further reducing the discrepancy between the official and the parallel market rate. The goal is to move these two rates sufficiently close that the difference between the official and the parallel market rates becomes so small that an illegal
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"Confronted with steadily declining living standards, . . . an unresponsive government to which there is no viable alternative, and an epidemic disease that threatens to wipe out large numbers of young adults, the typical Zairian can be forgiven for sinking into despair."

Decline or Recovery in Zaire?

BY THOMAS TURNER

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THE official United States view of Zaire holds that its government has been following the advice of Western experts since 1983.¹ As *Washington Post* reporter Blaine Harden summarizes it, supposedly Zaire "has stopped wasting money on white-elephant projects and [has] begun paying farmers prices that give them an incentive to grow food. It has lifted price controls and devalued its currency."²

But according to another view, held by many foreign observers and by Zairian opposition leaders (and consistent with my own observations since the 1960's),

Zaire is a den of unregenerate thieves. Its President and top ministers mouth the free-market lingo that the International Monetary Fund [IMF], the World Bank and the [Ronald] Reagan administration like to hear, while continuing to fill foreign bank accounts with loot. No government project is begun without payoffs. Payoffs are so ubiquitous and so exorbitant that many projects are never completed. Civil servants regard extortion as a part of their job description.

According to Harden, "the murky truth . . . seems to be that both of these views are true and false. Corrupt Zaire is reforming as never before; reforming Zaire is still corrupt."

In truth, corruption is the system in Zaire. Under President Mobutu Sese Seko's patrimonial rule, access to high office is controlled by the President himself. No one can be sure of remaining in office. No one is so disgraced, either in prison or in exile, that he cannot hope to return to high office. Given Zaire's disastrous economic and social situation, access to high office is the only hope of the Zairian elite or would-be elite that a Zairian can

maintain or attain a decent standard of living, including adequate schooling for his children. The system guarantees that top functionaries will serve the President rather than the nation and that the supposed opposition will remain fragmented. The system has worked well for Mobutu over the past 22 years and he is unlikely to abandon it, even under duress. Unfortunately, the system is incapable of promoting development.³

Mobutu is willing to pay lip service to reform and even to implement reform in nonessential areas, so long as outsiders keep his regime afloat financially and militarily.⁴ Despite the claim that Zaire has been following the IMF-World Bank instructions faithfully since 1983, the evidence shows that what Thomas Callaghy has termed "the ritual dance of the debt game" is alive and well.⁵ But today Mobutu's room to maneuver has been narrowed. The case of the 1987 budget is illustrative.

The Zairian government submitted its first version of the budget to Parliament in January, with revenue totaling 99.6 billion zaires (Z) and expenditure of Z105.6 billion, leaving a shortfall of Z6.0 billion. Parliament set up its own economic and financial commission, which revised the figures, bringing revenue up to Z106.0 billion and expenditure up to Z109.8, thereby narrowing the deficit to Z3.8 billion.

Then came the news that the IMF had agreed that the budget deficit could total Z6.0 billion. The commission then returned to work to raise spending, boosting capital expenditure and salaries, among other items.

The budget—with revenues set at Z100.0 billion and expenditures at Z106.0 billion—was finally approved by Parliament on March 11. Current revenue represented Z82.3 billion of the total, with a further Z17.7 billion under the heading of *Budget pour Ordre*, representing the government's contribution in counterpart funds for development projects funded by external sources.

The largest single contributors of revenue, custom taxes and duty, provide Z28.3 billion. There was to be a clampdown on exemptions and on smuggling, in order to increase this contribution. Direct and indirect taxes were to bring in Z25.9 billion, and the state mining company Gecamines was to produce another Z5.3 billion.

Revenue from oil-producing companies came to Z7.0 billion or less than 10 percent of government revenue, because of the sharply depressed price of oil. A few years

¹United States Department of State, *Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 1986* (Washington, D.C.: United States Government Printing Office, 1987).

²Blaine Harden, "Seeds of Reform Grow Slowly in Zaire," *The Washington Post*, November 20, 1987.

³On corruption, see David J. Gould, *Bureaucratic Corruption in the Third World: The Case of Zaire* (Elmsford, N.Y.: Pergamon Press, 1980). On patrimonialism, see Crawford Young and Thomas Turner, *The Rise and Decline of the Zairian State* (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1985), ch. 6.

⁴For earlier discussions of Zaire, see Thomas Turner, "Mobutu's Zaire: Permanently on the Verge of Collapse?" *Current History*, March, 1981; Thomas Turner, "Zaire: Stalemate and Compromise," *Current History*, April, 1985.

⁵Thomas M. Callaghy, "The Ritual Dance of the Debt Game," *Africa Report*, September-October, 1984, pp. 22-24.

earlier, the petroleum industry had contributed 20 percent of the total.

On the expenditure side of the budget, Z75.1 billion was to go to current expenditure, with the public debt comprising 42 percent of this amount. Internal debt comprises mainly government arrears to construction companies and suppliers of goods and services.

The total external public debt stood at \$5.0 billion, including \$3.0 billion contracted by the state electricity corporation constructing the Inga-Shaba hydroelectric project and power line.⁶ It was estimated that external debt service would represent 32 percent of current revenue.

Of the operational budget of Z26.5 billion, the ministries were to receive Z10.5 billion, of which almost half would go to national defense. The investment budget included Z13.2 billion, considerably less than the economic and financial commission's original proposal of Z18.2 billion but much higher than the government's revised proposal of Z7.9 billion. All three figures were insignificant when measured against the Z167 billion targeted for public investment in the five year development plan unveiled early in 1986.

THE FOREIGN DEBT

The budget ratification followed a tentative new agreement with the IMF. This replaced the \$273-million, 22-month standby agreement approved in May, 1986, but in abeyance since Mobutu's "radical" statement of October, 1986, that Zaire would limit service payments on its external debt to no more than 10 percent of export revenue and 20 percent of the national budget in 1987. Mobutu's threat obviously worked. He agreed to steep increases in prices for petroleum products and increases in taxes (notably land taxes and penalties for late payment of taxes). Mobutu also agreed to allow the national currency, the zaire, to continue its free float, despite his statement the previous October that he was considering the reintroduction of a fixed exchange rate.

In return for these concessions, Zaire won a concession on the issue of public-sector wage increases. Mobutu had announced increases of 40 percent, violating his agreement with the IMF to hold the line on wages; under the new agreement, the fund permitted increases of 20 percent. In addition, Mobutu's return to the straight and narrow path was rewarded by roughly \$126 million in new loans from the IMF. Most of the new funding was to come in the form of a new standby arrangement, but part of the money could take the form of a lump sum to compensate Zaire for the huge losses it

⁶On the Inga-Shaba "white elephants," the best source is Jean-Claude Willame, *Zaire: L'épopée d'Inga* (Paris: Editions L'Harmattan, 1986).

⁷*Africa Research Bulletin* (hereafter cited as *ARB*), April 30, 1987, pp. 8626-8627.

⁸*ARB*, June 30, 1987, p. 8714.

⁹*ARB*, September 30, 1987, p. 8827.

¹⁰Harden, loc. cit.

faced as a result of sharp downturns in the price of its main exports, copper and cobalt.⁷

On May 18, the Zairian government succeeded in persuading the "Paris Club" of public creditors to reschedule its debts (65 percent of the country's total external debt). The Paris Club rescheduled \$884 million (due between May, 1987, and May, 1988) over 15 years, with a six-year grace period. The agreement was exceptional, in that the Paris Club usually sets a 10-year ceiling on repayment delays, with grace periods of five years.

A few days later, the Zairians met with the consultative group for Zaire at the Paris office of the World Bank. The participating aid donors agreed to finance almost all the deficit in the balance of payments. Zaire's estimated financing needs in 1987 were \$805 million, and aid donors promised \$770 million. In 1988, Zaire would need \$750 million, of which the donors intended to provide \$706 million.

To be sure, all this generosity had its price. Zaire was committed to a series of reforms; e.g., public sector expenses, taxation and the exchange system. Moreover, the government was committed to creating a favorable climate for private sector investment, both international and national.⁸

In September, 1987, the so-called Kinshasa Club (private creditors who do not belong to the Paris or London Clubs or to other multilateral bodies) met in Kinshasa and agreed to reduce Zaire's 1987-1988 debt service obligation of \$171 million by more than \$163 million. Repayment of these debts was rescheduled over a period of 12 years, with a five-year grace period.⁹

THE UNITED STATES ROLE

The United States government played a major role in securing this additional aid for Mobutu's Zaire. In the spring of 1987, a senior IMF official in Washington reportedly resigned in protest because the United States was pressing the fund to ease lending conditions for Zaire. The United States government reportedly was also a major force in the Paris Club's favorable treatment of Zaire in May. In addition, direct United States aid to Zaire is now about \$60 million a year, the second highest figure in sub-Saharan Africa.¹⁰

The administration of President Ronald Reagan professes to believe that the economic situation in Zaire has "stabilized" because Zaire has followed its advice and that of the IMF and the World Bank. However, the evidence for such stabilization, let alone recovery, is sketchy. The zaire declined by 89.5 percent in 1987, measured against the dollar, and by a whopping 107.2 percent against the pound sterling. Prices in Zaire rose at an annual rate of 79.6 percent between September, 1986, and September, 1987, but only by 0.8 percent from August to September, 1987, suggesting that inflation has slowed. However, the price of a liter of gasoline was scheduled to rise from Z51 to Z54, an increase of nearly 6 percent. The change in the official price of gasoline was of course a

condition set by the IMF. To the Zairian consumer it must have looked a lot like inflation.¹¹

While there is little reason to doubt the fervor of the free-market sentiments of President Reagan and his top advisers, one should not overlook the geopolitical dimension of Washington's affection for Mobutu. On the one hand, a Western diplomat in Kinshasa told Harden,

Our main interest is making sure that this big country, as big as all of Europe, does not fall to pieces, endangering the stability of all of central and southern Africa.

On the other hand, Zaire provides a useful launching pad for United States intervention in central and southern Africa, witness the ongoing American assistance to Jonas Savimbi's Unita (National Union for the Total Independence of Angola) forces in Angola.¹²

A SYSTEM OF RULE

The process of continued reshuffling of top aids is an integral part of Mobutu's system of rule. That process continued at its usual pace in 1987. Finance Minister Mabi Mulumba was named Prime Minister in January. Ten weeks earlier, Mobutu had demoted the previous Prime Minister, Kengo wa Dondo, to the post of foreign minister. As part of the January, 1987, Cabinet reshuffle, Kengo was demoted once again, to the non-Cabinet post of head of the Audit Office (*Cour des Comptes*). Ekila Lyonda, ambassador to Belgium, replaced Kengo as foreign minister.¹³

A number of key Mobutu aides — e.g., Justice Minister N'Singa Udjuu Onwankebi Untube and Territorial Administration Minister Vunduaawe Te Pemako — were not shifted. Only two months later, however, Vunduaawe was dismissed for "serious failures in party discipline," although he was allowed to remain as a member of the central committee of the single party, the Popular Movement of the Revolution (MPR). Vunduaawe had been in disgrace earlier, in 1984–1986, for advocating dialogue with the banned opposition party, the Union for Democracy and Social Progress (UDPS).¹⁴

The ethno-regional dimension of these changes is important. In a few months, two leading political figures from the Equateur Region (in addition to Mobutu himself) both fell from grace: Kengo and Vunduaawe. Re-

maining in position at the junior minister level was Mobutu Nyiwa, the President's son and heir apparent. The name of Mabi, a Kasaian, as Prime Minister was seen by some observers as the counterpart of the crushing of the Kasai-dominated UDPS.

In July, 1987, a further change took place, illustrating both the continuing game of "musical chairs" and another characteristic of the Mobutu regime, i.e., frequent restructuring. Sambwa Pida N'Bagui, previously minister of planning, was named to the new post of Deputy Prime Minister and would head five economic and financial ministries: planning, finance, the budget, economy and industry, and portfolio. Five junior ministers, most of whom had served as ministers at least once, were appointed to assist the Deputy Prime Minister. The government press agency said the restructuring would provide "a new chance of success" to the five year plan for 1986–1990.¹⁵

More cynical Zaire-watchers saw the change as the latest in a seemingly endless series of changes of form that had no real substance. Harden seemingly concedes this, writing that

the new minister in charge of economic policy [presumably Sambwa] is a brilliant, hardworking and honest technocrat who, Western diplomats agree, is the best-qualified Zairian ever to hold such power. And yet the country's authoritarian President, Mobutu Sese Seko, recently saw fit to dispatch a government-owned DC-8 airliner to Venezuela 32 times to pick up 5,000 sheep for his private farm.¹⁶

Given the size of Mobutu's personal budget and the budget of the presidency, this "exception" to general belt-tightening is crucial. Does anyone think that Mobutu paid customs duties on the 5,000 sheep?

HIGHER EDUCATION

The combined effects of corruption and neglect on one of the country's most important institutions, the University of Lubumbashi, are illustrated in a recent article in *The Chronicle of Higher Education*, which offered a graphic example of the combined effect of corruption and neglect on one of the country's most important institutions. Author Steve Askin quoted the university's rector, Lombeya Bosongo Likund'Elio, as saying, "We know what we have to do, we know how to do it, and we have the personnel. But we don't have the money." A graduate of the university offered a blunter appraisal: "They should simply shut it down until the government gets serious about education and is prepared to spend some money on reconstruction."

Askin goes on to describe the intellectual impoverishment of the campus, which has no functioning central library, only marginally furnished department or faculty libraries, and no campus bookstore. Faculty salaries are so low that professors maintain their families by moonlighting. Students live in miserable conditions and many suffer from malnutrition.¹⁷

All of this sounds familiar to this author, who taught at

¹¹ARB, October 30, 1987, p. 8890.

¹²Ibid. On the Unita connection see also Anthony W. Gambino, "A Blow to Rights in Zaire," *The New York Times*, September 2, 1986.

¹³ARB, February 15, 1987, p. 8363. In the Zairian political vocabulary, a minister is called *Commissaire d'Etat*. The Prime Minister thus is *Premier Commissaire d'Etat*. Junior Ministers are *Secrétaires d'Etat*. These are differences in name only.

¹⁴ARB, March 15, 1987, p. 8394.

¹⁵ARB, September 15, 1987, p. 8593.

¹⁶Harden, loc. cit.

¹⁷Steve Askin, "Amid Stench and Decay, Professors and Students in Zaire Struggle to Keep Their Impoverished University Alive," *The Chronicle of Higher Education*, vol. 34, no. 20 (January 27, 1988), pp. A1, A42–A43.

Lubumbashi from 1973 to 1975 under a Rockefeller Foundation program that has since been declared a failure. Conditions in Zaire were much better in 1975, and even in 1984 when I returned on a grant from the National Endowment for the Humanities. The trend is clear, however.

Conditions at the University of Lubumbashi or the University of Kisangani or the marginally better-off University of Kinshasa demonstrate how unimportant it is to the country which particular individual is moved into or out of the position of minister of higher education. Because the economists, architects, agronomists, administrators and others who are supposedly going to lead Zaire out of underdevelopment are being educated under these conditions, the country's future seems bleak indeed.

Despite the unwillingness or inability of the Mobutu regime to address the country's most basic problems, the regime appeared more solidly entrenched in 1987 than it had been for years, in the sense that it faced less in the way of organized opposition. On June 24, 1987, President Mobutu announced that the last leaders of the UDPS had rejoined the MPR, the only legal party of Zaire. As *Jeune Afrique* noted:

With his sense of spectacle and of symbols, the Zairian President acknowledged this collective allegiance at Kinshasa—some 30 kilometers from Kinshasa—at the same spot where he had declared, exactly one year earlier, to have had enough of “alternately punishing and forgiving a little clique of seven people. . . . From now on there will be no more pardons and those who have been relegated to their villages will never come back.”

The seven who rejoined the MPR were Kibassa Maliba, a former minister and one of the earliest MPR officials; Bossassi Epole Bolya Kodya, president of the Zairian League for Human Rights; Birindwa ci Birhashwirwa, former president of the *Caisse d'Epargne* (the state-run savings bank); Kanana Tshiongo, a former deputy; Makanda Mpinga Shambuyi, a former deputy; Ngulula Mpandajila, a former minister, former deputy, former provincial president; and Tshisekedi wa Mulumba, the former vice president of Parliament.

Thus, the UDPS apparently came to an end.

Apart from a few dozen noisy supporters, prudently based outside the country—notably in Brussels and Paris—and true militants isolated in Kinshasa—the UDPS has no impact in this too vast country of Zaire. In some regions, only some high bureaucrats and party dignitaries have heard of it. . . .¹⁸

Perhaps it was too soon to write off the UDPS, however. Tshisekedi explained that permission had been

granted to allow the group to continue as a “tendency” within the MPR.¹⁹ But in January, 1988, when Tshisekedi returned to Kinshasa and attempted to address a public meeting, police beat and arrested hundreds of participants, including Tshisekedi himself.²⁰

There was no shortage of opposition parties, but these were based outside the country and seemed unlikely to pose a significant threat to the regime. In April, 1987, Simon-Pierre Kwenge announced in Brazzaville that the Congo Worker and Peasant party (POP) had been founded in Bukavu (Zaire) in November, 1986. (In common with some other opposition groups, notably the MNC/Lumumba, POP retains the name “Congo,” rejecting “Zaire” as an invention of Mobutu.) The POP intended to “raise the consciousness of the Zairian masses with the aim of unleashing a revolutionary insurrection against the despotic power” of Mobutu, Kwenge declared, and “giving a new lease on life to the Zairian opposition.” The POP was Marxist-Leninist, Kwenge said, and had declared its solidarity with the populations of Angola, Namibia, Mozambique and Chad, struggling against “apartheid and imperialism.” Kwenge said the party was composed of approximately 60 intellectuals, 20 office workers, and 27 workers and peasants, but hoped to reach the level of 200 members by March, 1988.²¹

Later that year, 13 other Zairian opposition movements (not including the POP or the UDPS) met in Switzerland and agreed to establish a government in exile, the sole aim of which “is to overthrow the Zairian dictator by all means.” Jerry Mehele of the MNC (Congolese National Movement) was named prime minister of the government in exile. In addition, the plan provided for three deputy prime ministers, five ministers of state, and 36 other ministers; some of the posts were left vacant, presumably to accommodate members of groups not represented at the meeting. The degree of splintering in the opposition was reflected in the fact that three different groups claiming the mantle of the murdered Prime Minister Patrice Lumumba took part: the Reformed MNC of Paul-Roger Mokede, the MNC/Lumumba of Polycarpe Kabeya, and the MNC/Lumumba CC of Albert Onawelo.

No sooner had the composition of the government in exile been announced than the supposed “president of the Constituent Assembly,” Mokede of the Reformed MNC, categorically denied his participation. In a communiqué to *Agence France Presse*, Mokede stated,

I have learned to my great surprise of my nomination as president of the Zairian government in exile formed in Switzerland, and it is my duty to make a categorical denial as to

(Continued on page 230)

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¹⁸Sennen Andriamirado, “Kibassa sous la houlette de Mobutu,” *Jeune Afrique*, August 19–26, 1987; see also *ARB*, July 15, 1987, p. 8534, and August 15, 1987, p. 8579.

¹⁹*The Washington Post*, February 10, 1988.

²⁰*ARB*, June 15, 1987, p. 8505.

²¹*ARB*, October 15, 1987, pp. 8633–8634.

"Ethiopia's new constitution, at least for now, enhances the regime's legitimacy only marginally. . . . so long as the 'national question' is not resolved to the satisfaction of the main opposition movements, Ethiopia will remain a divided and troubled society."

Revolution and State Power in Ethiopia

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On September 3, 1987, Ethiopia's Provisional Military Administrative Council held its final congress in the capital city of Addis Ababa. This was the definitive prelude to the inauguration of the People's Democratic Republic of Ethiopia, under the guidance of a civilian, Marxist-Leninist regime. Thirteen years of rule by the Provisional Military Administrative Council (PMAC) (following its overthrow of Emperor Haile Selassie) had come to an end. When the PMAC had first assumed power, there were no clear signs that it was committed to a Marxist-Leninist model of social transformation; neither was there any indication that it was sincere about its pledge to return Ethiopia to civilian rule. In fact, within months of seizing power, the new regime began systematically to buttress the preeminent role of "men in uniform" in the vanguard of the revolution.

Until its demise in 1974, the imperial state had attempted to construct an image that was akin to that of an absolutist but modernizing autocracy. It portrayed itself as a strong but compassionate state, a model for all of Africa. However, at a very fundamental level the imperial state constructed by Emperor Haile Selassie was weak, tenuously held together by a top-heavy, secularized bureaucracy and the traditional imperial myth. Once the myth of unassailability was destroyed, the PMAC began the process of reconstituting state institutions. This process has been slow, but it has been methodical and increasingly effective.

In 1974, the challenge of social, political and economic reconstruction was formidable. In order to meet the challenge of reconstruction, the new regime created a new social myth intended to secure legitimacy in the eyes of the majority of the citizens. The problem was compounded by the scope of economic and social underdevelopment that characterized Ethiopia. It was also negatively affected by the limited resource capacity of the state in terms of its lack of foreign currency, skilled manpower and appropriate technology.

The PMAC or Derg,¹ as it is popularly known, at-

tempted to compensate for its limited resource capacity by introducing a new social myth that was radically different from that which justified the Old Regime. This was a statist strategy based not on traditional legitimacy but on the principles of scientific socialism as articulated in the Soviet Union. At an operational level, this choice required the reorganization and reconstitution of the state; the redistribution of wealth and property; the creation of a capacity for central planning; the pursuit of a state socialist development strategy under the guidance of a vanguard party of "revolutionary democrats"; and the establishment of a constitutionally based people's republic.

The current design for a reconstituted Ethiopian society was first mentioned with the government's announcement of the Program for the National Democratic Revolution (PNDR) in early 1976. Since that time, the regime has systematically attempted to use ideology as well as new socialist institutions to legitimize its policies. It has done this in spite of enormous social, economic and political costs.

The process of social reconstruction in Ethiopia has been dealt with in great detail elsewhere.² This article intends critical assessment of the regime's attempt to establish society on new mythical as well as institutional foundations. It can be reasonably argued that the PMAC was more interested in pursuing political goals than it was in developing successful economic policies. Its chief political goal over the first 13 years of its rule was the establishment of political control and legitimacy.

But in spite of the Derg's efforts it has failed, and its failure will continue to inhibit any attempts to consolidate its power. In large measure, the failure of the state to consolidate its power effectively can be attributed to the fact that it is resource poor and administratively weak.

The limited capacity of the Ethiopian government to initiate development, let alone to respond to periodic uncertainties that strain its resources, was dramatically demonstrated by the country's reliance on foreign famine relief aid between 1984 and 1987. By 1983, the civil unrest taking place in the regions of Eritrea and Tigre, combined with a drought that had prevailed for more than a decade, contributed to mass starvation in Eritrea, Tigre and Wollo regions. Drought alone had a

¹This is an Amharic term that means "committee."

²See for example Marina Ottaway and David Ottaway, *Ethiopia: Empire in Revolution* (New York: Africana Publishing Company, 1977); and Fred Halliday and Maxine Molyneux, *The Ethiopian Revolution* (London: Verso, 1981).

devastating impact by the fall of 1984 on an additional 9 of Ethiopia's remaining 11 provinces. This catastrophe far exceeded the drought and famine of 1973-1974. By early 1985, almost 8 million people were suffering from drought and food shortages. Of that number, 2.5 million were immediately at risk of starvation. More than 300,000 died in 1984 alone—more than twice the number that had died in the drought a decade earlier. By the end of 1986, the death toll from this latest disaster had climbed to 1 million.

In response to the human tragedy, the international community responded generously once the dimensions of the unfolding crisis were understood. Aid came in the form of bilateral, multilateral and private donations of food and other relief supplies ranging from transport trucks to pharmaceuticals and from technical assistance to water-drilling equipment. The crisis stimulated an unprecedented outpouring from the public in the West, inspiring the formation of fund-raising extravaganzas on the part of musicians who formed themselves into humanitarian organizations such as Band Aid in England and USA for Africa in the United States. These activities generated millions of dollars that were then spent on relief inside Ethiopia and in refugee camps in Somalia and Sudan. The bulk of the relief dollars and supplies, however, were provided by Western governments including the United States. More than \$2 billion in foreign assistance was needed to bring the catastrophe under control.³

By early 1987, the physical impact of this massive influx of aid to Ethiopia was noticeable not only in the abatement of the famine, but also in what seemed to be the permanent establishment of donor agencies prepared to aid Ethiopia in its long-term development effort. The United Nations Office for Emergency Operations was closed in early 1987; many foreign relief workers returned home; and some relief agencies ended their operations. They left behind heavy-duty trucks that had been used to move donated supplies and infrastructure like wells and grain-storage bins. Other foreign agencies, however, brought in new personnel and built compounds to house their offices and staff.

The drought broke temporarily in early 1987, and for the first time in five years normal harvests were projected. However, before the year was out the drought and famine returned. In December, 1987, the government estimated that some 5.2 million people would need international aid through 1988. The United States Agency for International Development (USAID) put the figure closer to 6.5 million. This time, the government was able to secure international assistance rapidly, and it felt secure enough to allow relief convoys to travel to some

areas being hotly contested by elements of the Eritrean People's Liberation Front (EPLF) and the Tigre People's Liberation Front (TPLF). However, the government was unable to insure the safety of such convoys, and on October 23, 1987, EPLF guerrillas attacked a UN food convoy moving through Eritrea en route to Tigre. Twenty-six trucks carrying 450 tons of wheat were destroyed.⁴

The massive influx of famine relief aid between 1984 and 1987 had served almost as a blessing in disguise for the Derg. The enormity of the crisis and the government's willingness to deal with it forthrightly seemed to engender confidence among Western donors that the government was doing its best to deal with the crisis, and that therefore it deserved their help. Even the United States provided Ethiopia with millions of dollars in relief aid, while consistently criticizing the policies of the regime. This assistance compensated for the government's limited resource capacities, and allowed it to pursue its flawed political policies in spite of the crisis.

RESETTLEMENT AND VILLAGIZATION

One of the most controversial of the Derg's policies has been resettlement. At the height of the drought and famine, the regime set in motion a resettlement policy that was intended to relocate some 1.5 million people from the areas most severely affected by drought in the north to so-called "virgin lands" in the south that had adequate rainfall. Officials argued that such a move would allow people who had been forced from barren, exhausted and overpopulated areas to begin their lives anew. In addition, it was thought that the government would be in a better position to provide the people with needed social services in resettled areas. However, the government prepared poorly for this operation, and the first settlers experienced tremendous hardships in areas that were underdeveloped and unfamiliar to them. Once resettled, some people fled their new communities into Sudan and either took shelter in refugee camps or walked thousands of miles to try to return to their home areas.

Regardless of the government's official position that it planned resettlement strictly for humanitarian reasons, critics argued that the main purpose of the program was to depopulate areas being contested by the EPLF and the TPLF.⁵ Criticism notwithstanding, the regime continued its resettlement efforts through the height of the drought until March, 1986, when it paused for a year's "consolidation period." In the spring of 1987, resettlement began again, but this time it moved at a slower pace and it was better organized.

Despite constant criticism of the government's resettlement policy, most Western donors continue to work in Ethiopia, even in resettled areas. They justify their continued presence in the country on humanitarian rather than political grounds.

No matter what the real motive for resettlement—to depopulate areas of civil unrest or to improve the life

³"Ethiopia Revisited," *Africa: Recovery*, no. 1 (February-April, 1987).

⁴Scott Kraft, "Ethiopia—Will Relief be in Time?" *Los Angeles Times*, December 17, 1987.

⁵See François Jean, *Ethiopie: Du Bon Usage de la Famine* (Paris: Medecins Sans Frontiers, 1986).

chances of peasants who are perennially at risk because of drought and war — the net effect of the policy has been to strengthen the regime's control. In resettled areas, members of the Worker's party of Ethiopia (WPE) are heavily involved in political indoctrination of the residents and in stimulating agricultural production. Although the government claims that it is not attempting to force collectivization on the people, residents in resettled areas are expected to farm collectively. This is also the practice in so-called "villagized" areas.

The concept of "villagization" was first introduced in the 1975 "Land Reform Proclamation," but there was no immediate effort to implement the policy on a large scale. However, after repulsing the Somali invasion of 1977, the government villagized most of Bale region in the south central part of the country. The official justification for this measure was to cluster the rural residents of Bale into villages that could be easily protected and could receive government services like education, health care, agricultural extension and safe water.

By the early 1980's, it was clear that villagization had become an integral part of the Derg's long-term rural development strategy. However, it was not until signs of recovery from the 1983-1985 drought were evident that earnest efforts at villagization were begun in Hararge, Gojjam, Wollega, Kaffa, Sidamo and Illubabor.⁶ By March, 1987, it was estimated that there were some 10,000 villagized communities throughout the country. The long-term goal of the government is to move some 33 million people into villagized communities by 1994.

The government has experienced the most success in areas such as Shoa, Arussi and the Hararge highlands, where it is in firm control and has reasonable popular support. About 33 percent of the country's population is clustered in these regions.⁷

Attempts to villagize parts of western Shoa, the Hararge lowlands and all of Gojjam have met with local resistance. The government has responded with unbridled force. In some cases, rather than resisting openly, peasants have exercised their "exit" option, taking refuge in neighboring Sudan or Somalia.

Private humanitarian agencies and bilateral and multilateral development agencies are aware of alleged and real violations of human rights in the villagization process. However, such agencies tend to place basic human needs above politics.

Despite the efforts of some outside observers to down-

play the politics of villagization, politics cannot be ignored. In fact, the political underpinnings of the policy are as important as, if not more important than, the economic underpinnings. The regime is able to utilize the resources provided by foreign relief and development agencies to consolidate its phased collectivization of peasant agriculture.

BUREAUCRACY, PARTY AND CONSTITUTION IN ETHIOPIA

After an initial period of indecision, when the Derg was uncertain about its appropriate ideological and programmatic posture, it began systematically to lay the foundation for a Marxist-Leninist state with the announcement of the Program for the National Democratic Revolution (PNDR). Key elements in the quest to build a socialist state were perceived to be bureaucratic reform, party formation and the inauguration of a new Marxist-Leninist constitution.

Bureaucratic reform was slow but methodical. Initially, the Derg simply allowed most of the central bureaucrats who had served the Emperor to remain at their posts and appointed army officers to monitor their activities in every ministry. Simultaneously, it attempted to recruit to the civil service former high school and college students who were sympathetic to the revolution. To recast the character of the central bureaucracy, the Derg required all senior civil servants and political appointees to undergo a period of intense reeducation, so that they would adopt the proper socialist orientation.

The Derg's success at reorganizing the central bureaucracy was most evident at the regional and local levels. Ethiopia's 14 provinces were renamed regions and were subdivided into 102 subregions and 556 districts.⁸ This was seen as a major step in dismantling feudal privilege. All new appointees to regional, subregional and district posts were either military men or university-educated individuals who were regarded as progressives.

The Derg even attempted to spread administrative reform to the lowest echelons of regional administration. The Land Reform Proclamation had abolished the lowest level of rural administration, the *balabats*. In their place, the Derg introduced peasant associations. The stated purpose for this reform was to devolve more and more power to local communities. However, the goal was to enhance the state's central control over all aspects of daily life.

By 1984, there were almost 20,000 peasant associations throughout the country. Today, they represent the lowest level of government administration and are responsible for processing and interpreting policies from the center; maintaining law and order; facilitating party formation and ideological indoctrination at the local level; and leading economic development.⁹

In the cities, urban dwellers' associations serve functions similar to peasant associations in the countryside. They have broad political, economic and judicial

⁶See John M. Cohen and Nils-Ivar Isaksson, "Villagization in the Arsi Region of Ethiopia," *Report to the Swedish University of Agricultural Sciences* (Uppsala: International Rural Development Center, 1987).

⁷See "Ethiopia: Villagization Success," *New African*, no. 235 (April, 1987), p. 24.

⁸John M. Cohen and Peter H. Koehn, *Ethiopian Provincial and Municipal Government* (East Lansing: Michigan State University Press, 1980).

⁹See Dessalegn Rahmato, *Agrarian Reform in Ethiopia* (Trenton: The Red Sea Press, 1985).

powers, and act as the eyes and ears of the regime at the grass-roots level in urban areas.

In the industrial sector, Working People's Control Committees, created in 1981, have come to serve a somewhat threatening "watchdog" role with regard to productive activities. The committees are supposed to monitor and promote worker productivity. The regime claims that people's control committees have uncovered numerous incidents of fraud, corruption and waste. The tight surveillance that characterizes the workplace in Ethiopia today has been facilitated by the training provided to committee members by Soviet and East German security advisers. It is evident that the government's capacity to project its authority to the remote corners of Ethiopian society is increasing daily.

The expansion of the central bureaucracy was clearly an effort to shore up the coercive ability of the state and to lay the groundwork for the establishment of an all-embracing vanguard party. In 1979, the Derg announced the establishment of the Commission to Organize the Party of the Working People of Ethiopia (COPWE).¹⁰ However, the real work of the commission did not begin until its second congress in 1983. With the creation of COPWE, the Derg began to create new mass organizations like the Revolutionary Ethiopia Youth, women's associations and various professional associations. It also strengthened already existing mass organizations like peasant associations, urban dweller's associations, and the All Ethiopia Trade Union. The function of mass organizations is not only to represent the interests of their members at party congresses, but also to represent them on an everyday basis. They have active educational and developmental roles.

COPWE finished its work in September, 1984, and the Worker's party of Ethiopia was inaugurated. An 11-member Politburo was named to replace the Derg, but the entire 7-person executive committee of the PMAC was included in the new body. Of the 134 members of the WPE Central Committee, 29 are members of the armed forces and at least another 45 are ex-soldiers. This contrasts with only 22 positions held by representatives of mass organizations. Counting full and alternate members, military personnel make up over 60 percent of the WPE Central Committee.¹¹

More significant and striking than the predominance of Derg members in the Politburo and the WPE Central Committee is the fact that the party is far from demo-

¹⁰Roberto Correa Wilson, "On the Eve of the Establishment of the Party," *Verde Olive* (Havana), October 13, 1983, pp. 18-19.

¹¹See David Korn, *Ethiopia, the United States and the Soviet Union* (London: Croom Helm, 1986).

¹²See "Ethiopia: Last Tango in Addis," *Africa Confidential*, vol. 25, no. 20 (October 15, 1984).

¹³See "Ethiopia: Some Constitution," *Africa Confidential*, vol. 27, no. 13 (June 18, 1986).

¹⁴See Edmond J. Keller and Donald Rothchild, *Afromarxist Regimes: Ideology and Public Policy* (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1987).

cratic in its representation. Although organizations like labor unions and peasant associations are represented at party congresses, few of their representatives are actually on the WPE Central Committee. In fact, fewer than 35 percent of the members of the Central Committee are civilians. One in five civilians is a technocrat.¹²

The primary task of the WPE after its formation was to devise a new national constitution that would inaugurate The People's Democratic Republic of Ethiopia (PDRE). In the process, the regime hoped to enhance the twin goals of control and legitimacy. A 343-person constitutional drafting committee was appointed by the party. It was staffed by the Institute for the Study of Ethiopian Nationalities, which was founded in 1983 to study and offer a solution to the ethnic problems facing the country. The drafting committee hammered out the details of a socialist constitution for more than a year, and in June, 1986, it issued a 120-article draft.

One million copies of the draft constitution were distributed throughout the country. For the next two months, the document was discussed at more than 20,000 locations.¹³ The regime apparently used this approach in an effort to legitimize the process of constitution-making and to test the mood of the general population. In some areas, people attended local constitutional discussions only after pressure from local party members, but in others they attended voluntarily.

Generally, people were not interested in the new constitution. They seemed willing to concede a process they knew they could not control or influence. Where popular interest was evident, it centered around issues like taxation, religion and marriage laws. By far the most controversial provision had to do with the outlawing of polygamy. This issue caused a furor in the Muslim community. Muslims account for 40 to 60 percent of the total population; the government ultimately withdrew the article calling for the outlawing of polygamy.

After two months of deliberation at the grass-roots level, the drafting committee was reconvened to consider the proposed amendments. Ninety-five separate amendments were proposed, but only cosmetic changes resulted. The referendum on the new constitution was held on February 1, 1987, and the results of the voting were announced by WPE General Secretary Mengistu Haile Mariam three weeks later. It was reported that 96 percent of the 14 million people eligible to participate actually voted. Eighty-one percent of the electorate was said to have endorsed the constitution; 18 percent opposed it.

The PDRE was officially proclaimed on February 22, 1987,¹⁴ making Ethiopia the most recent of six Black African regimes subscribing to the designation of

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Edmond J. Keller is the author of numerous articles on African and Afro-American politics. His latest book is *Revolutionary Ethiopia* (Bloomington, Ind.: Indiana University Press, 1988).

BOOK REVIEWS

ON AFRICA

By Virginia Curtin Knight

Consulting Editor, *Current History*

GUINEA-BISSAU: FROM LIBERATION STRUGGLE TO INDEPENDENT STATEHOOD. By Carlos Lopes, translated by Michael Wolfers. (Boulder: Westview Press, 1987. 185 pages, references, \$35.00.)

Carlos Lopes is a Guinean intellectual who heads the National Institute of Studies and Research in Bissau. Originally prepared as an academic assignment, the text begins with an analysis of various development theories and how they apply to the theories of Guinea's revolutionary leader, Amílcar Cabral. The author then analyzes the results of Guinea's transition from a Portuguese colony to its present-day condition, calling it a "state with doubtful nation-state credentials."

Lopes is pessimistic about the future of Guinea-Bissau because he believes that the "petty bourgeoisie" who led the independence movement have exhausted their revolutionary potential and that the Marxists refuse to allow cultural and political realities to interfere with their class analysis.

POLITICS AND THE MILITARY IN UGANDA, 1890-1985. By Amii Omara-Otunnu. (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1987. 181 pages, appendixes, bibliography, index, \$35.00.)

With a brief introduction outlining the social structures and military practices of the major language groups in present-day Uganda, Omara-Otunnu demonstrates how someone like Idi Amin could flourish as a military strongman.

The author writes that the disintegration of discipline in the military was the root cause of Uganda's troubles. He attributes the breakdown in discipline to three main factors: one, what he calls "the familiarity syndrome"; two, the social composition of the rank and file; and three, a lack of education among the troops.

Politics and the Military is a well-written history of the military under colonial rule and its transformation between independence and the second military coup of 1985.

THE CHURCH STRUGGLE IN SOUTH AFRICA.

2d ed. By John W. de Gruchy. (Grand Rapids, Michigan: Eerdmans Publishing, 1986. 244 pages, notes, indexes and bibliography, \$10.95.)

De Gruchy explores the historical roots of the Christian church in South Africa, its relation to the government and its policy of apartheid, and the tensions

between the church and society and within the church itself. De Gruchy, a professor of Christian studies at the University of Cape Town, has supplemented this second edition with a postscript, a new bibliography and a subject index.

A HISTORY OF AFRICA. By Hosea Jaffe. (London: Zed Books, 1986. 147 pages, bibliography and index, \$26.95, cloth; \$9.95, paper.)

Hosea Jaffe is South African-born and author of books on political economics and African history. He interprets significant events in African history as the result of conflict between competing modes of production. In viewing the continent's history as a consequence of actions taken by Africans, he dismisses the European-centered Marxist theories of universal and inevitable stages of history.

AN AFRICAN VOICE: THE ROLE OF THE HUMANITIES IN AFRICAN INDEPENDENCE. By Robert W. July. (Durham: Duke University Press, 1987. 243 pages, notes, bibliography and index, \$22.50, cloth; \$10.95, paper.)

Robert W. July, a professor of history at Hunter College and Graduate School, City University of New York, has narrowed his scope from his previous book on the *Origins of Modern African Thought* to the impact of African humanists on African cultural independence. July concentrates on the people of West Africa, especially people from Ghana and Nigeria, and how they strengthened African culture in the face of Western imports.

July writes in an easy style, free of academic or political jargon, as he examines the activities of people in the arts and humanities—the visual arts, theater, music, dance and literature—and structural changes within the universities.

SOUTH AFRICA'S SECURITY DILEMMAS. By Christopher Coker. (New York: The Center for Strategic and International Studies, Praeger, 1987. 97 pages, notes and index, \$34.95, cloth; \$9.95, paper.)

Christopher Coker is a lecturer in international relations at the London School of Economics and the author of a book on United States foreign policy. In this book, Coker challenges what he calls the myth of South African military superiority that has evolved since the Sharpeville riots in 1960, when South Africa began beefing up its military. Coker asks "whether South Africa has a viable defense strategy or whether its military operations are more limited than we imagine. . . ."

Not underestimating the superior training and motivation, equipment and weaponry of the South Africa Defense Forces (SADF), Coker believes that SADF's abilities to defend its borders and maintain internal security are limited and will deteriorate over time. To Coker, "the township riots remain by far the most serious challenge the security forces now face. . . . indeed, the battle to keep order in the townships has become much harder," partly because of the conflict between the army and the police.

Turning his attention to the border areas, Coker asks whether South Africa has really benefited from its military operations in the bordering states of Botswana, Zambia and Zimbabwe. Despite the Israeli-style surgical strikes and destabilization, Coker says that South Africa's borders are not secure. Examples of insecure borders include the 100 miles from the Limpopo River to Pietersburg, where not one farm is occupied by whites; the unoccupied 40 percent of all farms on the Zimbabwean-South African border; the unoccupied 45 percent of farms on South Africa's border with Botswana; and the unoccupied 15 percent of farms on the border with Mozambique.

Coker also notes that the government will have difficulty sustaining its military strength with its current ceiling on military spending. The long-term effects of sanctions; the growing unhappiness of young white men with national service, and the crisis in the arms industry all contribute to a weakened military.

Coker's questions about the state of the South African military warrant further examination.

THEY CANNOT KILL US ALL: AN EYEWITNESS ACCOUNT OF SOUTH AFRICA TODAY. By Richard Manning. (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1987. 255 pages, \$16.95.)

As bureau chief in Johannesburg for *Newsweek*, Richard Manning spent nine months in South Africa before he was deported by the government. He writes of his experiences there from September, 1985, to June, 1986, during the tumultuous days of township rioting. Manning interrupts his narrative and puts events into historical perspective to give the reader some sense of the conditions that led to the current crisis.

LEGITIMATING THE ILLEGITIMATE: STATE MARKETS AND RESISTANCE IN SOUTH AFRICA. By Stanley B. Greenberg. (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1987. 251 pages, notes and index, \$35.00, cloth; \$12.95, paper.)

Associate director of the Southern African Research Program at Yale University, Stanley Greenberg writes that the current South African government is now more vulnerable to pressures from within and without. Greenberg cites changes in relations between the state and the labor movement and political strug-

gles within state institutions as evidence of the changing nature of the regime.

After interviews with hundreds of state officials and an examination of government archives, Greenberg concludes that the changing economic order in South Africa has compelled the state to change the nature of its relations with Africans. He writes that "the attempt to manage the emergent African working class and urban population has produced perplexing results that challenge the order of control. In the process, the state has been drawn both to coercive methods and, paradoxically, perhaps necessarily, to methods that seek to broaden support for the political and economic orders."

This is a clearly written examination of the constantly changing nature of relations between the state and the supply of labor. The labor movement in South Africa is perceived by many as the vanguard for change. This book provides an important analysis of the growth of the labor movement and its relations with and regulation by the government.

SOUTHERN AFRICA: AN AMERICAN ENIGMA.

By Sheikh R. Ali. (New York: Praeger, 1987. 227 pages, appendixes, bibliography and index, \$37.95.)

Sheikh Ali, a professor of political science at North Carolina Central University in Durham, outlines the currents of United States policy toward southern Africa between 1948 and the administration of President Ronald Reagan. Ali concludes that in the event of a civil war in South Africa, the United States would protect its economic interests and support the status quo. His book is a well-researched primer on United States-southern African policy.

THE ROAD TO ZIMBABWE, 1890-1980. By Anthony Verrier. (London: Jonathan Cape, 1986. 364 pages, appendixes, notes and index, \$26.95.)

Anthony Verrier examines the role of the British government in Rhodesian affairs from the chartering of the British South African Company to the August, 1979, Commonwealth Summit in Lusaka, Zambia. He concludes that all British governments from the 1890's to the 1970's have supported white against black in Rhodesia. And he puts the myths of British liberalism—and the actions of Labour governments in relation to both UDI (the Unilateral Declaration of Independence) and South Africa—in a historical context that refutes the traditional interpretation. Verrier bases his analysis of contemporary events on his access to the Wellensky papers, interviews, and his own involvement in the negotiating process.

He writes that the greatest influence on British relations with southern Africa was the "result of a decision by [Clement] Attlee and [Aneurin] Bevin to build a nuclear deterrent." Because of South Africa's uranium

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ECONOMIC REFORM AND WAR IN MOZAMBIQUE

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fell from \$25 million in 1983 to \$15 million in 1984, but it has apparently been increasing since then.¹³

All this assistance is crucial to Mozambique. Accounting for close to 30 percent of the budget, it keeps the country afloat. Food aid has become essential to the survival of a significant percentage of the population. The aid from the World Bank and the IMF has also resulted in considerable policy reform. Nevertheless, it is extremely unlikely that foreign aid will stem the country's economic decline, and lead it toward meaningful development, as long as the war continues.

THE POLITICAL SITUATION

In the midst of military turmoil and economic decline, at the core Mozambique continues to enjoy political stability. Cohesion has always been the great strength of the Frelimo regime; thus far, it has not been affected by the country's enormous problems.

The Frelimo leadership has been surprisingly unified since independence. While there have been disagreements over policy choices, conflicts have been resolved without a major crisis. The composition of the Political Bureau has remained unchanged, except for the addition of one member in 1983; the Central Committee was enlarged at the 1983 congress but was not purged of existing members. The succession to Machel was uneventful. Over the years, all rumors about the demotion or loss of influence of one or another Political Bureau member have been false. For example, after the 1983 party congress, Mario Machungo was said to be in disgrace for supporting the large project approach; but he is now the Prime Minister.

This cohesion explains why political turmoil has not been added to the country's other woes. Economic and military disaster has not shaken Frelimo. Paradoxically, Renamo is more successful at destroying Mozambique than it is at destroying the party in power.

On the other side of the conflict, Renamo seems to be equally unshakable, but for the opposite reason: rather than cohesive, it appears to be amorphous. Renamo remains elusive. In fact, more is known about the origin of the movement than about its present character. It is clear that Renamo was abetted by Rhodesian intelligence until 1980 and that it was transferred to South African

sponsorship at that time. A number of individuals prominent in the Portuguese colonial apparatus during the war of independence were deeply involved in the organization of the movement, and it had ties to conservative Portuguese businessmen.¹⁴ Much less is known about the sources and extent of external support for the current organization.

But perhaps the murkiest issues concern the organization and leadership of the movement. Afonso Dhlakama, the head of Renamo, is not a Jonas Savimbi. He stays inside Mozambique and does not seem to seek publicity. It is uncertain how much power he has within the organization, and to what extent he is simply a convenient African figurehead in an organization where outsiders still have major influence. It is not even clear whether Renamo is a single, hierarchical organization or a coalition of warlords enjoying a large degree of autonomy. Finally, it is not known whether all the disruption inside Mozambique is Renamo's responsibility. Renamo spokesmen claim that all atrocities and acts of wanton destruction committed in Mozambique are perpetrated by the undisciplined FAM. While nobody accepts that claim, diplomats in Maputo believe that Renamo is not responsible for all the attacks and that possibly one-third of all incidents may be caused by free-lance bandits rather than by Renamo proper.¹⁵

Whatever the truth, it seems clear that Frelimo does not confront an organization with a strong united leadership and clear lines of command, but faces an organization less well defined. This confrontation between a united, internally strong Frelimo and an amorphous Renamo makes the likelihood of a solution very remote. Frelimo's internal unity may give it the illusion of strength, increase its resolve to fight and decrease the pressure to find a peaceful settlement. Renamo's apparent decentralization also makes it easier for Renamo to fight on rather than to negotiate.

No attempt to find a political solution appears to be under way. In fact, the only known attempt to open a dialogue between Frelimo and Renamo took place in the fall of 1984 and failed. As a result, the coming year is likely to bring very little change in Mozambique. There will probably be a continuation of the trend toward reform of the economy, and a continued economic decline because of the fighting. The number of refugees and people displaced within the country will continue to increase and so will the death toll in the war-ravaged country. ■

ZIMBABWE

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South Africa remains an outlet for nearly 80 percent of the country's trade, a major source of imports, and the top market for Zimbabwe's exports.¹⁵ To compound the dilemma, near-bankrupt Zambia, a long-time champion of sanctions but desperately short of foreign exchange,

¹⁵*Africa Economic Digest*, July 24, 1987, p. 7.

¹³United States Agency for International Development, *Congressional Presentation Fiscal Year 1987*, p. 304.

¹⁴See David Martin and Phyllis Johnson, "Mozambique: To Nkomati and Beyond," in Phyllis Johnson and David Martin, eds., *Destructive Engagement* (Harare: Zimbabwe Publishing House, 1986), pp. 1-42; *Africa Contemporary Record*, vol. 15, 1982-1983, pp. A12-A19.

¹⁵William Claiborne, op. cit.

anxiously sought to take advantage of the sudden and unexpected boom in world copper prices by increasing its exports of the metal. A blockage of routes to the south would have made that nearly impossible. Thus, Mugabe, the great pragmatist, bowed to the realities of the day and announced to his frustrated citizens that the country was simply not ready for such a drastic step and would have to postpone sanctions again. Ironically, such efforts to reduce Zimbabwe's dependence on South Africa risked increasing Mugabe's vulnerability to domestic economic hardship and social unrest and to criticism from Zambia, its valued neighbor and ally. Mugabe also had to face the fact that neither the Western nor the Eastern powers were prepared to compensate Zimbabwe for a sanctions-related loss of trade.

The Soviet Union, "dirty-dancing" into a rapprochement with the United States, could ill afford to risk a misstep by stoking the southern African fires. Moreover, the Eastern bloc economies were too weak to prop up Zambia and Zimbabwe, and the African National Congress seemed too disorganized and ill-disciplined inside South Africa to take effective advantage of further economic destabilization there.

The United States was even more hesitant to assist Zimbabwe. Relations between the two countries have steadily deteriorated since independence. And since 1986, the Americans have stopped all but humanitarian assistance. The Reagan administration grudgingly continues to provide modest assistance for upgrading the Beira Corridor but only through the medium of the Mozambique authorities. Zimbabwe's dependence on its southern adversary was visibly illustrated later in 1987 when it had to rent diesel locomotives from South Africa to relieve shortages of haulage power.

ECONOMIC CONSTRAINTS

Zimbabwe's economy was severely constrained by a shortage of foreign exchange, brought on by a large foreign debt. Much of the problem stemmed from heavy public borrowing to finance the country's impressive expansion of its educational and health services and to boost the government's role as a domestic investor and lender. The price for these objectives has been high. The debt-service ratio has climbed steadily since independence, and approached 30 percent by the end of 1987, an all-time high. This has placed severe limits on import capacity and has aggravated the balance of payments situation.¹⁶

The government, anxious to maintain its outstanding reputation in the international financial community, particularly among its external creditors, has not repudiated any of its debt and has not fallen into arrears on its payments of interest and principal. Nor has it sought a

comprehensive rescheduling or restructuring of its debt, for fear of losing a measure of its financial autonomy to external organizations and the governments that influence them.

On the other hand, the country has failed to obtain fresh infusions of private capital. Western banks and multinational corporations take Mugabe seriously when he says that Zimbabwe is already too vulnerable to foreign economic influence. Though the regime has never confiscated private property, it refuses to be bound by international investment codes.

The government has begun to deal with the economic crisis in its own way. In 1986, Zimbabwe started to curtail imports drastically through the progressive and substantial devaluation of its currency. The cost of imports skyrocketed. This hurt all sectors of the economy because of the dependence on imported spare parts and raw materials used in production. Consequently, many factories, mines and transport vehicles were idled or reduced their capacity. On the other hand, the devalued Zimbabwe dollar made exports more competitive in world markets and the country improved its export performance in 1987, despite predictions to the contrary. To add another spur, the regime launched an ambitious \$6.5-million Export Incentive Scheme.¹⁷

Domestic mining companies were greatly helped by the dramatic escalation in world prices of base metals, particularly copper and nickel, and by the relative stability of world prices for gold. Zimbabwe also commanded strong prices for beef. The country was able to maintain a trade surplus, however small, because of an increase in barter, or countertrade, especially with Eastern bloc countries and India. Nearly 20 percent of its trade in 1987 was of this nature. Zimbabwe, an oil importer, also benefited from the weakness in oil prices, as petroleum hovered between US\$16 and US\$17 per barrel.

Toward the end of 1987, the economy showed signs of improvement. But austerity had resulted in a high degree of labor tension, marked by a spate of wildcat strikes beginning in August. Organized labor was angry because of the government imposed a wage freeze at a time when inflation was growing and had exceeded 15 percent. Unemployment has become one of the country's vulnerable points. The population growth rate is approximately 3.5 percent per year, and more than half the population is under 15 years of age. Since independence, more than 370,000 youths have reached employment age and face a job market in which nearly 17 percent of the labor force is unemployed. To keep pace with the population explosion, the economy must grow at least 8 percent a year. Yet over the last four years, the gross domestic product (GDP) growth rate has averaged less than 1.5 percent.¹⁸

In terms of economic planning, Zimbabwe seems to be running against the general tide in Africa. Public spending is steadily increasing, and the 1987-1988 budget was the largest in history, representing an 11 percent increase in actual expenditure. Capital spending is soar-

¹⁶Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe, *Quarterly Economic and Statistical Review*, vol. 8, no. 4 (December, 1987), pp. 15-27.

¹⁷*New African* (London), September, 1987.

¹⁸Hull, "Zimbabwe Country Report," p. 66.

ing, and security and defense expenditures on the military and police continue to eat up an increasing amount of the budget. Also, while most African countries are giving at least lip service to privatization, Zimbabwe is increasing its subsidization of parastatals and acquiring greater equity in private companies, particularly those that are headquartered in South Africa or that have a large proportion of South African shareholders. In 1987, the government secured the majority ownership of the giant firm, Zimbabwe Newspapers. It also acquired a 37 percent holding in the huge Delta Corporation, owned by South African Breweries.¹⁹

Zimbabwe is uneasy about its dependence on nonconsumer imports and its export of primary commodities. Consequently, the thrust will be toward import-substituting industries that are capable of producing more capital goods domestically and exporting more finished products. Still, import substitution means moving into industries that require greater capital and advanced technology. Some economists argue that Zimbabwe's import-substitution policies, which date back to the days of Ian Smith's regime, have merely shifted the frontier of import dependency from the finished products to the machines and parts needed to manufacture them.

Unable or unwilling to attract foreign investment, the government must rely more completely on its own resources. The Industrial Development Corporation (IDC), a parastatal set up during the days of white rule, is being restructured to broaden its capital base tenfold to \$60 million.²⁰ The IDC is expected to invest in companies stressing import substitution. In order to generate more capital for public investment, the government placed a surcharge on company tax rates in 1987. And to stem the flight of capital and encourage domestic private investment, the government cut the allowable dividend and profit remittances of foreign companies.

The government is also pushing its indigenization program. It has followed Zambia's lead in speeding the retirement of white civil servants and reducing the number of expatriates in management. Most visible was the replacement of the Canadian head of Zimbank by L. Tsumba, a Zimbabwean. Despite its encouragement of parastatals, the government has become more insistent that they be well managed and profitable. Toward that end, an Impartial Commission of Inquiry into Parastatals was formed and has begun to weed out managers who are considered incompetent, nepotistic or corrupt. The executives of National Railways and Air Zimbabwe have come under intense criticism and the managing director of the Zimbabwe Iron and Steel Company (ZISCO) has been sacked.

With moderate success, Mugabe is using his position as the current head of the nonaligned movement to re-

duce Zimbabwe's dependence on the Western powers. The regime has strengthened its links with the Eastern bloc countries and has drawn closer to fellow members of the nonaligned movement, particularly India, Romania, Algeria and Yugoslavia. In March, 1987, it established full diplomatic relations with Afghanistan. Communist countries were particularly well represented at Zimbabwe's annual International Trade Fair in Bulawayo. Cuba attended for the first time, and was joined by East Germany, Czechoslovakia, Hungary and the Soviet Union, along with many Western countries.²¹

Nevertheless, trade with the Eastern bloc countries remains small and most of the gains have been made in the area of technical cooperation. The regime has also tried to reduce its vulnerability by promoting regional trade in Africa. It continues to play a leading role in the Southern Africa Development Coordination Conference and in the 18-nation Preferential Trade Area with eastern and southern Africa. Relations with the People's Republic of China and North Korea continue to be especially cordial. The \$30-million Chinese-built sports stadium was completed in Harare, Zimbabwe's capital, and in addition, North Korea provides a measure of military and technical support.²²

Zimbabwe has cultivated warm relations with South Africa's major revolutionary organization, the African National Congress (ANC), although Zimbabwe has fallen short of permitting it to operate openly from Zimbabwean territory, largely because of threats of retaliation by South Africa. In October, the government hosted an international conference on apartheid, attended by more than 500 delegates from a variety of organizations, including ANC president Oliver Tambo, and Joe Slovo, a member of the ANC's executive committee and a leader of the Communist party of South Africa.

CONCLUSION

Like all leaders and governments in Africa today, President Mugabe and his ruling ZANU-PF are desperately searching for ways to reduce their vulnerability to domestic and external threats. In southern Africa, this search has assumed a special urgency. To survive in that increasingly turbulent region, Mugabe has had to navigate between the Scylla of white South Africa and the Charybdis of domestic social and ethnic turmoil. He has had to balance delicately the pressures of deeply entrenched local capitalists against the strident demands of socialist ideologues, and the needs of frustrated landless black peasants against prosperous white commercial farmers.

In the process, Mugabe has been forced to compromise his Marxist ideals and principles and has rendered himself dangerously vulnerable to the very people who catapulted him into power. Never before has President Robert Mugabe enjoyed as much power and as much opportunity to shape Zimbabwe's future. It remains to be seen whether external and internal forces will

¹⁹*Economist Intelligence Unit*, no. 4 (1987), pp. 9-12.

²⁰*Ibid.*, p. 16.

²¹*Africa Economic Digest*, May 15, 1987, p. 14.

²²*Financial Times*, January 2, 1988, p. 24.

push him toward the right, the left, or the center, and whether he can move his deeply divided country toward greater freedom and equity for all. Will citizens of different racial, cultural and ethnic backgrounds succeed, through a synergistic process, in forging a new nation in Zimbabwe? Zimbabwe could very well become the testing ground for a new world order, or a killing field for racists, tribalists and ideologues. ■

SOUTH AFRICA

(Continued from page 208)

the coming struggle for majority rule. Zulu Chief Mangosuthu Buthelezi, feeling threatened and betrayed on his own turf, has lashed out at UDF and COSATU as "not worthy" of reconciliation. In his words,

... the only reconciliation that will ever be [successful] in this country is the reconciliation of the most powerful with those who pay homage to the powerful. We are talking about a life and death struggle.¹⁵

The UDF seems more amenable to peace talks, but it is doubtful that the leaders of that umbrella organization, restrained and incapacitated by the state of emergency and police harassment, speak for their more zealous "comrades." In such a tense atmosphere, the factions are vulnerable to government manipulation. The government has apparently been successful in convincing outsiders that township violence has been contained and that what remains is "black on black."

The ANC grows steadily in appeal and stature. The government reports some 19.5 "guerrilla attacks" per month, almost half of which are aimed at the security forces.¹⁶ Yet the main purpose of these attacks remains symbolic and inspirational, to expose the government's vulnerabilities and to demonstrate what can be achieved. The ANC simply does not possess the means to field and support an army within South Africa large enough to tie down large numbers of defense forces. Guerrilla warfare is just one theme in its political struggle.

Ironically, the ANC is gaining at a time when its promise to intensify the armed struggle has not materialized. As the ANC continues to organize, infiltrate, en-

courage protest and sabotage, and lobby internationally, more and more it assumes the visage of a responsible alternative to government rather than a calculating, pro-Soviet lunatic fringe, as Pretoria insists.¹⁷ A series of discussions by white and black leaders with ANC spokespersons in exile add to the ANC's aura of reasonableness and sobriety. Students, clerics, professionals, trade unionists, politicians, academics and journalists have headed to Lusaka, London, New York and elsewhere for talks with ANC officials.

Perhaps the most celebrated and publicized sessions were held in Dakar, Senegal, in July.¹⁸ Some 61 mostly Afrikaner leaders and intellectuals (none from the ruling party or government, most from the left of center of the white political spectrum) met 17 leading ANC intellectuals, among them Thabo Mbeki (whose father was released from prison in November), Mac Maharaj, Pallo Jordan and Steve Tswete. Their assignment: to contemplate the democratic future of their common homeland.

The white delegation was led by the former leader of the Progressive Federal party opposition in Parliament, Dr. Frederik van Zyl Slabbert, and former member of Parliament Alex Boraine. Their organization, the Institute for a Democratic Alternative for South Africa, helped set up the sessions. Although white delegates had no official authority to "negotiate," the talks were fruitful in generating dialogue, publicizing the "reasonable" side of the ANC in white South Africa and identifying the ANC as the principal adversary of Afrikaner nationalism. Discussions focused on the reluctance of liberal whites to identify with the ANC's policy of "armed struggle," the role of Communists in the ANC, and the ANC's long-range plans for the nationalization of privately owned businesses and enterprises. For some whites, fears were partly alleviated. Others held no illusions about a peaceful, rapid transition to a majoritarian future.

A communiqué issued at the end of the talks, the Dakar declaration, said that the signatories "accepted the historical reality of armed struggle," while they expressed "deep concern" over the proliferation of "uncontrolled violence." Two white businessmen who participated declined to sign the declaration. The outcome of the talks, however, was a broad accord on general principles for a political solution to the present conflict—a negotiated solution involving the ANC after the unconditional release of all political prisoners and the unbanning of organizations. The white delegates technically represented no one and held no agreed-on views; the ANC participants spoke with a single voice for their party. Still, the exchange of views was important and will lead to further discussions.

The government, for its part, seeks to stifle any future "pilgrimages" to the ANC. On its return, the IDASA group was met with violence and hostile right-wing demonstration. A black official of IDASA was found stabbed to death within a couple of weeks.

¹⁵Quoted in *Weekly Mail*, vol. 3, no. 49 (December 11–December 17, 1987), p. 1. See also Patrick Laurence, "Buthelezi on Violence," *Weekly Mail*, vol. 4, no. 1 (January 15–January 21, 1988), p. 5.

¹⁶*Weekly Mail*, vol. 3, no. 48 (December 4–December 10, 1987), p. 4.

¹⁷Thomas G. Karis, "South African Liberation: The Communist Factor," *Foreign Affairs*, vol. 65, no. 2 (Winter, 1986/87), pp. 267–287. The government's viewpoint is detailed in *Talking with the ANC* . . . (Pretoria: Bureau for Information, June, 1986). For background on the ANC, see Thomas G. Karis, "Revolution in the Making: Black Politics in South Africa," *Foreign Affairs*, vol. 62, no. 2 (Winter, 1983/84), pp. 378–406; Stephen M. Davis, *Apartheid's Rebels: Inside South Africa's Hidden War* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1987).

¹⁸John Matisonn, "Meeting the ANC in West Africa," *Work in Progress*, no. 49 (September, 1987), pp. 3–5.

The year ended on a note of deceptive calm. For the most part, the children are back in school. The economy is apparently recovering its vitality. The initial shock of international sanctions has been fended off. The government muddles along, without apparent direction or agreement as to strategy and purpose. Press laws have been tightened, masking the unrest. A revised and comprehensive security apparatus is at work throughout the country. The right wing has made its presence felt. Violent and punitive preemptive strikes across the borders have neutralized immediate threats there.

The appearance of stabilization in South Africa may well mask the realities of political ferment and frustration. In most of the townships, the protests, albeit muted compared to those of the previous three years, continue. A divided black population is united in its desire to displace white rule, come what may. Opposition continues in the face of police and defense force provocation. The homelands are unsettled and explosive. The trade union movement is poised to lash out on a nationwide scale. Survival instincts are imperative, especially for young people.

In a way, life is back to "normal." Do not be deceived. The two great nationalisms of South Africa, white and black, are growing stronger as the government tries to project an atmosphere of calm. The two sides, each badly wounded and divided, are ready for another round. It is, in Milton's words, "that practis'd falsehood under saintly shew, Deep malice to conceal, couch'd with revenge." ■

TANZANIA

(Continued from page 212)

currency transaction is not worth the risk.

TRADE LIBERALIZATION

A second major building block in the government's program of policy reform is trade liberalization, the gradual removal of restrictions on the import and export of all categories of goods, including consumer items as well as industrial and agricultural inputs. Liberalizing trade serves a variety of purposes vital to economic recovery. First and foremost, it is integral to the effectiveness of currency devaluation, since it helps eliminate one of the most powerful motivations for exchanging currency illegally: if desired consumer goods become available in local shops, there is less reason to engage in illegal transactions for foreign currency. No amount of devaluation is likely to produce a stable exchange rate if the citizens of a society can obtain the goods they desire only in foreign markets.

Trade liberalization is also vital as a stimulus for increased agricultural production and a host of other economic activities. By the late 1970's, some observers of the Tanzanian rural sector had come to believe that the reasons for diminished production levels had less to do with low producer prices than with the fact that Tanzanian farmers could purchase very little with the shillings they

did obtain. The same was undoubtedly true of innumerable urban dwellers. In economic parlance, this is sometimes referred to as excessive liquidity, meaning that many Tanzanians had ample supplies of cash given the meager level of goods available and, therefore, they had little incentive for the added cash income that increased production might bring. Without an increased supply of consumer goods, neither higher producer prices for farmers nor wage increases for urban workers are likely to have any significant economic effect.

Trade liberalization can also help to arrest the hemorrhage of foreign exchange that occurs when agricultural products are smuggled out of the country to obtain goods that cannot be obtained in domestic markets. There is little doubt that, in recent years, a sizable proportion of Tanzania's annual coffee harvest has been quietly crossing into neighboring nations like Kenya and Uganda as part of a complex bartering process to acquire goods that were unavailable locally. Not only did Tanzania lose the hard currency that legal sale of this commodity might have realized, but it also lost the value of the imported inputs used in its production. The dramatic recovery in agricultural productivity reported in the *Wall Street Journal* article cited above may have had less to do with suddenly increased levels of production than with the fact that commodities that were being illegally transported into Kenya and Uganda have begun to be legitimately marketed within Tanzania.

Without trade liberalization, then, Tanzania would have continued to endure an economic impasse. Its domestic production of critically important consumer goods had been drastically reduced as a result of the acute scarcity of foreign exchange that was making it all but impossible to import the necessary factory inputs like raw materials and machinery. At the same time, trade barriers resulting from its established policy of providing a protectionist wall to insulate domestic industry from foreign competition had virtually eliminated imported supplies. As a result, Tanzania's economy was stagnating at low levels of production and of consumption. It is some measure of the popularity of the policy of freer trade that clothing now being imported as part of the new policy is referred to colloquially as "asante Mwinyi" (thank you, President Mwinyi).

PRICE REFORM

According to the Economic Recovery Program agreed on by the Tanzanian government and the IMF in July, 1986, producer prices for agricultural commodities will be allowed to rise dramatically, by about 5 percent per year over inflation. In addition, private traders will be allowed to purchase and sell many of Tanzania's most important commodities, including maize, the country's principal food staple. Price reform has already yielded impressive results including self-sufficiency in maize and, most dramatically, a 100 percent increase in cotton production between 1986 and 1987. Sisal production has

also begun to recover; the area planted to this crop increased by about 65 percent during this same period.¹² While other exports, including coffee and cashews, have been slower to register such increases, this is probably attributable to the fact that, as tree crops, they require several years before production responds to a more favorable economic environment.

The change toward higher agricultural prices that accurately reflect market considerations represents a fundamental reversal of the government's previous policy. At independence, the Tanzanian government established strict controls over the procurement, processing and marketing of Tanzania's major agricultural commodities. The policy of creating strict government controls was most commonly justified on the basis that private traders were likely to exploit peasant farmers, but its principal outcome was to suppress the producer prices of agricultural commodities to levels far below those that might have existed under freer economic conditions.

The policy of price suppression had many roots. Lowering the prices of food staples was one means among several, including currency overvaluation, of subsidizing the living costs of urban consumers. The reason for this subsidy is political, not economic. African governments throughout the continent are deeply concerned about the potential for political turbulence in their capital cities. To the degree that this is possible, cheapening the cost of food is one way to reduce the likelihood of urban discontent.¹³ Cheap food benefits practically all urban groups. The Tanzanian government was no exception to this general proposition. Indeed, as the country's largest employer, it could be said to have benefited most from this policy, since a low-paid civil service helped facilitate the massive expansion of the government's payroll.

Suppression of the prices of exportable commodities had somewhat different purposes. When Tanzania became independent in 1961, its new government, like so many others in Africa, was immediately compelled to deal with new expectations. The transition from colonial rule to independence, it was generally thought, would bring about long-awaited increases in a variety of social services, including health and education, as well as improvements in rural infrastructure. The burning question was where to locate the financial resources to respond to these expectations.

The most feasible immediate answer was to increase the level of taxation on agricultural exports. The most effective means of doing so, because it was not as visible as a direct increase in the export tax was to broaden the margin between the world market price and the producer price. By establishing itself as a monopolistic purchaser of such commodities like coffee, sisal and tea, the govern-

ment was able to extract a substantial financial gain from the international sale of these items and to use the money to finance the enlargement of state services.

PARASTATAL REFORMS

The fourth area of policy reform has to do with the role and financing of the parastatal corporations that operate in the agricultural sector. As an integral component of its policy of regulating producer prices, the Tanzanian government had given these corporations, sometimes referred to as crop authorities, a legal monopoly over transactions with producers. Since private traders were not allowed to compete with government agencies in the purchasing of a wide array of agricultural commodities, price competition at the farm level was virtually negligible. This made it possible for government corporations not only to offer low prices, but to engage in a variety of other practices that had profound disincentive effects on production. A number of the government's crop authorities fell far behind, for example, in their payments to farmers, while other crop authorities made partial payments or made their payments in practically worthless certificates.

Under the Economic Recovery Program, private traders are now given far greater latitude to buy agricultural commodities directly from farmers for resale in cities and towns. The principal commodity affected by this change thus far has been maize, and there seems little doubt that the increased role of the private sector accounts for the most part for the sudden increase in the level of domestically marketed maize. The Recovery Program provides for a substantial broadening of the private sector's role in the export area as well. Among other changes, it completely eliminates the government's monopoly of Tanzania's export trade. For example, it allows both privately owned estates and producer cooperatives to act as exporters for tea and oilseeds.

ECONOMIC RECOVERY: HOW VIABLE?

A host of questions has been raised about the viability of Tanzania's present economic recovery. An issue that arises immediately is the country's staggering foreign debt and its implications for long-term development. Before the Economic Recovery Program began, the debt-service ratio (the percentage of foreign exchange earnings used to make debt payments) was estimated at more than 65 percent. The debt burden alone was making it extremely difficult for Tanzania to regain a positive economic momentum. Because such a large proportion of Tanzania's hard-earned foreign currency had to be used to repay foreign creditors, it could not be used to acquire vitally necessary economic inputs, including those needed to stimulate agricultural production.

Under the terms of the IMF agreement, Tanzania has been given a three-year moratorium on debt payments and, under present conditions, will not be required to resume debt servicing until the summer of 1989. The

¹²"Tanzania's Green Gold," in *World Food Program Journal*, no. 3 (July-September, 1987), p. 5.

¹³For one statement of this view, see Robert Bates, *Markets and States in Tropical Africa* (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1980).

idea behind the moratorium is that the economy should be given breathing space for economic recovery and that debt payments will be substantially easier once there is an upward economic trajectory. This strategy is working well. It permits Tanzania to use its foreign exchange earnings to finance the importation of desperately needed capital goods, spare parts and raw materials for the industrial sector, the equipment and supplies needed to rebuild a badly deteriorated transportation infrastructure and, perhaps most important, to import the goods necessary to rejuvenate the agricultural sector.

Debt relief has made all this possible while allowing the country the latitude to import the consumer goods necessary to provide material incentives for higher levels of production. The debt moratorium has also contributed to a new psychological atmosphere. As recently as 1984, Tanzania was very much in the grip of a mood of economic defeatism. Today, this has clearly been replaced by an atmosphere of economic optimism about the future.

The critical question is what happens when Tanzania is required to resume some level of debt repayment. Much, of course, depends upon the extent to which its creditors are prepared to continue a highly flexible approach to debt in return for continuing policy reforms that encourage the private sector. Since Tanzania has always enjoyed a highly positive image among donor agencies, such flexibility is not unlikely. But the possibility always exists that, if the process of policy reform should stall, the need to resume debt repayments could severely hamper Tanzania's economic recovery by reducing the import of needed economic inputs.

SOCIALIST OPPOSITION

Another set of questions has to do with how far and how fast the socialist factions within the party and the government are prepared to see changes proceed. Although the process of policy reform has thus far proceeded with surprising smoothness, it would be premature to conclude that there will not be stronger and more active opposition. Resistance to economic liberalization could easily stiffen, for example, if overstuffed government agencies or parastatal corporations are compelled by the new economic arrangements to begin laying off redundant employees. A case in point is the National Milling Corporation (NMC), the parastatal corporation established to purchase, process and distribute maize.

According to the new economic policy, parastatal corporations that incur losses will no longer be subsidized out of the government's budget and must seek ways to operate on a profitable basis. If this requirement is strictly imposed, the NMC and other parastatal bodies in a comparable position will be required to cut back substantially on the size of their staffs. Since the private sector is not yet sufficiently robust to absorb these persons, there could be a sharp rise in the level of unemployment among civil servants and parastatal employees. The

prospect of high public sector unemployment could easily jeopardize Tanzania's still fragile economic recovery by forcing the government to deal with stiffening opposition to policy reform from within its own ranks.

INFLATION THREAT

Discontent within the public sector could also be seriously exacerbated by the high level of inflation that has accompanied the early stages of economic recovery. Although the shops and stores in Dar es Salaam have become a virtual cornucopia of consumer items that were practically unobtainable just a few years ago, the prices of these items have, in most cases, skyrocketed to levels far beyond the reach of an average public sector employee. A fivefold devaluation of the Tanzanian shilling has produced an equivalent increase in the local shilling price of imported goods and an almost commensurate increase in the cost of a wide array of domestically produced items. Even as this has occurred, the government has been compelled by the terms of its IMF agreement to maintain a strict ceiling on public sector salary increases. Since these are now substantially below the country's inflation rate, there has already been a substantial erosion of the purchasing power of government employees.

A final question has to do with how much breadth and depth the economic recovery will be able to attain. There is much concern about the possibility that a flood of imports will reduce the prospects of an economic recovery for domestic industries that engaged in the production of items now being acquired abroad. Will imported clothing, for example, make it more difficult to revive the Tanzanian textile industry? Similar questions will confront a host of industries ranging from concrete production to bicycle assembly.

To be successful in sparking a sustainable and broad-based pattern of economic growth, trade liberalization may need to be diluted with a measure of protection for potentially viable local industries. While there is little doubt that protectionism allowed a number of Tanzanian industries to operate in an inefficient and costly manner, it is doubtful that the sudden and virtually complete removal of this protection will stimulate their economic maturity. Rather, it may contribute to long-term dependence on the importation of manufactured goods.

Tanzania has set in place the basic building blocks of an economic recovery. As a result, there is considerable basis for optimism about the country's prospects. One of the most important of these building blocks is political, the fact that Tanzania has justly earned a positive reputation as one of Africa's most stable countries. However, a variety of political and economic hurdles remain to be surmounted. The political disagreements between socialists and pragmatists remain an important feature of the Tanzanian system. If the economic recovery program falters, these disagreements could become accentuated and might assume dimensions that would constrain the ongoing process of policy reform. ■

ZAIRE

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my personal participation in the organization responsible for this nomination.

Saying that he "had always been hostile to the formation of a government in exile . . . for Zaire cannot afford the luxury of two parallel governments," Mokede appealed to all exiles "to return to the country to take part in the immense task of national reconstruction."²² In sum, far from demonstrating the breadth and strength of opposition to the Mobutu regime, this initiative demonstrated the fragmentation and incoherence of the opposition.

Violent opposition to the Mobutu regime appears to be on the wane. About 1,500 members of Laurent Kabila's Party of the Popular Revolution (PRP) insurgency in eastern Zaire reportedly surrendered in 1986.²³ There has been no recurrence of the kind of bomb blasts that occurred in 1984 at the Voice of Zaire and the central post office in Kinshasa, for which Libya was blamed. In August, 1987, however, the Voice of Zaire announced that a large cache of arms and ammunition brought into the country illegally had been discovered in a military camp in Kinshasa. Armed forces Chief of Staff General Eluki Monga Aundu was quoted as saying that the arms had come into the port of Matadi without clearing customs and had been transported to Camp Kokolo in a vehicle belonging to an unnamed diplomatic mission.²⁴ The apparent coup attempt was followed by a major purge of high military officers.

THE AIDS THREAT

Beyond the maneuverings of the politicians in power and their counterparts in exile and beyond the even more serious question of economic decline, Zaire faces a disaster in the form of widespread infection with the virus-borne Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome (AIDS). To avoid misunderstanding, it should be stressed that the vectors of the disease in Central Africa are different from those in North America. Transmission by sexual intercourse is mainly heterosexual, and transmission by intravenous drug use is rare, while infection through blood transfusion is apparently much more common than it is in North America. Intrauterine transmission from mother to child seems to be common.

Estimates vary widely as to the extent of AIDS infection in Zaire. Dr. Kayembe of Zaire estimates that be-

tween 4 percent and 7 percent of the general population of Zaire is infected, with the rate among female prostitutes as high as 27 percent.²⁵

In neighboring Zambia, President Kenneth Kaunda set an example for candor when he announced, on October 4, 1987, that his son Masuzyo had died of AIDS at the age of 32. It is widely believed that in Central Africa AIDS is hitting the urban middle class—teachers, administrators, doctors, engineers, traders, mechanics, and military officers—whose skills are vital to the future of the region. These are the people who travel more, who care less about tradition, and who have more opportunity for promiscuity. The result may well be disastrous. As the international medical bulletin *Aids-Forschung* put it:

A disease selectively causing ill health and death in the most productive age group and in the best educated will have . . . horrifying demographic, social and economic consequences.²⁶

Statistics from Zambia bear out this warning. At the main hospital in Lusaka, the capital, more than one-third of the young men who were tested in 1986 were infected with the virus. In Kitwe, in the copper belt adjacent to Zaire, 44.4 percent of female patients at the hospital tested positive for the AIDS virus, while well over 10 percent of the "healthy" people like blood donors and pregnant mothers were also infected. It should be emphasized that in Africa, middle class people are much more likely to use Western-style hospitals and clinics than are the poor.²⁷

Until recently, the government of Zaire has been less forthcoming about AIDS than the governments of some of its neighbors. For example, World Health Organization statistics include data from the Central African Republic, Congo, Zambia, Tanzania, Rwanda and Uganda, but not Zaire.²⁸ However, the Zairian government officially launched an anti-AIDS campaign in June, 1987. The campaign was led by a national committee created by the government, which handed out free condoms on June 22 as part of the nationwide campaign. It seems clear, however, that the campaign faces an uphill fight, particularly among men.²⁹

Confronted with steadily declining living standards, the absence of a credible program to reverse that decline, an unresponsive government to which there is no viable alternative, and an epidemic disease that threatens to wipe out large numbers of young adults, the typical Zairian can be forgiven for sinking into despair. "Recovery" may be visible in certain aggregate measures, especially as the term is interpreted by observers in Washington and New York, but "decline" is visible all around. ■

ETHIOPIA

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People's Republic. The constitution resembles a hybrid of the Soviet and Romanian constitutions. The original

²²United States Department of State, op. cit.

²³ARB, September 15, 1987, p. 8609.

²⁴Claude Gras, Jean-Claude Cuisinier, and Pierre Aubry, "Le SIDA en Afrique," *Afrique Contemporaine*, no. 143 (March, 1987), p. 26.

²⁵ARB, October 15, 1987, p. 8650, citing *Aids Forschung*.

²⁶ARB, October 15, 1987, p. 8650.

²⁷See the map accompanying Gras, Cuisinier, and Aubry, op. cit., p. 25.

²⁸ARB, August 15, 1987, p. 8584.

²⁹See *Jeune Afrique*, April 29, 1987, p. 50.

draft was closely patterned on the Soviet model, but the final version departs from that model in two critical respects. First, the office of the presidency is strengthened and elevated above the authority of the Council of State. This change creates a President with powers similar to those of the Romanian chief executive. Second, the Soviet model of self-determination is consciously not endorsed. It was reported that the problem of nationalities was hotly debated in the drafting committee as well as in the WPE Central Committee, but nothing was immediately changed in this regard.¹⁵

The constitution declares that Ethiopia is a unitary state; Amharic is the national language. However, the language, religion and culture of all constituent nationality groups are said to be protected by law. Article 9 declares that "administrative and autonomous regions" are to be created in order to "give a democratic expression to the rights of nationalities and a Marxist-Leninist solution to the nationalities issue." "Narrow nationalism" is regarded as counterrevolutionary and is therefore not tolerated. Regional autonomy is assumed in certain cases to encourage class unity and to neutralize aspects of nationalist affinities.

The responsibility for spelling out the legal basis for autonomous and administrative regions was assigned to the 835-member National Assembly (Shengo). That body meets once a year. Day-to-day operations of the central government are handled by the Council of State, seven permanent commissions and various ministries.

The first session of the Shengo was convened in early September, 1987. One of its first items of business was the government's plan for administrative reorganization of regional governments. The plan was rapidly endorsed by the Assembly. As a result, 24 administrative regions and 5 autonomous regions were created. The autonomous regions are Tigre, Dire Dawa, Ogaden, Assab and Eritrea; among the autonomous regions, Eritrea apparently has the most autonomy. In particular, Eritrea's regional government has broader powers in the areas of industrial development and education. In contrast to the governments of other autonomous regions, the Eritrean government can independently establish any type of industry; and it controls education up to the junior college level. Other autonomous regional governments are limited; they are able to set up only medium-size industries and can control education only to the secondary level.¹⁶

Eritrea also differs from other autonomous regions in that it has three administrative regions of its own: the north, made up of what were once Barka, Keren and Sahel provinces; the south-central part of historic Eritrea; and the west. The northern administrative region is almost totally under the control of the Eritrean People's

Liberation Front (EPLF). Some observers suggest that the regime may consider giving up that region to the EPLF in a future political settlement. On the other hand, the creation of a new Assab autonomous region is apparently an attempt to foreclose any Eritrean claims to that area. It also guarantees Ethiopia's access to the Red Sea. Significantly, Assab region includes portions of what were once districts in eastern Tigre and Wollo.

The latest round of administrative reorganization is a reality only on paper. The party and the administrative infrastructure necessary to implement the policy are being put into place slowly. Moreover, the regime has encountered considerable resistance from the various liberation and other opposition movements, universally reject the plan.

The EPLF has called for a UN-sponsored referendum so that the Eritrean people themselves can decide their fate. It is not insignificant that the EPLF sees no role for the Organization of African Unity (OAU) in the resolution of this problem, because the OAU has consistently rejected Eritrea's claim to self-determination. By the time the OAU was formed, Ethiopia had already annexed Eritrea, and it was considered by the OAU to be a province of that country.

The Eritrean Liberation Front (ELF) was particularly outraged by the creation of the autonomous region of Assab. It saw this move as yet another Ethiopian attempt to annex a significant part of the historic colony of Eritrea. In its initial statement on the plan, the ELF called on the Ethiopian government to sit down at the negotiating table immediately with a unified Eritrean delegation, without preconditions. TPLF regards the new constitution as irrelevant to its movement for social justice in Ethiopia.

CONCLUSION

For more than a decade the government of Ethiopia has engaged in social and political policies intended to consolidate its power while at the same time enhancing its legitimacy. In approaching these objectives the regime has been severely constrained by its limited resource capacity. With the steady growth of the central bureaucracy and the inauguration of a vanguard party, the lack of trained and ideologically disciplined agents of the state has at least been partially addressed. However, the regime continues to lack the legitimacy it so critically needs. It also lacks the economic resources needed to promote rapid development.

The regime's efforts to implement socialism from above have been costly both in financial and in human terms. The enactment of new projects like resettlement and villagization will do little to change the situation. Critics argue that, if anything, these policies will make matters worse. Moreover, the establishment of the WPE and the Constitution of 1987, new institutions intended at least in part to enhance the regime's legitimacy, promise to have immediate meaning for few if any members of

¹⁵See "Ethiopia: Timetable," *Africa Confidential*, vol. 27, no. 20 (October 1, 1987).

¹⁶See "Ethiopia: Redrawing the Map," *Africa Confidential*, vol. 28, no. 23 (November 18, 1987).

the general population. Especially in the eyes of opposition movements like the TPLF, EPLF, ELF and the Oromo Liberation Front and their supporters, the regime is still illegitimate.

What is perhaps more important, despite possessing one of Africa's largest armed forces (around 300,000), the Ethiopian regime does not have the military capacity to defeat opposition movements once and for all; nor does it have the economic capacity or political legitimacy that would be needed to undermine the popular bases of opposition decisively in areas not firmly controlled by the government. Ethiopia's new constitution, at least for now, enhances the regime's legitimacy only marginally. The coercive capacity of the state has been and will continue to be greatly expanded. However, force is no substitute for legitimacy, and so long as the "national question" is not resolved to the satisfaction of the main opposition movements, Ethiopia will remain a divided and troubled society. ■

UNITED STATES POLICY

(Continued from page 196)

United States companies are among the most progressive in the world and that their continued presence in South Africa is the best hope for change.

While Congress adopted a wait-and-see attitude with respect to the ultimate effectiveness of the 1986 Anti-Apartheid Act, the administration was quick to declare that sanctions legislation was ineffective after only a few months in place. Thus, when newly appointed United States Ambassador to South Africa Edward J. Perkins applauded United States sanctions and declared them "an unmitigated success" in June, the State Department quickly "clarified" his remarks by noting that Perkins was referring to the success of sanctions in conveying American contempt for apartheid and noted that Perkins had also said that it was too soon to tell whether sanctions would change apartheid. No one was surprised when the administration's first annual review of the Anti-Apartheid Act concluded in October that sanctions had not worked. However, instead of recommending further sanctions as the law suggested, the President called for "active and creative diplomacy," which some congressional critics interpreted as nothing more than constructive engagement by a different name.⁵

It is unclear to what extent United States Ambassador Edward Perkins's "active and creative diplomacy" in South Africa is in full concert with the administration

that appointed him. He received a stern warning from the South African government in December to stop interfering in the country's domestic affairs for writing:

I sense a growing realization that a valid political system here must be one that correlates with the demographics of the country, not merely black participation, or black cooperation, but a government which truly represents the majority of South Africans. Moreover, the majority must have a significant say in how that government is formed.⁶

In calling for black majority rule, Ambassador Perkins went further than any other Reagan administration official.

In 1987, South Africa shared the foreign policy spotlight with Mozambique, which was suddenly elevated by the right wing in the United States into the latest arena in the struggle against international communism. From the right-wing point of view, the Reagan administration was "selling out" by nurturing friendly relations with a Marxist government. From the administration's point of view, or more precisely, the view of the State Department, the strategy of offering more development and security to Mozambique than the Soviet Union would offer was a way to encourage Mozambique to turn away from Moscow. That process, according to the administration, began in 1982 and resulted in Mozambique's withholding support from the Soviet Union on certain sensitive United Nations votes, leading it to offer diplomatic assistance in negotiations between Namibia and Angola and to participate in the Nkomati peace accords with South Africa.⁷

A June, 1987, State Department policy paper stated that Mozambique had begun to reduce its political and economic dependence on Moscow and reach out to the West, thus reducing Soviet influence in southern Africa.⁸ Right-wing politicians, particularly those in the President's own party, like Senator Jesse Helms (R., N.C.), challenged that policy by advocating the recognition and support of the so-called Mozambique National Resistance, Renamo. Right-wingers portray Renamo guerrillas as anti-Communist freedom fighters, who deserve United States support under the Reagan Doctrine, which calls for support of insurgencies directed against Communist or leftist governments.

On the other hand, the United States government, its Western allies, and virtually all of independent Africa support the current government in Mozambique and portray Renamo very differently. Created in 1977 by the Rhodesian Secret Service and now allegedly a tool of the South African military, Renamo has no apparent ethnic or popular base in Mozambique and more often attacks civilians than military targets. Nevertheless, for Senator Helms it is apparently enough that Renamo is anti-Communist; Senate confirmation hearings for the new United States Ambassador-designate to Mozambique, Melissa Wells, gave Helms a forum to voice his disapproval of administration policy and generate support for Renamo.

⁵E.A. Wayne, "Congress Considers Boosting Sanctions Against South Africa," *Christian Science Monitor*, November 5, 1987.

⁶John D. Battersby, "U.S. Envoy is Urging Black Pretoria Rule, Minority Protection," *The New York Times*, December 9, 1987.

⁷J. Stephen Morrison, "The Battle for Mozambique," *Africa Report*, September-October, 1987, p. 44.

⁸United States State Department, "Mozambique: Charting a New Course," *Current Policy*, no. 980, June, 1987.

Of course, Senator Helms has used such opportunities to score ideological points in the past, but in holding Melissa Wells's confirmation hostage for 11 months, he put the White House in the uncomfortable position of having to battle the conservative wing of the Republican party. Helms's delaying tactics were successful in rallying some conservative Senate colleagues, including Senate Minority Leader Robert Dole (R., Kans.), who, as a presidential hopeful, apparently felt that support for Renamo might become a conservative litmus test.

So successful was the organized opposition for Renamo's propagandists and their supporters in Congress, the Defense Department, the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) and others that by midsummer the State Department's approach to Mozambique was in danger.⁹ The beginning of the end of opposition came on July 19 when Renamo guerrillas massacred nearly 400 men, women and children in a farming town in southern Mozambique. News of the incident, one of the most brutal episodes in the 10-year-old conflict, quickly reached Washington. All but the hard-core conservative support for Renamo disappeared, and in early September career foreign service officer Melissa Wells was finally confirmed as the new United States ambassador to Mozambique. The President had the final word in the battle between moderate and reactionary conservatives on United States foreign policy toward Mozambique; on a state visit to Washington in October, Mozambican President Joaquim Chissano was assured by President Reagan of continuing United States support.

As for Angola, the United States has become Angola's leading trading partner and Angola is the second largest United States trading partner in Africa (after Nigeria). Thus it is all the more remarkable that among the major Western powers only the United States refuses to recognize the Angolan government. Furthermore, the United States has provided millions of dollars in military aid (at least \$15 million in 1987) to the Union for the Total Independence of Angola (Unita), the antigovernment guerrilla movement that has undermined Angola's economy and national integration.

Antitank and anti-aircraft missiles and other weapons provided by the United States along with massive support from South Africa have counterbalanced pro-government Cuban and Soviet support, thus creating a stalemate in the 12-year-old civil war. United States support for Unita, is reportedly sent through Zaire, has contributed to an escalation of the war and to Angola's further dependence on Cuban troops and Soviet advisers. Assistant Secretary of State Chester Crocker's type of shuttle diplomacy to broker an agreement for the withdrawal of Cuban troops from Angola as a precondition for Namibian independence from South Africa

assumes a greater sense of urgency.

South Africa, however, seems more interested in destabilizing neighboring black states than in negotiating with them. The timing of South Africa's military incursion deep into Angola in July, 1987, only weeks after a high-level Angolan delegation visited the United States and United States State Department officials visited Angola, is highly suspect. Prospects for a diplomatic breakthrough remain poor, while the likelihood of a continuing military stalemate in Angola is good.

CONCLUSION

The assumption at the beginning of 1987 was that the Reagan administration's foreign policy agenda had been weakened by the political fallout from the Iran-contra scandal, infighting between the State Department and the National Security Council over their respective roles in the foreign policy-making process, and a major defeat at the hands of Congress over South African sanctions legislation. Six years of constructive engagement had produced no significant victories, and the administration was fast approaching lame-duck status. The President and his foreign policy advisers seemed to be directing their energies toward negotiating a major arms reductions treaty with the Soviet Union. The prognosis, therefore, was for a somewhat enfeebled policy toward Africa. In fact, in 1987, it was demonstrated once again that seemingly decisive action in Congress is not always the last word in policy disputes.

It appears that someone forgot to tell the Reagan administration that constructive engagement was dead:

Although the [United Nations Security Council] resolution was patterned after our own sanctions plan, the administration failed to support it and in doing so disregarded a section of the Anti-Apartheid Act urging the United States to propose South African sanctions patterned after the act at the U.N.¹⁰

The administration further circumvented implementation of the Anti-Apartheid Act through inaction and various loopholes and failed to convoke an international conference to consider further sanctions as the law requests.

The importance of purely domestic political considerations in the formation of United States foreign policy was reaffirmed in 1987. Senators Mitch McConnell (R.) and Wendell Ford (D.) of Kentucky, with assistance from Senator Richard G. Lugar (R.) of Indiana, for example, were able to arrange an exemption from the ban on the import of South African uranium, but not for ideological reasons. Rather, Senators McConnell and Ford, both of whom voted in favor of sanctions against South Africa in October, 1986, were concerned about the impact that the specific ban on uranium would have on 2,000 of their constituents, who are employed at the Department of Energy's uranium-processing plant in Paducah, Kentucky.

⁹Morrison, op. cit., p. 45.

¹⁰Paul Simon, "The Senate's New African Agenda," *Africa Report*, May-June, 1987, p. 14.

The prolonged debate over Melissa Wells's confirmation as United States ambassador to Mozambique had far less to do with her credentials than with conservative anger over the apparent contradiction between United States support for anti-Communist guerrillas in Angola and the administration's refusal to extend the so-called Reagan Doctrine to Mozambique. Indeed, at times Mozambique seemed to be lost in the debate between moderate and reactionary conservatives over territoriality and the appropriate way to contain communism.

Within the context of Africa as a policy area of peripheral concern, United States diplomacy in 1987 continued to concentrate on southern Africa, and paid the most attention to Soviet and American gains and losses. With few remaining months in power and a preoccupation with other world areas, the administration probably will make no significant changes in its policy toward Africa, nor will there be any major foreign policy breakthroughs. ■

BOOK REVIEWS

(Continued from page 222)

reserves, he claims, "South Africa acquired a power to determine what Britain would, or more usually, would not do concerning Southern Africa in general and Southern Rhodesia in particular which . . . was the biggest single if least readily appreciated element in the course of events between 1947 and 1980."

Verrier's view of the motives and relationships that influenced the history of the region is articulate and provocative. This book is important reading for anyone interested in southern Africa.

ANGOLA, MOZAMBIQUE AND THE WEST

Edited by Helen Kitchen. (New York: Center for Strategic and International Studies, Praeger, 1987. 168 pages and index, \$11.95, paper; \$34.95, cloth.)

Angola, Mozambique and the West is a volume in the Washington Papers series and is jointly published by Praeger Publishers and Georgetown University's Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS). The main contributors to *Angola, Mozambique and the West* are John Marcum, who offers an analysis of the roles of Unita (the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola) and the United States in Angola, and Gillian Gunn, who writes about Angola and Mozambique. An additional article, which covers the Soviet Union's ambivalence toward Mozambique and Africa, is contributed by Winrich Kühne. R.S.B.

QADDAFI AND THE LIBYAN REVOLUTION. *By David Blundy and Andrew Lycett.* (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1987. 240 pages and index, \$17.95.)

QADDAFI'S WORLD DESIGN: LIBYAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1969-1987. *By Ronald Bruce St. John* (London: Saki Books, 1987. 184 pages, notes, bibliography and index, \$35.00.)

When Libyan leader Colonel Muammar Qaddafi led the movement to overthrow Libya's monarchy in 1969, the totalitarian Libyan state became a major actor in the foreign relations of the nations of Africa and the Middle East. These latest entries in the collection of works about the controversial Qaddafi shed some light on the popular image of Qaddafi as a fanatic, madman and lunatic and on the aggressive approach of the Qaddafi regime to Libyan foreign policy.

Qaddafi and the Libyan Revolution is a biography of the Libyan leader that attempts to balance the paranoic and terrorist images of Qaddafi with a picture of Qaddafi as a dedicated political leader and a proponent of his own brand of revolutionary philosophy. The authors of this study spent time in Libya compiling information from interviews with "hundreds of people connected with Qaddafi." Unfortunately, like the present Libyan regime, *Qaddafi and the Libyan Revolution* is long on sensationalism but short on factual analysis. The authors focus on the more bizarre aspects of Qaddafi's personal life and popularity (drawing an analogy between Colonel Qaddafi and rock singer Mick Jagger). The titles of the book's chapters (Qaddafi Superstar, Terror Inc., and Murder in London, for example) are indicative of the authors' style.

On the other hand, *Qaddafi's World Design*, which is distributed in the United States by Humanities Press International, presents a more balanced coverage of the impact of Qaddafi on the African and Middle Eastern political scene and the failure of Libyan foreign policy. Political analyst Ronald Bruce St. John lived and worked in Libya for four years. His personal experiences and his expertise in Libyan affairs help St. John portray the long-term consequences of Qaddafi's erratic behavior for Libya within the framework of international relations. Says St. John, "it was the inflexibility of Qaddafi more than any other factor which was responsible for the singular lack of success of Libyan foreign policy." R.S.B.

ALSO RECEIVED

WAR AND REFUGEES: THE WESTERN SAHARA CONFLICT. *Edited by Richard Lawless and Laila Monahan.* (London and New York: Pinter Publishers, 1987. 201 pages and index, \$30.00, cloth.)

NORTH AFRICA: REGIONAL TENSIONS AND STRATEGIC CONCERNS. *By Richard B. Parker.* (New York: Praeger, 1987. 225 pages, bibliography and index, \$39.95.) ■

Erratum: We regret an error in the article by Mark N. Katz, "Soviet Policy in the Middle East," in our February, 1988, issue. Page 60, right column, lines 32-35 should read: "These states have paid little attention to Soviet claims that since the United States is the main source of tension in the gulf, it should withdraw its military forces."

THE MONTH IN REVIEW

A Current History chronology covering the most important events of March, 1988, to provide a day-by-day summary of world affairs.

INTERNATIONAL

Arms Control

(See *U.S., Foreign Policy*)

Central American Peace Plan

(See also *Nicaragua*)

March 4—Costa Rican President Oscar Arias Sánchez offers to send a representative to the peace talks between the Nicaraguan contras and the Sandinistas as a replacement for Miguel Cardinal Obando y Bravo. The Sandinistas have stated publicly that they no longer want Cardinal Obando y Bravo as mediator, while the contras say they will not continue talks unless the Cardinal is present.

March 8—The Sandinistas say they will not participate in the peace talks with the contras scheduled for March 9.

March 10—The contra leadership agrees to resume discussions with the Sandinistas. According to the latest terms, which were proposed by Nicaraguan President Daniel Ortega Saavedra, the talks will be held in Nicaragua, will follow an open agenda and will be observed by Cardinal Obando y Bravo and OAS (Organization of American States) President João Soares.

March 22—Sandinista government and contra leaders begin 3 days of negotiations, agreeing to a temporary truce in the fighting.

March 23—Both the contras and the Sandinistas offer versions of a cease-fire agreement at their negotiations in Sapoá, Nicaragua.

March 24—Nicaragua's Sandinista government and the contras say that they will extend the cease-fire they signed on March 21 for 60 days through May; the government agrees that some 3,000 anti-Sandinista prisoners will be freed in small groups; the government will allow freedom of expression, the return of exiles and free elections.

March 29—Nicaraguan and contra officials agree on the location of 5 cease-fire zones into which the contra forces will withdraw.

International Terrorism

(See *Germany, West; Lebanon; U.K., Great Britain, Northern Ireland*)

Iran-Iraq War

March 1—Iran and Iraq bombard each other's capital cities; heavy casualties are reported.

March 2—Iraq fires missiles into Iran's holy city of Qom; Iran responds with a counterattack on several Iraqi cities.

March 4—Iran and Iraq continue missile attacks for the 5th consecutive day.

March 6—U.S. surveillance helicopters are fired on; Iranian machine gunners in the Persian Gulf are suspected.

March 8—Iran and Iraq continue their missile attacks. Since February 29, Iraq has reported firing 43 missiles into Iran and Iran has reported firing 23 missiles into Baghdad, the Iraqi capital.

March 11—Iran and Iraq agree to halt the 12-day series of missile attacks on one another's cities.

March 13—Iraqi missiles hit Teheran during a supposed cessation in hostilities.

March 18—Iran accuses Iraq of using chemical weapons to quell an Iranian offensive in northern Iraq.

March 19—Iraq reports major attacks on Iran's Kharg Island oil production center; Iran reports missile attacks on Baghdad.

Iran and Iraq report heavy fighting between their armed forces on the central front.

March 21—An Iraqi air attack on Iran's Kharg Island oil terminal kills at least 54 crewmen on 2 Iranian supertankers; Iran responds with heavy artillery fire on the Iraqi city of Basra.

March 22—Iran attacks 2 neutral supertankers, killing 2 sailors; Iraq fires missiles into Iran and its jets raid 7 other cities.

March 23—Iran again charges that Iraq is using chemical weapons to repulse attacks by Kurdish rebel forces on Iraq's northern front.

March 24—As a result of missile attacks on Teheran and Baghdad, Iran reports that 10 people have been killed in Teheran; Iraq reports that 13 people have been killed by Iranian missiles in Baghdad.

March 27—Iran and Iraq continue fighting on the ground and in the air; Iran reports large gains on the northern military front.

Iranian gunboats set fire to 2 supertankers in the Persian Gulf; Iraq fires missiles into Qom, and its planes attack other Iranian targets.

March 30—Kuwait reports an attack by Iranian naval vessels on one of Kuwait's outpost islands in the Persian Gulf.

North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)

(See also *U.S., Foreign Policy*)

March 2—At a 2-day summit meeting, NATO calls on the Warsaw Pact to make huge reductions in its conventional arms stockpile.

March 3—U.S. President Ronald Reagan meets with NATO leaders; the meeting's final communiqué stresses the unity of the alliance.

United Nations (UN)

(See also *U.S.S.R.; U.S., Foreign Policy*)

March 1—Lebanese kidnappers release 2 Scandinavian UN Relief agency employees who were kidnapped a month ago in southern Lebanon.

March 2—143 nations of the General Assembly vote to submit the U.S. decision to close the PLO (Palestine Liberation Organization) mission office at the UN to the World Court.

March 8—The U.S. and Britain veto a Security Council resolution that would have imposed an oil embargo on South Africa.

March 23—The General Assembly adopts a resolution citing the U.S. for violating a 1947 agreement that prevents the closing of the PLO observer mission at the UN.

Warsaw Pact

(See *Intl, NATO*)

AFGHANISTAN

(See also *U.S.S.R.; U.S., Foreign Policy*)

March 9—Foreign Minister Abdul Wakil says that a peace settlement between Afghanistan and Pakistan is unlikely before March 15. The Soviet Union's General Secretary, Mikhail

Gorbachev, had set March 15 as the deadline for acceptance of his proposed May 15 starting date for the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan.

BANGLADESH

March 5—Results of the March 3 national election are announced; the ruling Jatiya party wins a large majority of the seats in Parliament. The elections were marred by violence and a boycott by opposition parties, who have been trying to force the resignation of President H.M. Ershad.

BOTSWANA

(See *South Africa*)

BRAZIL

March 22—By a 334-212 vote, Congress approves retention of the presidential system with a 5-year term for the President. Opponents of President José Sarney wanted to shorten the presidential term to 4 years.

BURMA

March 22—In Lashio, a massive fire kills 113 people and leaves 20,000 homeless; the death toll in the conflagration is the worst in the history of the nation.

CHINA

(See also *U.S., Foreign Policy*)

March 5—The New China News Agency reports that rioting occurred in the Tibetan capital of Lhasa at the close of today's Buddhist prayer festival. As many as 9 people may have died in the demonstration for Tibetan independence.

March 20—The New China News Agency reports that during a 5-day meeting of the Communist Party Central Committee, General Secretary Zhao Ziyang urged local leaders to engage in a process of "consultation and dialogue" with citizens.

March 28—Politburo member Song Ping announces that the government plans to reduce the central bureaucracy by 20 percent in order to promote efficiency; the plan, subject to approval by the National People's Congress, would be the most extensive economic reform program instituted by the government since its establishment in 1949.

COSTA RICA

(See *Intl, Central American Peace Plan*)

EL SALVADOR

March 5—Salvadoran and U.S. officials say that they suspect Christian Democratic party official Luis Mejía Miranda of misusing almost \$2 million in U.S. aid intended for relief of war-torn areas of El Salvador.

March 7—Christian Democratic officials deny charges of corruption, but announce the dismissal of Luis Mejía as a candidate in the March 20 elections.

March 21—In the March 20 national elections, President José Napoleon Duarte's Christian Democratic party receives fewer votes than expected and the rightist Republican Nationalist Alliance (Arena) party gains control of the national legislature.

FRANCE

March 22—President François Mitterrand announces his candidacy for a 2d term as President. Mitterrand will oppose Prime Minister Jacques Chirac and former Prime Minister Raymond Barre in the election in April, 1988.

GERMANY, WEST

March 3—West German citizen Ralph Schray, who was kidnapped on January 27 in Lebanon by a terrorist group led by

the brother of Mohammed Ali Hamadi and Abbas Hamadi, is freed from captivity. The group had detained Schray in the hope of forcing the release of the Hamadis, who are currently being tried on charges of terrorism in West Germany.

March 28—The government announces the arrest of 6 people on espionage charges; West Germany claims that the detainees are members of the K.G.B., the Soviet Union's secret service network.

HONDURAS

(See also *Nicaragua; U.S., Foreign Policy*)

March 16—Honduran government officials say that Nicaraguan military forces have not crossed the border into Honduras and that Honduran military forces have not been engaged in hostilities.

March 18—President José Azcona Hoyo confirms that he asked the U.S. government to send 3,000 infantry troops to Honduras.

March 19—Honduran government officials state that between 1,500 and 2,000 Nicaraguan troops have crossed the border into Honduras in pursuit of the contras.

March 21—According to government officials, the Sandinista troops that entered Honduras last week have returned to Nicaragua.

HUNGARY

March 15—A crowd of 10,000 people stage an open protest in Budapest after 8 opposition leaders are arrested by police. The protest is the largest antigovernment public demonstration in Hungary since the 1956 uprising.

INDIA

March 15—Approximately 3,000 people are arrested during a nationwide 1-day strike called by India's 2 major Communist parties to show dissatisfaction with the government of Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi; over 23,000 people have been detained since a series of strikes began on March 12.

INDONESIA

March 10—Suharto is reelected to a 5th term as President; Suharto was the only candidate in the election.

March 11—State Secretary Sudharmono is elected by acclamation as Vice President; Sudharmono's candidacy had been contested by Jailani Naro of the United Development party, but Naro withdrew his opposition at the last moment.

IRAN

(See *Intl, Iran-Iraq War; U.S.S.R.*)

IRAQ

(See *Intl, Iran-Iraq War; U.S.S.R.*)

ISRAEL

(See also *U.S., Foreign Policy*)

March 4—The Israeli army denies journalists access to the occupied territories of the West Bank. Recent press coverage of police beatings of Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza Strip have provoked criticism in Israel and abroad.

March 6—Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir obstructs an effort by Foreign Minister Shimon Peres and the Labor party to force a Cabinet vote on the peace plan advanced by U.S. Secretary of State George Shultz.

Israeli soldiers kill 2 Palestinian protesters in disturbances in the occupied territories. In addition, a Palestinian wounded on February 4 dies of his injuries. The unofficial death toll in the violence that started in December, 1987, stands at 82.

March 7—Three guerrillas, members of Yasir Arafat's Al Fatah branch of the PLO, commandeer a commuter bus in

southern Israel and hold 11 people hostage. After the terrorists shoot 1 hostage dead, police launch an attack on the bus, in which the 3 terrorists and 2 female hostages are killed.

March 11—In a newspaper interview, Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir states that the Middle East peace plan proposed by the U.S. "harbors grave danger for the future of Israel."

March 13—Approximately 50 percent of the Palestinians employed as members of the police forces in the West Bank and Gaza Strip resign from duty.

March 14—Arriving in Washington, D.C., for the start of a 4-day visit to the U.S., Prime Minister Shamir says that the disturbances in the occupied territories are "aimed against the existence of Israel."

Authorities in the Gaza Strip impose a nighttime curfew on the region because of the resignation of the Palestinian policemen.

March 17—A PLO base in Lebanon is destroyed by Israeli warplanes; Lebanese officials say that 1 PLO guerrilla died in the attack.

March 20—Israeli soldier Moshe Karz is shot at his guard post in Bethlehem and dies from his wounds later in the day. Karz becomes the first Israeli fatality in the ongoing violence in the occupied territories, which has claimed 100 Palestinian lives in the last 3 months.

March 23—Israeli soldiers conduct a series of mass arrests in the occupied territories; Arab press sources say that 500 Palestinians have been detained.

The Israeli Air Force attacks PLO and Sunni Muslim bases near Sidon in Lebanon. Military officials claim that the bases are guerrilla arms depots.

March 24—The 90-day closed trial of nuclear technician Mordechai Vanunu ends when he is found guilty on charges of treason and espionage by a 3-judge court; the Israeli secret service abducted Vanunu from a London hotel on September 30, 1986, after he sold information about Israel's nuclear program to a British newspaper.

March 27—Vanunu is sentenced to 18 years in prison; the prosecution requested a life sentence.

During Israeli army raids to arrest suspected Palestinian leaders of the disturbances in the occupied territories, 4 Palestinians are killed.

March 28—The Israeli army announces that it is closing off the occupied territories until March 30; the action will ban journalists from the region and restrict Palestinians from traveling throughout the country.

March 30—During protests marking the Palestinian observance of Land Day, 4 Palestinians are killed in clashes with Israeli forces.

March 31—Talking to reporters in the West Bank, Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir says that violent Palestinian protesters will be crushed "like grasshoppers."

JAPAN

(See *U.S., Foreign Policy*)

JORDAN

(See *U.S., Foreign Policy*)

KOREA, SOUTH

March 9—Opposition leader Kim Dae Jung says that the proposed merger of South Korea's 2 main opposition parties will not occur before this spring's parliamentary elections.

March 17—In a surprise announcement, Kim Dae Jung resigns as president of the Peace and Democracy party. Park Young Sook is named as acting president.

March 20—Reunification Democratic party officials announce that merger talks with the Peace and Democracy party have been called off; members of both parties were involved in a

violent confrontation on March 19 in the lobby of the hotel where the talks were taking place.

LEBANON

(See also *Intl, UN; Germany, West; Israel*)

March 1—The Organization of the Oppressed on Earth, the pro-Iranian group that abducted U.S. Marine Lieutenant Colonel William Higgins on February 17, says it will put Colonel Higgins on trial for espionage.

The UN announces that 2 of its relief agency workers, who were kidnapped on February 5 by guerrillas belonging to the Revolutionary Cells terrorist group, have been released from captivity.

NICARAGUA

(See also *Intl, Central American Peace Plan; Honduras; U.S., Foreign Policy, Legislation*)

March 15—President Ortega announces that the government has begun a major offensive against contra forces in northern Nicaragua.

The U.S. government claims that the Sandinistas have sent military forces into Honduras in pursuit of the contras.

March 16—In a nationally broadcast speech, President Ortega denies that Nicaraguan soldiers have entered Honduras to destroy contra bases of operation.

March 21—Direct negotiations between the contras and the Sandinistas open in Sapoá, Nicaragua. Leaders from both sides say that they will observe a truce during the 3 days of negotiations.

March 27—The government releases 100 prisoners as part of the cease-fire agreement reached on March 23.

PAKISTAN

(See *Afghanistan; U.S.S.R.*)

PANAMA

(See also *U.S., Foreign Policy*)

March 1—In hiding, deposed President Eric Delvalle announces that he has set up an escrow account for the receipt of funds from foreign banks that are owed to the Panamanian government; foreign banks have been withholding payments because of the legitimacy crisis in Panama between Delvalle and the nation's de facto leader, General Manuel Antonio Noriega.

March 4—The government orders the shutdown of all banks in Panama in order to avoid a run on deposits by creditors. This action is triggered by the March 3 announcement by the National Bank that it was unable to supply local banks with funds.

March 14—Police clash with public employees in Panama City after the government's March 11 announcement that it lacks the funds to meet its \$33-million weekly payroll obligation.

March 16—Military forces put down a coup attempt against General Manuel Noriega; news of the failed coup, which was led by a group of middle-level army officers, provokes widespread public disturbances.

March 17—The military takes control of the nation's public utilities after electricity and water are cut off by disgruntled workers.

A dusk-to-dawn curfew is imposed in Colón, the 2d largest city in Panama.

March 18—The government announces that it will suspend some constitutional rights, including the right of habeas corpus, if public disturbances do not abate.

March 19—General Noriega turns down a U.S. offer that would have allowed him to leave Panama to live in exile. In exchange, the U.S. government would not have sought his extradition on criminal charges.

March 21—In a nationally televised speech, Manuel Solís Palma, who was named as President on February 26 by General Noriega, says Noriega would be willing to relinquish power by the May, 1989, presidential elections if his opponents enter into direct negotiations with the present regime.

The National Civic Crusade, a coalition of 200 business and civic organizations, begins a nationwide general strike.

March 25—Because of a lack of cash, the government defers distributing paychecks to the military until April 1.

March 27—The government announces that it will sell 1.3 million pounds of flour for cash on the open market. Military troops seized the flour on March 26 when they occupied Panama's 2 largest mills.

March 28—After a demonstration by the National Civic Crusade, soldiers raid a luxury hotel and arrest 12 journalists, including 5 U.S. citizens.

March 30—Support for the 10-day-old general strike called by the National Civic Crusade wanes as supermarkets reopen and longshoremen return to work.

PHILIPPINES

March 20—In a radio interview, President Corazon Aquino says that she will not seek reelection in 1992.

SAUDI ARABIA

(See U.S., *Foreign Policy*)

SOUTH AFRICA

(See also *Intl*, *UN*)

March 1—The government proposes a bill to Parliament that will ban foreign funding of political groups if the funding could "endanger public safety."

March 17—A Supreme Court judge orders a 1-month stay of execution for the Sharpeville Six, a group of 5 black men and 1 black woman convicted of the 1984 murder of a black township official. The group was scheduled for execution today.

March 21—At least 1,000,000 black workers stage a 1-day nationwide strike to commemorate the anniversary of the 1960 Sharpeville Massacre.

March 22—The government prohibits publication of the leading antiapartheid weekly periodical, *New Nation*, for a 3-month period.

March 28—South African soldiers attack a house in Botswana and kill 4 people after an hour-long gun battle. The South African government claims that the 4 people were members of the African National Congress.

SRI LANKA

March 3—Officials say that Tamil rebels attacked the village of Trincomalee today, killing 16 people.

March 11—Unidentified gunmen ambush a passenger bus in northern Sri Lanka. At least 17 people, mostly Tamils, die in the attack.

TAIWAN

(See U.S., *Foreign Policy*)

U.S.S.R.

(See also *Afghanistan*; *Germany, West*; U.S., *Foreign Policy*)

March 1—The government reports that military forces were dispatched to the city of Sumgait in Azerbaijan on February 28 to control rioting between Armenians and Azerbaijanis, and that a nighttime curfew was instituted.

March 2—A government spokesman says that several people died in the riot in Sumgait on February 28; unofficial sources in Moscow say at least 17 people died.

March 6—The news agency Tass reports that the Soviet Union's embassy in Iran has been attacked by demonstrators; the crowd was upset by reports in the Iranian press that the Soviet Union was supplying missiles to Iraq.

March 10—Officials say that 9 people died in the attempted hijacking of a Soviet airliner flying from Irkutsk to Leningrad; 5 of the hijackers, members of a family of jazz musicians, were among those killed when government troops assaulted the plane in Leningrad.

March 15—The Soviet Union postpones its scheduled May 15 troops withdrawal from Afghanistan because a peace agreement has not been reached at the UN-sponsored Geneva negotiations. The government blames the U.S. and Pakistan for the impasse.

March 17—The Foreign Ministry declares that the Soviet Union will remove its forces from Afghanistan "in some other way" if the negotiations in Geneva are not successful.

March 23—In a resolution approved by the Presidium, Armenians are warned that "every available measure" will be taken to prevent large-scale ethnic protests in support of the annexation of the Nagorno-Karabakh region. The Presidium's action is a response to calls by leaders of the recent disturbances for a mass demonstration on March 26.

March 24—Armenian nationalist leaders call off the mass protest that was scheduled to take place on March 26 in Yerevan, the capital of Armenia.

March 28—The government newspaper *Izvestia* says that a work stoppage at factories, railroads, and schools in Stepanakert, the capital of the Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Region, has brought economic activities to a halt in the region. However, *Izvestia* does not reveal when the strike began.

UNITED KINGDOM

Great Britain

(See also *Israel*; *U.K.*, *Northern Ireland*)

March 6—In the British crown colony of Gibraltar, undercover British antiterrorist agents shoot and kill 3 unarmed members of the Irish Republican Army (IRA). The government says that a large bomb was found in a car left behind by the terrorists and that the car was parked near a parade ground.

March 7—Foreign Secretary Geoffrey Howe says that the car found in Gibraltar, which belonged to the dead IRA members, did not contain a bomb after all. However, he adds that Spanish police discovered bomb-making materials in a car rented by the IRA terrorists and claims that the terrorists had planned to detonate a large bomb during a military parade scheduled to occur in Gibraltar on March 8.

Northern Ireland

(See also *U.K.*, *Great Britain*)

March 6—The IRA admits that 3 of its members killed today in Gibraltar were in an "active service unit" and that they died while "in active service."

March 14—The leaders of the Ulster Defense Association dismiss the organization's longtime head, Andy Tyrie; no replacement is named.

March 16—In Belfast, the funeral of the 3 IRA members killed on March 6 in Gibraltar is interrupted when an assailant throws handgrenades and fires an automatic weapon into the crowd at the graveside service; 3 mourners are killed in the attack.

March 19—At the funeral of one of the mourners slain in Belfast on March 16, 2 armed undercover British soldiers drive into the funeral procession; after attempting to flee, the soldiers are seized and beaten by the mob and then killed by unidentified assailants.

UNITED STATES

Administration

(See also *U.S., Foreign Policy, Political Scandal, Science and Space*)

March 3—In Boston, U.S. District Court Judge Walter Skinner issues a nationwide injunction that bars Secretary of Health and Human Services Otis Bowen from cutting off federal funds to family-planning clinics that provide assistance to women seeking abortions.

March 17—The Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) says it will provide \$1 billion in aid for relief to Texas First Republic Bank, to restore its cash flow.

March 22—The U.S. Postal Service announces that the cost of mailing a 1st class letter will rise to 25 cents on April 3; other rates will also rise at that time.

Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) head Lee Thomas says that the EPA will not use experimental data on the effects of phosgene gas on humans, since the data was obtained from experiments by Nazi doctors in World War II on prisoners of war.

Economy

March 1—The Commerce Department revises its index of leading economic indicators for December, 1987, to show a gain of 0.3 percent instead of a decline of 0.2 percent. In January, the index fell 0.6 percent.

March 2—A drop of 9 percent in the sale of single family homes in January is reported by the Commerce Department; the decline is the largest in over 5 years.

March 4—The Labor Department reports that the nation's unemployment rate fell to 5.6 percent in February.

March 11—The Labor Department reports that the producer price index fell 0.2 percent in February.

March 17—The Commerce Department reports that the nation's foreign trade deficit increased slightly, to \$12.4 billion, in January.

March 23—The Labor Department says that its consumer price index rose 0.2 percent in February.

March 24—The Federal Home Loan Bank Board reports that the country's 3,147 savings and loan associations lost a record net of \$6.8 billion in 1987 compared to a small \$132-million profit in 1986; the greatest losses came from the Texas associations.

March 29—The Commerce Department reports that its index of leading economic indicators rose 0.9 percent in February.

Foreign Policy

(See also *Intl, Iran-Iraq War, NATO, UN; El Salvador; Honduras; Israel; Lebanon; Nicaragua; Panama*)

March 1—The State Department says that the U.S. supports deposed Panamanian President Eric Arturo Delvalle's proclamation freezing Panamanian assets outside Panama.

Secretary of State George Shultz ends his Middle East visit and stops in Brussels for the 2-day NATO summit.

March 2—The State Department releases documents in which it advises banks holding Panamanian assets (amounting to about \$50 million) not to disburse the funds.

Chief of the Customs Service William von Raab announces that his agents will seize the passports of Americans who reenter the country with illegal drugs.

President Ronald Reagan meets with NATO leaders in Brussels.

March 4—The State Department says that the U.S. will not halt aid to the Afghan rebels unless the Soviet Union halts military supplies to the Soviet-supported Afghan government.

March 5—In a letter to Secretary of State Shultz, 30 Senators criticize Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir and Israeli

political parties supporting Shamir. The Senators suggest that Shamir and his supporters are obstructing the Middle East peace process.

Shultz returns to Washington, D.C., after a generally unsuccessful Middle East trip.

March 9—In a letter to Prime Minister Shamir and to Jordan's King Hussein, Shultz states that the object of his peace plan for the Middle East is "a comprehensive peace providing for the security of all the states in the region and the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people."

Shamir responds to the letter from the 30 U.S. Senators by expressing his surprise at the tone of the letter from Israel's friends.

March 11—President Reagan announces that among other steps, the U.S. will withhold some \$7 million in Panama Canal dues that were scheduled to be paid next week; the U.S. will also suspend trade preferences worth \$96 million a year to Panama.

The Reagan administration will close the PLO office in the UN legally unless the PLO acts to close its office within 10 days, according to the Justice Department.

March 15—The State Department refuses to withdraw public affairs officer Terrence Kneebone from its Panama Embassy because the order for his withdrawal was issued by the Noriega regime in Panama, a regime not recognized by the U.S.

March 16—Defense Secretary Frank Carlucci confers in Moscow with Soviet Defense Minister General Dmitri Yazov.

The White House announces that 3,200 men of the 82d Airborne Division will be sent to Honduras on a training exercise because of what the administration calls the invasion of Honduras by Nicaraguan forces.

President Reagan says that the U.S. will continue to pursue its Middle East peace plan despite President Reagan's apparently fruitless meeting with Shamir in Washington, D.C.

March 17—U.S. forces arrive in Honduras.

Defense Secretary Carlucci ends 3 days of talks with Soviet Defense Minister Yazov; Carlucci says that their discussions "built bridges."

Prime Minister Shamir returns to Israel after 4 days of discussions in Washington, D.C., that ended in virtual failure.

March 18—U.S. Ambassador to Honduras Everett Briggs and Honduran President José Azcona Hoyo say that Honduras asked the U.S. to send troops to Honduras.

March 19—The State Department says that Panama's de facto leader, General Manuel Noriega, has refused to leave Panama in exchange for the dropping of extradition charges against him pending in the U.S. because of Noriega's alleged drug-trafficking; Noriega indicates that he intends to remain in Panama and to choose his own successor.

March 20—Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze arrives in Washington, D.C., for high-level talks on Afghanistan, the Middle East and arms control.

A U.S. force of 750 troops moves within 15 miles of the Nicaraguan-Honduran border in a show of strength designed to force Nicaraguan troops from Honduras.

March 21—Shultz and Shevardnadze begin 3 days of talks in Washington, D.C.; the talks are expected to focus on arms control issues.

March 22—At the insistence of the U.S., the government of Taiwan halts work on a secret plant capable of producing weapons-grade plutonium.

The Justice Department sues in U.S. District Court to force the PLO to shut its observer mission at the UN; the department says that the activities of the PLO violate the terms of the Anti-Terrorism Act adopted by Congress in 1987.

March 23—President Reagan announces that he will go to Moscow from May 29 to June 2 for a summit meeting with

Soviet General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev; President Reagan adds that he hopes to negotiate and sign an accord on the reduction of long-range strategic nuclear weapons.

March 25—President Reagan tells reporters that he hopes Israel is "not considering" any military action against the medium-range ballistic missiles Saudi Arabia has recently purchased from China.

March 26—The State Department announces that Secretary Shultz will return to the Middle East April 3 to resume his efforts to secure peace in the region.

March 28—U.S. forces begin their withdrawal from Honduras.

March 29—Japanese and U.S. commerce officials complete a trade agreement that will open the construction market in Japan to U.S. builders.

The U.S. warns Panama that "there are limits to its patience"; the warning is a response to the seizure of U.S. journalists by the Panamanian military on March 28.

Legislation

March 2—The House votes 315 to 98 to approve the Civil Rights Restoration Act, which reverses a 1984 Supreme Court ruling that allowed the federal government to withhold federal funds from specific programs practicing sex discrimination policies, instead of penalizing the schools. Under the terms of the new act, entire educational institutions would be liable to suffer the withdrawal of federal funds.

March 3—The House votes 216 to 208 to defeat a measure providing \$30.8 million in humanitarian aid to the Nicaraguan contras; the plan was put forward by the Democratic leadership of the House.

March 22—The House votes 292 to 133 and the Senate votes 73 to 24 to override President Reagan's veto of the Civil Rights Restoration Act.

March 30—By a 345-70 vote, the House approves a \$47.9-million appropriation for humanitarian aid for the Nicaraguan contras.

March 31—The Senate votes 87 to 7 to approve the contra aid package passed by the House on March 30.

Political Scandal

March 11—Former National Security Adviser Robert McFarlane pleads guilty to 4 misdemeanor counts of withholding information from Congress during the hearings on the Iran-contra arms-money deal.

March 16—Lieutenant Colonel Oliver North (former National Security Council aide), Rear Admiral (Ret.) John Poindexter (the former National Security Adviser), retired Major General Richard Secord and businessman Albert Hakim are indicted by a U.S. grand jury in Washington, D.C., on conspiracy charges growing out of the Iran-contra affair.

March 18—Lieutenant Colonel North resigns his U.S. Marine Corps commission, saying that his defense in the Iran-contra deal might require him to ask for "testimony and records from the highest-ranking officials of our government" and that he needs to be free from active duty to defend himself.

March 24—North, Poindexter, Secord and Hakim plead not guilty to the charges brought against them.

March 25—Speaking to a small conference at the White House, President Reagan says he does not believe the defendants in the Iran-contra arms deal are guilty of breaking any laws; he believes they are not guilty; he also reiterates that he still thinks North is a "national hero."

March 29—Deputy Attorney General Arnold Burns, Assistant Attorney General William Weld and 4 of their aides resign from the Justice Department. Their resignations are believed to be linked to the legal problems faced by Attorney General Edwin Meese 3d.

Politics

March 1—Massachusetts Governor Michael Dukakis wins the Vermont Democratic primary, defeating activist Jesse Jackson; Vice President George Bush defeats Senator Robert Dole (R., Kans.) in the Republican primary.

March 8—In the Republican "Super Tuesday" primaries and caucuses, Vice President George Bush outdistances Senator Robert Dole and religious leader Pat Robertson in 17 states. Bush wins 577 delegates, compared to 98 for Dole and 9 for Robertson.

In the Democratic "Super Tuesday" primaries and caucuses, Michael Dukakis wins 382 delegates; Jesse Jackson wins 370 delegates; and Tennessee Senator Albert Gore wins 323 delegates.

March 10—Representative Jack Kemp (R., N.Y.) withdraws from the Republican presidential race.

March 11—Former Colorado Senator Gary Hart withdraws from the Democratic presidential race.

March 15—In yesterday's Illinois primaries, George Bush defeats Robert Dole by a large majority; Illinois Senator Paul Simon wins the Democratic primary, defeating Jesse Jackson and Michael Dukakis.

March 18—Michael Dukakis places first in the Democratic caucuses in Kansas.

March 26—In Democratic caucuses in Michigan, Jackson defeats Dukakis with 55 percent of the vote. Dukakis places first in North Dakota.

March 28—Representative Richard Gephardt (D., Mo.) withdraws as a contender for the Democratic presidential nomination.

March 29—Senator Robert Dole announces that he is withdrawing his candidacy for the Republican presidential nomination.

Michael Dukakis defeats Jesse Jackson in the Democratic Connecticut primary, while George Bush wins the Republican Connecticut primary.

Science and Space

March 7—The Justice Department releases documents showing the payment by the U.S. government and space shuttle manufacturer Morton Thiokol of long-term, tax-free annuities worth some \$7.7 million to the families of 4 of the 7 astronauts killed in the *Challenger* shuttle disaster.

March 15—In a study released today, the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) says that the condition of the earth's ozone layer over the Northern Hemisphere has deteriorated seriously over the last 2 decades.

Supreme Court

March 7—In a 2-part decision, the Court rules 6 to 0 that preliminary information regarding corporate mergers is "material" and may not be concealed from the public before an "agreement in principle" has been reached; the 2d part of the decision is a 4-2 ruling in which the Court makes it easier for shareholders to bring so-called "fraud-in-the-market" class action suits against a corporation.

The Court begins a 2-week recess.

March 23—In a 5-3 ruling, the Court reverses a 1986 lower court decision and upholds federal regulations denying food stamps to strikers unless the strikers are already receiving stamps.

VATICAN

March 5—The Vatican releases its budget and projects a record budget deficit of \$61.8 million.

VIETNAM

March 10—Prime Minister Pham Hung dies of a heart attack in Ho Chi Minh City at the age of 75. ■



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